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Synopsis 
This dissertation proposes to examine the organs of the Company and its officers as its agents 
in company contracts. It will also examine the law in England and Australia pertaining to the 
said subject and recommend whether Malaysia should be prompted to adopt the statutory 
reforms of these countries. 
It is generally said that the human agency through which the capacity of the company can 
operate or manage and conduct itself lies either in the shareholders acting together in general 
meeting or the board of directors, the two principal organs of the company. Both these organs 
have an organic quality of their own and in theory they can exercise all the powers of the 
This dissertation will firstly look into the various powers of this organs, the source of their 
company under its memorandum or articles and those conferred to it by statute. However, 
there is a legal as well as a commercial necessity to divide the powers of the company 
between these two organs. 
powers and the autonomous characteristics of these organs in Malaysia , England and 
Australia. 
The dissertation will then go on to discuss the issue that in practice, outsiders rarely deal with 
the board of directors or the members in general meeting. More often, their relationship with 
the company involves dealing with the agents or employees of the company. Companies are 
capable of being bound by the acts of its agents in the same way as natural persons: s.35(4) 
of the om panics Act l 965(hcrcinaficr refcn d to a 'the Act'). This involve the application 
of the principles of a, ncy law, in particular the question whether tho who puq 011 to 
on the company's behalf have the authority to do so. Agency law has several distinct features 
in its application to companies and in particular is the doctrine of ultra vires. 
The study will critically examine the legal capacity and competence of the company as 
limited by the law. The Act requires a company to state in the memorandum of association 
the objects of the company. Section 18(1) of the Act sets out the minimum content 
requirement of the memorandum of association. Amongst others, the memorandum of 
association was required to contain an objects clause that specifies the range of activities the 
company was permitted to engage in. The objects clause was regarded as important from the 
point of view of the company's shareholders and creditors. They were entitled to expect that 
the money they invested or lent to the company would be applied in carrying the business 
listed in the objects clause. The importance of the objects clause was reinforced by the 
common law doctrine of ultra vires. The doctrine provided that any contract made by the 
company that was not in furtherance of a transaction specified in the objects clause was void. 
The dissertation will then go on to discuss the fact that role of the ultra vires doctrine as 
explained by the judges, was to prevent insidious enlargement of a company's capacity as a 
result of indiscriminate exercises of powers for purposes that are neither ancillary or 
reasonably incidental to the pursuit of authorised objects by rejecting such exercise of powers 
as being null and void Although this may result in a very harsh treatment of an outsider who 
is a bona fide purchaser dealing with the company in good faith without notice, this remains 
necessary if the whole rationale of th ultra vires doctrine i. to be pr . ervcd. Further th 
disscnauon will analys th' common law and statutory developrn nt of thi doctrine nd a 
comp uison will be made with the .. n lish nd Australian position. 
II 
This dissertation will also examine the point that a company may enter into a contract 
indirectly through an agent. The agent may be an officer or employee of the company. 
Whether a company will be liable under a contract for the acts of an officer or agent is 
governed under the general law of agency. These agency principles have been modified by 
the common law and the Act so as to recognise the abstract nature of companies. 
This dissertation will then discuss the fact that whenever there is a delegation of power to an 
agent, that agent is given some sort of authority by the principal. This authority is the actual 
authority of the agent. This authority may be express or implied authority. Express authority 
is that which is expressly conferred upon the agent. Implied authority is not expressly stated; 
it is authority implied by the circumstances. This may be of two forms: authority to do things 
incidental to matters that the agent is expressly authorised to do so, and authority to do things 
that a person in that position usually does. This type of implied authority is sometimes known 
as "customary" or "usual" authority. This dissertation will look into the various authorities 
given to the agents. 
Further, the dissertation will discuss the fact that sometimes the authority of an agent to do 
certain acts depends on compliance with certain formalities or there is some irregularity in 
the management which vitiates the authority conferred upon the agent which a party outside 
the company has no way of determining whether the company's internal regulations have 
been complied with. However, the law does not require an outside party to do so. If an agent 
has an apparent authority to do an act, a person dealing with the company i cntitl d to 
assume that all mallets of internal management and proc dur pre cribed b the rticle of 
association have been ompli d with. Thi. is known as th "rul in Turquand's c . 0c1 th 
"indour mana ement 1 ul ''. 
Ill 
The dissertation will examine the rule in Turquand's case and its' exceptions as it is applied 
in Malaysia and the common law as it has been codified in England . 
However, the Rule has been criticised because of uncertainty which has arisen from a large 
body of case law. 
As a consequence, in Australia, the common law principles discussed above have been now 
been replaced by statutory provisions. The principles are now. contained in ss. 164 to 166 of 
the Corporations Law l 990(herein after referred to as the 'Corporation Law'). These 
provisions are based around six protective assumptions set out in s.164(3) of the Corporation 
Law and are subject to the limitations in s.164 ( 4). The Australian provisions are an attempt 
to make a comprehensive reform of the unsatisfactory judge-made law on the subject of this 
dissertation. The dissertation will critically examine these statutory provisions in detail and 
also consider the extent to which the statutory provisions in Australia could be adopted m 
Malaysia. 
In conclusion, it is stated that in Malaysia the Rule in Turquand's case reigns supreme 
together with its obscurities and inadequacies. Whether the Malaysian legislatures may be 
prompted or be tempted to venture into a statutory reform like in Australia or as in England 
remains to be seen. For the time being in Malaysia the subject of this dissertation continues 
to be regulated by common law, which to an Australian or English observer, may look a little 
out of date. Finally, it is stated that while reform is welcome and necessary, a bland 
automatic adoption of foreign legi lation may not b to Malaysia's advantag . are must b 
tak n to ensure that we do not import foreign I gi lation with all their deficiencies. 
It is hoped that this dissertation serves to clarify the position of the organs and officers of a 
company and their relationship with the outsider to an appreciable extent. 
Discussion and study relating to the relevant law and cases cover the period up to December 
1997. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The separate legal personality of a company was firmly established at common law in the 
case of Salomon v A Salomon and Co. Ltd' . A direct consequence of the incorporation of 
a company is that the company has a legal personality of its own which is distinct from 
its corporators. This means that the company has its own legal capacity to enjoy rights, 
assume obligations and incur liabilities and perform duties independently of the 
corporators. However, as a corporation is an artificial person, its capacity can only 
operate through some human agency; it has no mind of its own any more than it has a 
body of its own. 
The human agency through which the capacity of the company can operate or manage 
and conduct itself lies either in the shareholders acting together in general meeting or the 
board of directors, the two principal organs of the company. Both these organs have an 
organic quality of their own and in theory they can exercise all the powers of the 
company under its memorandum or articles and those conferred to it by statute. However, 
there is a legal as well as a commercial necessity to divide the powers of the company 
between these two organs. The first chapter of this thesis will look into the various 
powers of this organs, the source of their powers and the autonomous characteristics of 
these organs in Malaysia , England and Australia. 
In practice, outsiders rarely deal with the board of directors or the members in a general 
meeting. More often, its relationship with the company involves dealing with its agents or 
employees. Companies are capable of being bound by the acts of its agents in the same 
1 118971 AC 22 I louse Of Lords 
way as natural persons: s.35(4) of the Companies Act 1965(hereinafter referred to as 'the 
Act'). This involves the application of the principles of agency law, in particular the 
question whether those who purport to act on the company's behalf have the authority to 
do so. Agency law has several distinct features in its application to companies and in 
particular is the doctrine of ultra vi res. 
However, it must be stated that an individual has the natural legal power to enter into any 
binding contractual relationship. In contrast, companies have to be endowed with these 
capabilities and powers by the law. It follows that unlike an individual, a company may 
only legitimately exercise powers that have been endowed by law. 
A company's legal capacity and competence is thus limited because the Act requires a 
company to state in the memorandum of association the objects of the company. Section 
18(1) of the Act sets out the minimum content requirement of the memorandum of 
association. Amongst others, the memorandum of association was required to contain an 
objects clause that specifies the range of activities the company was permitted to engage 
in. The objects clause was regarded as important from the point of view of the company's 
shareholders and creditors. They were entitled to expect that the money they invested or 
lent to the company would be applied in carrying the business listed in the objects clause. 
The importance of the objects clause was reinforced by the common law doctrine of ultra 
vires. The doctrine provided that any contract made by the company that was not in 
furtherance of a transaction specified in the objects clause was void. 
The role of the ultra vires doctrine as explained by the judges was to prevent insidious 
enlargement of a company's capacity as a result of indiscriminate exercise of powers for 
purposes that are neither ancillary or rca onably incid ntal to the pur uit of authori cd 
2 
objects by rejecting such exercise of powers as being null and void. Although this may 
result in very harsh treatment to an outsider who is a bona fide purchaser dealing with the 
company in good faith without notice, this remains necessary if the whole rationale of the 
ultra vires doctrine is to be preserved. The common law and statutory development of 
this doctrine will be explored in Chapter 2 of this thesis and a comparison will be made 
with the English and Australian position. 
As stated earlier, a company is an abstract entity, and it can only enter into contracts 
through the actions of a natural person. Section 3 5 ( 4) of the Act provides that so far as 
the of making a contract is concerned, a person acting under the express or implied 
authority of a company, may make a contract in the name of or on behalf of the company 
in the same manner as if that contract were made by a natural person. This indicates that a 
company may enter into a contract directly through one of its organs, usually the board of 
directors, or through a person who represents the mind and will of the company. This 
type of situation is governed under the organic theory of company law which largely lies 
outside the law of agency but draws upon it. 
A company may also enter into a contract indirectly through an agent. The agent may be 
an officer or employee of the company. Whether a company will be liable under a 
contract for the acts of an officer or agent is governed under the general law of agency. 
These agency principles have been modified by the common law and the Act so as to 
recognise the abstract nature of companies. The agency rules which are applicable to 
companies are subject to the common law rules and to the doctrine of constructive notice 
and a special set of principles known as the "rule in Turquand's case"2 and its exceptions. 
Whenever there is a delegation of power to an agent, that agent is given some sort of 
authority by the principal. This authority is the actual authority of the agent. This 
authority may be express or implied authority. Express authority is that which is 
expressly conferred upon the agent. Implied authority is not expressly stated; it is 
authority implied by the circumstances. This may be of two forms: authority to do things 
incidental to matters that the agent is expressly authorised to do so,3 and authority to do 
things that a person in that position usually does." This type of implied authority is 
sometimes known as "customary" or "usual" authority. Chapter 3 will look into the 
various authorities given to the agents. 
Sometimes the authority of an agent to do certain acts depends on compliance with 
certain formalities or there is some irregularity in the management which vitiates the 
authority conferred upon the agent. A party outside the company has no way of 
determining whether the company's internal regulations have been complied with. 
However, the law does not require an outside party to do so. If an agent has an apparent 
authority to do an act, a person dealing with the company is entitled to assume that all 
matters of internal management and procedures prescribed by the articles of association 
have been complied with. This is known as the "rule in Turquand's case" or the "indoor 
management rule". 
2 Raval JJ111islr Hank v Turquand ( 1856) J 19 FR 886. 
1 Pol» v. Leask (1860) 28 Heuv 562, 575 JX.1" Str John Romilly MR (Muster of the Rolls' Court, Englund), affirmed by 
the House of l.onh (1861)BLJCh 155 
~ l lclv Ilutchinson v. Hraylw<1d Lsd 1196811 QB S49, 83 per Lord Dennmg MR (Court of App •al, hi land) 
4 
Hence, person's dealing with a company and contracting in good faith may assume that 
"acts within its constitution and powers have been properly and duly performed 
and are not bound to inquire whether acts of internal management have been 
regular." 5 
The application of this rule gives rise to a presumption which prevents the company from 
avoiding a contract by relying on the fact that the proceedings were irregular and the 
person acting for the company was unauthorised to do so. This serves to protect persons 
"who are entitled to presume, just because they cannot know, that the person with whom 
they deal has the authority which he claims'" . 
At common law, the doctrine of constructive notice operated against outsiders dealing 
with companies. However, this doctrine did not operate where the directors or other 
agents of a company acted outside their authority but this was not apparent from the 
articles or other public documents of the company. The rule specifically states that while 
persons dealing with a company are taken to have constructive notice of the contents of 
the company's public documents, they need not go further to ensure that the internal 
proceedings of the company have been properly carried out. In fact, the outsider can 
assume that these proceedings were properly carried out. 
The rule in Turquand's case and its' exceptions as it is applied in Malaysia and the 
common law as it has been codified in England will be discussed in Chapter 4 .. 
1 Ilalsbury's Laws of England 4U• cd 1988 Vol 7 (I) par 980. This statement was approved by Lord Simonds in Moms 
v kc111.v.M1jI9461AC459 ut p 474. 
b per Lord Simonds m Moms v Kanssen (above) 
However, the Rule has been criticised because of uncertainty which has arisen from a 
large body of case law. Professor Gower observed: 
" Unhappily its obscurity increases in direct proportion to the literature upon it, 
and only its undoubted practical importance makes it essential to devote some 
space to it even at the risk of further obfuscation." 
Gower commented that the history of the development of the Rule saw an increase in the 
limitations to which the rule was subject. These limitations have become so extensive that 
the object of the rule has been obscured. 
" The result is that the law has become a jungle of irreconcilable decisions to the 
benefit of no one save the legal profession. If this branch of the law is ever 
codified the draftsman will be well advised to ignore all case law of the present 
century and to go back to the first principles and the judgments of the founding 
fathers of our modem company law. Unhappily a textbook writer has to state the 
law as he finds it and not as it ought to be."7 
As a consequence, in Australia, the common law principles discussed above have been 
now been replaced by statutory provisions. The principles are now contained in ss. 164 to 
166 of the Corporations Law 1990(hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation Law'). 
These provisions are based around six protective assumptions set out in s.164(3) of the 
Corporation Law and are subject to the limitations in s.164 ( 4). The Australian provisions 
are an attempt to make a comprehensive reform of the unsatisfactory judge-made law on 
the subject of this dissertation. Chapter 5 will discuss these statutory provisions in detail 
7 '11\0mp on "Company Law" Doctrines und Authority to Contrnct (19 6) Umv ot Toronto I J 2 tR 111 p 2 4 
and also consider the extent to which the statutory provisions in Australia could be 
adopted in Malaysia. 
7 
CHAPTER! 
THEORGANSOFTHECOMPANY 
1.1 Introduction 
Section 16 (5) of the Companies Act 19651 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') 
provides as follows : 
"On and from the date of incorporation . . . the subscribers to the 
memorandum together with such other persons as may from time to time 
become members of the company shall be a body corporate by the name 
contained in the memorandum capable forthwith of exercising all the 
functions of an incorporated company and of suing and being sued and 
having perpetual succession ... with power to hold land but with such 
liability on the part of the members to contribute to the assets of the 
company in the event of it being wound up as is provided by this Act." 
This section identifies a company as a separate legal personality. The separate 
legal personality of a company was firmly established at common law in the 
case of Salomon v A Salomon and Co. Ltd2 . A direct consequence of the 
incorporation of a company is that the company has a legal personality of its 
own which is distinct from its corporators. This means that the company has its 
own legal capacity to enjoy rights, assume obligations and incur liabilities and 
perform duties independently of the corporators. However, as a corporation is 
1 Acr No 125 
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an artificial person, its capacity can only operate through some human agency; 
it has no mind of its own any more than it has a body of its own. In the case of 
Northern Counties Securities Ltd v. Jackson and Steeple Ltd3. Walton J. said: 
" ... the company as such was only a juristic figment of the imagination, 
lacking both a body to be kicked and a soul to be damned. From this it 
followed that there must be some one or more persons who did, as a 
matter of fact, act on behalf of the company, and whose acts therefore 
must, for all practical purposes, be the acts of the company itself."4 
The human agency through which the capacity of the company can operate or 
manage and conduct itself lies either in the shareholders acting together in 
general meeting or the board of directors, the two principal organs of the 
company. Both these organs have an organic quality of their own and in theory 
they can exercise all the powers of the company under its memorandum or 
articles and those conferred to it by statute. However, there is a legal as well as 
a commercial necessity to divide the powers of the company between these two 
organs. 
1.2 The Board of Directors 
The board of directors is usually charged with the function of managing the 
company's business.' Typically the board is given the powers of the company 
other than those that the Act or the memorandum and articles of association 
'[197412 All J.ll 62~ 
4 Ibid, at p. 634 
' 'l'nhl A tu ts 7J 7K provide an xnmple of the common form ot 111 licks 
reserve for the members. In managing the company's business the board may 
make both strategic as well as operational decisions. However, in many cases 
the actual day to day management of a company is delegated to a managing 
director or managers or the company secretary. The larger the company, the 
more likely the board will concern itself only with broad policy, leaving 
operational decisions to delegates. The board's function in relation to such 
persons is to supervise them to ensure that they keep within the sphere of 
activity allotted to them. 
The Act also envisages that the board will ensure that the company is run in 
accordance with the law. This is sometimes done by ensuring that the board is 
responsible for compliance with various sections. Therefore the board is 
responsible for the appointment of the company secretary and the company's 
first auditors. 6 
Also, the board must also ensure that proper accounting records are kept and 
that the accounts are laid before the members at the annual general meeting and 
that the provisions of the Act concerning the accounts are observed. 7 
Thus, it may be said that the board of directors has a threefold function. First, it 
makes decisions on behalf of the company within the sphere that has been 
delineated to it. Secondly, the board is responsible in general for supervising the 
company's agents and employees in the discharge of their duties. Thirdly, the 
6 s. 119( I) and , .172( I) of the Act r pecuvcly 
1 .171 of the Act 
10 
directors are generally responsible for ensuring that the company is run m 
accordance with the Act. 8 
However, the function of any particular director depends upon the arrangement 
between him and the company and the company's organizational set-up. 
1.2.1 Directors 
Under section 4(1) of the Act, the term company officer generally includes a 
director. A director is someone appointed to carry out the day-to-day running 
and control of the company. A director may be appointed by the members at the 
annual general meeting or the articles may provide that a certain person or body 
will have the power to appoint the directors of the company (as illustrated in the 
case Raffles Hotel v. Malayan Banking (No.2)9) 
It is obvious from the Act that the test which determines whether a person is a 
director is one of function and not of name. Therefore, anybody who functions 
as a director will be vested with the duties and liabilities of a director even 
though he may not be officially appointed to the office of director. The concept 
of someone not on the board but controlling the company has reached the point 
where the existence of a "shadow director" has been acknowledged by section 4 
of the Act. A shadow director is a person in accordance with whose directions 
the directors are accustomed to the act. However, a person is not a shadow 
director merely because the directors of the company receive advice from him 
8 
"( omp uiy Law" Walter Woon (I .aw & Tax, A 1a Pacific) (I 997) 
q 119661 I MLJ 206 (Court of Appeal, Smgupore) 
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which is part of his professional service. Hence, a lawyer who advises directors 
in his professional capacity will not be deemed a director of the company. 
Section 122 (1) of the Act states that every company must have at least two 
directors at any one time. Further section 122 (2) states that directors have to be 
natural persons and section 122 (3) states that the first directors must be named 
in the memorandum or articles of association. 
In the case of public companies or their subsidiaries, section 127 of the Act 
states that the directors must not be above the age of 70 years of age. Also, a 
director of a public company is bound to inform the company in writing of the 
date he will tum 70 years old and he must do so within 14 days after he 
becomes a director. However, a person above the age of 70 years may be 
appointed or re-appointed as a director if a resolution supported by 75% of the 
members is passed approving the appointment. The appointment will only be 
until the next general meeting. 
Section 129 (1) of the Act provides that the act of the director is valid 
notwithstanding any defect which may later be discovered in his appointment or 
qualification. However what the provisions cannot do is to cure a situation 
where there has been a total absence of appointment as opposed to a mere slip 
or irregularity in appointment as illustrated in the case of Morris v. Kanssen'i . 
The law pertaining to the removal of directors in a public company is different 
from that applicable to a private company. 
10!1946IAC451J 
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In the case of a public company, it is not possible to have irremovable directors. 
Section 128(1) of the Act provides that a public company may always remove a 
director by ordinary resolution, notwithstanding anything contained in the 
company's memorandum or articles of association or in any agreement that may 
exists with the director. Section 128(2) of the Act states that a special notice 
must be given of such a resolution notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
stated in the memorandum or articles of association or in any agreement that 
may exists with the director. Special notice means that the directors proposing 
the resolution must give the company notice of their intention to move the 
resolution at least 28 days before the meeting and the director who is to be 
removed is entitled to make representation in writing to the company, which is 
bound to circulate it. At the meeting the director has a right to have his defence 
heard. Section 128(7) of the Act states that s.128 coexists with any other powers 
to remove directors which might exists apart from the section. Therefore, if the 
articles of association allow the removal of the directors, he may be removed in 
accordance with the articles of association. However, the procedure set out in 
s.128(2) of the Act must be adhered to. 
The power to remove a director of a private company would usually be 
governed by the company's articles of association. A company's articles may 
usually provide that it may by ordinary resolution remove a director before the 
expiration of his period of service. Table A article 69 is an example of such an 
article In the absence of such an article, a director whose term of office is 
specified in the articles may not b removed before the expiration of that tcnn 
n 
until the articles have been altered appropriately as illustrated in the case of 
Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co., Blackpool v. Hampson 11 . 
If a director has a separate contract of service with the company, the removal of 
the director in question before his term expires will be in breach of contract for 
which damages may be obtained. This can be enunciated from the case of 
Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v. Shirlaw12 . A director removed under section 
128(1) of the Act also retains his rights to obtain compensation in accordance 
with any contract that he might have with the company. This is provided by 
section 128(7) of the Act. 
1.3. Members in General Meeting 
It was stated in the case of Raja Khairulzaman Shah v. Zaman Indah Sdn. 
Bhd. 13 the fact that a person owns shares does not by itself make him a member 
of the company. There are only three ways of becoming a member of a 
company. First, section 16(6) of the Act states that the subscribers to a 
memorandum are automatically members of the company; they become 
members ipso facto on the incorporation of the company. Secondly, by s.123 
(2) of the Act where a person has signed and lodged an undertaking to take and 
pay for his qualification shares, he shall, as regards those shares, be in the same 
II (1882)23 Ch. D. I 
12 [ 194012 All ER 445 (I louse Of Lords) 
11 11979 I 2MLJ 181. 183 per Abdoolcadcr J. 
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position as if he had signed the memorandum for that number of shares. Third, 
s.16 ( 6) goes on to state that any person who agrees to become a member and 
whose name is on the register of members is a member of the company. 
The term "shareholder" is often loosely used synonym for "member". However, 
a member need not be a shareholder. The obvious case is when the company 
does not have a share capital. Nor is a person who owns shares in a company 
necessarily a member; as it is possible to purchase shares on the Stock 
Exchange without being registered as the holder of the shares in the company's 
register of members. Therefore, a person may be a shareholder in the sense of 
owning shares in the company without being a member. A holder of shares who 
is not a member is not entitled to exercise any of the rights of membership, nor 
is he subject to the liabilities of a member. 
1.3.1 Members' Rights 
All members' of companies have certain rights conferred on them by the Act, 
the articles or the general law. Members are entitled to the following rights:- 
a) to have the memorandum and the articles observed - s.33(1) of the Act; 
b) to restrain ultra vires acts - s.20(a) of the Act; 
c) to have access to company's records and to have certain information 
provided to them - s. 160(2), s. 141 (5), s.115(3) of the Act; 
d) to attend and vote at general meetings . l 48( I) of the Act; 
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e) to be treated fairly - s. 181 Of the Act. 
These rights are personal rights of the member, and the company or any other 
person cannot generally interfere with the exercise of such rights. 
1. 4 Division of Corporate Powers Between Board and General 
Meeting 
Shareholders cannot operate, manage or conduct all functions of a company. 
This is because the diversity of individual interests amongst shareholders would 
not promote efficient and orderly management of the affairs of a company. 
Furthermore, there is the inconvenience in having to assemble shareholders 
together to debate upon every decision or to conduct business on a daily basis. 
The exception is when the company has very few shareholders. 
From the legislative point of view, the necessity to control the affairs of the 
company also requires that there should be a definite individuals upon whom 
the law can impose responsibility or enforce compliance with the statutory 
provisions. As a consequence, it is a statutory requirement under s.122(1) of the 
Act that a company must have at least two directors. For these reasons, 
commercial and legal expediency dictate that the powers of management should 
be divided between the board of directors and the shareholders in the general 
meeting and that ideally the major portion of management powers should vest 
in a small group of people, namely, the board of dir ctors 
1.4.1 Consequence of Division of Powers 
Once powers are divided between the board and the shareholders in a general 
meeting, whether under the articles of association or the Act, the general 
resulting consequence is that one organ is autonomous of the other and no organ 
may usurp or interfere with the exercise of powers by the other.14 
However, the general meeting may nonetheless be considered the supreme 
organ in the sense that if there is a breakdown in the machinery of the board of 
directors in relation to the exercise of powers exclusively vested in them, the 
general meeting may intervene by assuming the powers but only for purposes of 
resolving the impasse. There are however English cases dealing with the power 
to issue shares which does not nicely fit into the principle of autonomy. In Hogg 
v. Cromphorn Ltd. 15 and Bamford v. Bamford" where directors exercised their 
power to issue share for an improper purpose, a general meeting had a power to 
intervene by ratifying the improper exercise of power. 
1.5 Sources of Management Powers 
There are three sources from which management powers are derived. The first 
source is common law, the second is the articles of association which is 
1• National Road» on I Motorist» • Associotk»: v, Parker ( 1986) 4 ACI .C 609 
"119671 Ch.2 4. 
16119701Ch.212. 
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regarded as a kind of statutory contract between the company and each of its 
members and the third source is the Act itself. 
1.5.1. Articles of Association 
The articles of association of a company are provisions which regulate the 
internal management and operation of the company. Section 33( 1) of the Act 
gives contractual effect to the articles. It provides that they have the effect of a 
contract under seal between the company and each member17 and members 
inter se18 under which each of them agrees to observe and perform the 
provisions of the articles of association as in force for the time being so far as 
the provisions are applicable to them. This is illustrated in the case of Wong 
Kim Fatt v. Leong & Co. Sdn. Bhd.& Anor. 19 
lt also invariably establishes a hierarchy of powers which is divided between 
the board of directors and shareholders in general meeting. Where powers are 
divided, effect will be given to the division. 
lt would not be quite feasible to set out specifically the respective powers of 
each of the two organs individually. Hence, there is always a provision vesting 
all general powers of management in the board of directors in addition to 
provisions delegating specific powers. Most companies adopt Article 73 of 
Table A articles of association as the provision vesting general powers of 
1" 1Jich11w111• Ken! <~ Ucm111t•1•Aiarl'li Slit'<'!' Breeders 'A.nocwt1c111 //9/9j I Ch 1181 
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1ij i l 1)7(1 J I Ml .I I Hl 
IX 
management in the board of directors. 
1.5.2 General Powers of Management vested in the Board: art. 73 of TableA 
Article 73 of Table A provides as follows- 
The business of the company shall be managed by the directors who may pay 
all expenses incurred in promoting and registering the company, and may 
exercise all such powers of the company as are not, by the Act or by these 
regulations, required to be exercised by the company in general meeting, 
subject to the provisions of the Act, and to such regulations, being not 
inconsistent with the aforesaid regulations or provisions, as may be prescribed 
by the company in general meeting; but no regulation made by the company in 
general meeting shall invalidate any prior act of the directors which would have 
been valid if that regulation had not been made. 
The case of Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd v. 
Cuninghame" makes it clear that who has what powers under the articles of 
association depends upon the construction of the articles of association. Where 
specific powers are laid down, there will not be much difficulty in deciding the 
issue. However, the interpretation to be given to art. 73 of Table A which vests 
general powers of management and control in the board of directors has given 
rise to considerable difference of opinion. 
19 
Cozens-Hardy LJ in the above case held : 
"It has been decided that the articles of association are a contract 
between the members of the company inter se. That was settled finally 
by the case of Browne v. La Trinidad (1887) 37 Ch D 1, if it was not 
settled before. We must therefore consider what is the relevant contract 
which these shareholders have entered into, and that contract, of course 
is to be found in the memorandum and articles. . .. , but it seems to me 
that the shareholders have by their express contract mutually stipulated 
that their common affairs should be managed by certain directors to be 
appointed by the shareholders in the manner described by other articles, 
and such directors be will liable to be removed only by special 
resolution. If you once get a stipulation of that kind in a contract made 
between the parties, what right is there to interfere with the contract, 
apart, of course, from any misconduct on the part of the directors? There 
is no such misconduct in the present case"21 . 
1.5.2.1 Construction of Article 73 of Table A 
Where it is intended that certain inherent powers of shareholders are to be 
excluded and emplaced in the hands of the management, clear words must be 
used to displace those inherent powers. One of the inherent powers of 
11 Ihul, 11 p •M 
shareholders is the right to appoint directors in general meeting as illustrated in 
the case of Worcester Corsetry, Ltd v. Witting22. 
The general power of management and control vested in the board in terms of 
art. 73 of Table A is clearly made subject to the provisions of the Act and the 
articles of association. It is also subject to the memorandum of association 
because director being agents of the company, cannot possess more powers than 
the company itself. 
Article 73 of Table A uses the words ' subject to regulations ... as may be 
prescribed by the company in general meeting '.This gives rise to the question 
whether the words confer upon shareholders in general meeting a general 
supervisory power over directors whether in respect of their specific or general 
powers or both. One view is that art. 73 of Table A confers autonomous power 
in the hands of the board because the word regulation has the same meaning as 
the word 'articles" such that if the shareholders want to interfere whether in 
respect of specific or general powers, they can only do so by altering the articles 
to take away the powers of the board and this can only be done by special 
resolution" . 
The opposite view is that shareholders have general supervisory control over 
the directors" with respect to their general as well as their specific powers 
11 I l 9161 I C'h MO 
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without any need to alter the articles such that shareholders may interfere by 
passage of an ordinary resolution. In the case of Credit Development Pte.Ltd v. 
IMO ne.us", a third view was taken. This view endorses the latter view but 
qualifies it to the extent that the supervisory powers are only in respect of the 
general power vested in directors under the first limb of art. 73 of Table A. 
The preponderance of judicial opinion is against any form of supervisory 
control by shareholders in general meeting over directors' specific as well as 
general powers. 
1.5.2.2 Malaysian Case Law 
In the case of Dato Mak Kok & Ors v. See Keng Leong & Ors.27, the plaintiffs 
were directors of a public company which had an insurance company as its 
A 
subsidiary. Some of the plaintiffs were also the directors of the insurance 
company. Both the articles of association of the public and insurance companies 
adopted in essence art. 73 of Table A. Section 18A of the Insurance Act 1976 
provided as follows: 
(1) There shall be no change in the control of any Malaysian insurer unless the 
Director General has given approval in writing for such change. 
(2) For the purpose of this section, the expression of 'control' in relation to a 
Malaysian in urer means the possession directly or indirectly of the power 
2" 1199112 81.R 370 
H (1990) l MSCLC 90, 3~7 
to direct or cause the direction of the management and policy of the insurer. 
At a requisitioned extraordinary general meeting, the chairman of the meeting 
terminated the meeting. Certain shareholders remained behind and continued 
with the meeting. At the continued meeting, all the plaintiffs were removed as 
directors and new directors were appointed. The directors who were removed 
took out an action to restrain the new directors from acting as directors. One of 
the grounds put forward was that the removal of the plaintiffs as directors 
contravened s.18A of the Insurance Act 1976 and the corporate veil of the 
public company and the insurance company ought to be lifted for the purpose of 
s.18A of the Insurance Act 1976 
Zakaria Yatim J applying the principles enunciated in the case of Automatic 
Self-Cleansing Machine Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd v. Cuninghame28 and 
Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd. v. Stanley" held : 
" The EGM was a meeting of the shareholder of PanGlobal Equities. 
The proposed resolution was to remove the plaintiff as directors and to 
replace them with new directors. This did not affect the powers of the 
plaintiff as directors of PanGlobal Insurance, because as before the 
EGM of PanGlobal Equities, they are still directors and in control of 
PanGlobal Insurance. Although PanGlobal Equities owns 99.92% of all 
the issued hare capital in PanGlobal Insurance, PanGlobal Equities 
cannot interfere with the powers of the directors to control affairs of 
JN Supra not • () 
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PanGlobal Insurance. PanGlobal Equities cannot even impose its will 
upon the directors of PanGlobal Insurance when the articles of 
association of the latter have confided to them the control of its affairs." 
The above indicates the Malaysian position on the general powers of the 
management. 
1.5.2.3 English case Law 
In Automatic Self -Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd v. Cunninghame'" the 
company had an article similar to article 73 of Table A. A shareholders' 
meeting was convened and an ordinary resolution was passed directing the 
directors to carry out a sale of the company's property and to perfect the 
transaction. The directors refused to carry out the direction as they thought that 
the sale was improvident and the terms were not favourable to the company. In 
upholding the stand taken by the directors upon the ground that the directors of 
the company are not the agents of the shareholders, Collins MR.31 held: 
"It has been suggested that this is a mere question of principle and 
agent, and that it would be an absurd thing if a principle in appointing an 
agent should in effect appoint a dictator who is to manage him instead of 
he managing the ag nt. l think that the analogy does not strictly apply to 
this case. No doubt for some purposes directors are agents. For whom 
IO ~· .-.11p111 note O 
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are they agents? You have, no doubt, in theory and the law one entity, 
the company, which might be a principal, but you have to go behind that 
when you look to the particular position of directors. It is by the 
consensus of all the individuals in the company that these directors 
become agents and hold their rights as agents." 
In the case of Marshall's Valve Gear Co. Ltd. v. Manning Wardle & Co. Ltd32 ., 
Neville J declined to follow the decision in Automatic Self Cleansing Filter 
Syndicate Co. Ltd v. Cunninghame33 on the grounds that in that case, the 
shareholders sought to interfere by way of an ordinary resolution contrary to the 
articles and accordingly refused to strike out the action of the company brought 
by a majority shareholder when the directors refused to sue. 
Shortly after the decision of Neville J, Farwell LJ in Salmon v, Quin & Axtens 
Ltd. 34 followed the decision in Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. 
Ltd. v. Cuninghame'l and held that a provision in terms art. 73 of Table A did 
not allow shareholders to interfere with the decisions of directors. Interference 
can only be justified by the passage of a special resolution to alter the articles. 
In support of the decision, the decision of Buckley LJ in Gramophone and 
Typewriter Ltd. v. Stanle/6 was cited. 
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"This court decided not long since, in Automatic Self -Cleansing Filter 
Syndicate Co. v. Cunninghame [1906]2 Ch 34, that even a resolution of 
a numerical majority at a general meeting of the company cannot 
impose its will upon the directors when the articles have confided to 
them the control of the company's affairs. The directors are not servants 
to obey directions given by the shareholders as individuals; they are not 
agents appointed by and bound to serve the shareholders as their 
principals. They are persons who may by the regulations be entrusted 
with the control of the business, and if so entrusted they can be 
dispossessed from that control only by the statutory majority which can 
alter the articles. Directors are not, I think, bound to comply with the 
directions even if all the corporators are acting as individuals."37 
Subsequent English cases such as John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd. v. Shaw" 
and Scott v. Scoti39 have also confirmed the principle that the powers of the 
board are autonomous , declining to follow the decision in the case of 
Marshall's Valve Gear Co. Ltd. v. Manning Wardle & Co. ua". 
In Breck/and Group Holdings Ltd. v. London Suffolk Properties Ltd. & Ors.,41 
the articles of association vested general powers of management in the board on 
similar terms as article 73 of Table A. An action was brought without a 
17 lh1<l, u p I OS 
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resolution of the board which required the affirmative vote of certain directors. 
A board was subsequently called to adopt and ratify the action. At the same 
time, attempts were made by the majority shareholders who supported the 
action to convene a general meeting to adopt the proceedings. It was argued that 
the outcome of the board meeting really did not matter as it was certain that the 
general meeting would adopt the action. Harman J. took the opportunity to 
review the cases discussed above and came to the conclusion that while the 
decision of Neville J. in Marshall's Valve Gear Co. Ltd. v. Manning Wardle & 
Co. Ltd 42 had not been expressly overruled, it was in conflict with the majority 
of cases. Harmen J. 43 held, 
" The principle, as I see it, is that the article confides the management of 
the business to the directors and in such a case it is not for the general 
meeting to interfere. It is a fortiori when the shareholders coming 
together have specifically resolved that some matters be required to 
have their joint consent and have confided that matter particularly to the 
directors. That seems to me to reinforce the general proposition which I 
derive from the authorities cited." 
The above seems to indicate the English position on the general powers of 
management. 
41 ... 
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1.5.2.4 Australian Case Law 
Courts of Australia favour the view that shareholders do not have the power to 
interfere with decisions of the board of directors acting within their powers. In 
Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. & Ors.44, Lord Wilberforce in the 
Privy Council expressly approved of the decision delivered in Automatic Self- 
Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd v. Cuninghame 45 . 
1.5.3 Specific Powers Vested in the Board 
Under Table A of the articles of association some of the specific powers vested 
in the board of directors ( in addition to the general powers vested by virtue of 
article 73 are:- 
1. Convening of extraordinary general meetings (art.44); 
u. use of the common seal of the company (art.75 and 96 ); 
111. borrowing of money and creating securities for any debt, liability or 
obligation of the company or any third party (art. 74); 
iv. appointment of managing director and delegating their powers to the 
managing director, associate director and the secretary (arts.91, 93, 94 and 
95); 
4~ 
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v. recommendation on quantum of dividends (art. 98). 
1.5.4 Specific Powers vested in General Meeting 
The majority of the powers vested in the body of shareholders in general 
meeting under Table A are repetitions of the powers which are required to be 
exercised by the company in a general meeting under the Act. In addition to the 
provisions of the Act, some of the specific powers vested in the general meeting 
are:- 
1. election of directors in place of those retiring (art.66); 
11. removal of directors, subject to s.128 of the Act (art.69); 
m. declaration of dividend in an amount not exceeding the amount 
recommended by directors and directions on payments (art. 98 and 104). 
1.5.5 Powers conferred by the Act 
The legislative intent is that a company and its corporators are free, subject to 
powers which by the Act are reserved for the general meeting only, to divide 
powers between the board and the general meeting. Hence, there are only a few 
instances in which the Act actually confers powers upon directors. 
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1.5.5.1 Powers vested in board 
The following are some of the powers vested in the board of directors under the 
Act.- 
1. appointment of first auditors ( s.172( 11) ); 
11. appointment of an approved company auditor to fill a casual vacancy in the 
office of auditor of the company (s.172(3)) ; 
111. appointment of the company secretary or secretaries (s. 139(3)). 
1.5.5.2 Powers vested in general meetings 
Powers which are vested in the general meeting under the Act may broadly be 
divided into two categories. The first category is aimed at controlling potential 
breaches of fiduciary duties on the part of directors. The second category is 
aimed at preserving or maintaining the capital of the company. 
The following are some of the powers vested in the general meeting» 
l.6 The Company Secretary 
Another important officer of the company is the secretary. By virtue of s.139(1) 
of the Act every company is required to have at least one secretary and s.4 
state' that the secretary is deemed to be an officer of the company. 
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The secretary generally has purely ministerial and administrative function and 
he does not possess any managerial powers as was stated in the case of Re 
Maidstone Buildings Provisions Ltd. 46. 
The nature of the secretary's duties varies from company to company. The 
responsibilities of the secretary are imposed by the Act, the articles or the 
appointing board of directors. 
The courts until recently continued to treat the company secretary as a 
subordinate servant, without ostensible authority to commit the company by his 
actions apart from such matters as the engagement of clerical staff However in 
modern times the attitude of the courts towards the secretary has changed. In 
the case of Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd. v. Fide/is Furnishing 
Fabrics Ltd. 47 , Lord Denning said that; 
" A company secretary is a much more important person nowadays than 
he was in 188748 . He is an officer of the company with extensive duties 
and responsibilities. This appears not only in the modem Companies 
Acts, but also by the role which he plays in the day-to-day business of 
companies. He is no longer a mere clerk. He regularly makes 
representations on behalf of the company and enters into contracts on its 
behalf which come within the day-day running of the companies 
busines 1 So much so that he may be regarded as though he was held out 
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as having authority to do things on behalf of the company. He is 
certainly entitled to sign contracts connected with the administrative 
side of a company's affairs, such as employing staff, and ordering cars 
and so forth. All such matters now come within the ostensible authority 
of a company's secretary." 
It is arguable, therefore, that the secretary has also graduated as an organ of the 
company; he is an officer of the company with substantial authority in the 
administrative sphere and with powers and duties derived directly from the 
articles and the Act. The powers and duties of the company secretary will be 
dealt with further in Chapter 2. 
1. 7 Conclusion 
Therefore it can be seen that a company is divided into two constituent parts or 
organs: the board of directors and the general meeting of members. Wide 
powers of management are conferred on the board of directors. This is typical 
of most companies. Accordingly, when the board exercises those powers, its 
acts are regarded as the acts of the company. In other instances, the acts of the 
members in a general meeting are considered as the acts of the company. 
Sometimes the board of directors delegate some of their powers to particular 
individuals, such as the managing director or the principal executive officer. 
The acts or state of mind of these individuals may be attributed to the company. 
In practice, outsiders rarely deal with the board of directors or the members in 
general meeting. More often, its relationship with the company involves dealing 
with its agents or employees. Companies are capable of being bound by the acts 
of its agents in the same way as natural persons: s.35(4) of the Act. This 
involves the application of the principles of agency law, in particular the 
question whether those who purport to act on the company's behalf have the 
authority to do so. Agency law has several distinct features in its application to 
companies and which this dissertation will now try to explore. 
CHAPTER2 
ULTRA VIRES and AGENCY 
2.1 Introduction 
In the legal context, a power is the ability to affect a particular change in a given legal 
relation. In this regard, an individual has the natural legal power to enter into any binding 
contractual relationship. In contrast, companies have to be endowed with these 
capabilities and powers by the law. It follows that unlike an individual, a company may 
only legitimately exercise powers that have been endowed by law. 
A company's legal capacity and competence is thus limited because the Act requires a 
company to state in the memorandum of association the objects of the company. Section 
18(1) of the Act sets out the minimum content requirement of the memorandum of 
association. Amongst others, the memorandum of association was required to contain an 
objects clause that specifies the range of activities the company was permitted to engage 
tn. 
The objects clause was regarded as important from the point of view of the company's 
shareholders and creditors. They were entitled to expect that the money they invested or 
lent to the company would be applied in carrying the business listed in the objects clause. 
The importance of the objects clause was reinforced by the common law doctrine of ultra 
vires. The doctrine provided that any contract made by the company that was not in 
f urthcrance of a transaction specified in the objects clause was void. 
The role of the ultra vir is doctrine a explained by the judges wa to prevent insidiou 
enlarg m nt of a company's capacity a a result of indiscriminat ex rcis s of power for 
purposes that are neither ancillary or reasonably incidental to the pursuit of authorised 
objects by rejecting such exercise of powers as being null and void. Although this may 
result in a very harsh treatment of an outsider who is a bona fide purchaser dealing with 
the company in good faith without notice, this remains necessary if the whole rationale of 
the ultra vires doctrine is to be preserved. In summary, the ultra vires doctrine may be 
expressed in the following sub-rules: 
1. a distinction must be drawn between objects and powers ; 
11. an express power is a power that is found in the objects clauses of a memorandum; 
111. an implied power is created by a process of implication on the grounds that a 
company must necessarily possess powers to do acts for purposes that are either 
ancillary or reasonably incidental to the pursuit of the authorised objects; 
iv. a transaction that is entered into in direct pursuance of an object in the memorandum 
is valid and binding; 
v. a transaction that falls within the scope of an implied or express power is valid and 
binding only if it is exercised for a purpose ancillary or reasonably incidental to the 
pursuit of the authorised objects in a company's memorandum. 
It can be noted from steps (iii) and (v) that the requirement that a power must be 
exercised for a purpose ancillary or reasonably incidental to the objects is not only as a 
touchstone for the implied creation of powers but also as a control mechanism to ensure 
that powers are exercised within the bounds or capacity of the stated objects. 
I lowever, in this age of a complex and fast changing economic environment, a 
company's dexterity to switch or undertake new business activities may be vital for its 
survival. Also, businessmen today prefer to operate a group of companies rather than a 
sole company in order to take full advantage of limited liability. As a result evasion 
techniques were introduced by these businessmen. 
The other shortcoming of the ultra vires doctrine is that it operates harshly on innocent 
outsiders who constantly run the risk of their transactions with the company being 
rendered null and void if the purpose of the transaction is outside the scope of the 
memorandum. As a result, conscious judicial efforts have been made to counter evasion 
of the ultra vires doctrine and also to ameliorate its inherent harshness. 
2.2 The Common Law Position before the Rolled Steel case 
An illustration of the strict common law application of the ultra vires doctrine is provided 
by Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche' . The objects of the company, as 
stated in the memorandum included, 
" to make, and sell, and lend or hire, railway carriages and wagons, and all kinds of 
railway plant, fittings, machinery, and rolling stock; to carry on the business of 
mechanical engineers and general contractors". 
The directors entered into a contract on behalf of the company for the purpose of a 
concession to construct a railway. When the company then refused to proceed with the 
contract the vendor of the concession brought an action against it for breach of contract. 
The House of Lords held that the construction of railways was not within the objects of 
the company as stated in the memorandum of association. As the contract was ultra vires, 
it was void and the action against the company failed. 
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The operation of the ultra vires doctrine also extended very broadly. An example of this 
is Re Jon Beau/ ort (London) Ltd 2 . A company was incorporated to carry on the business 
of tailors and manufacturers of clothes and materials. It then decided to manufacture 
veneered panels, an activity outside its objects. The company ordered coke on the 
company letterhead which stated that the company was a manufacturer of veneered 
panels. The supplier of the coke sought to enforce the payment of the debt. He failed 
because the contract was ultra vires ; the company did not have the power to manufacture 
veneered panels. This was despite the fact that the coke could have been used for the 
authorised purpose of manufacture of clothes. The coke supplier had actual knowledge 
that the company was engaged in the manufacture of veneered panels by the information 
on the company letterhead. He also had constructive notice that such an activity was 
outside the company's objects. He could have examined the company's memorandum 
which is a public document. 
These cases illustrate the problems which arose from the strict application of the ultra 
vi res doctrine. It often resulted in the intention of the parties to a contract being thwarted 
by application of a technical, unrealistic rule. It enabled a party to a contract to avoid 
legal obligations or prevented enforcement of legal rights under a contract. 
The rationale for this doctrine was that persons dealing with a company were taken to 
have read the content's of the company's memorandum and articles of association. These 
are public documents available for inspection. This is known as the doctrine of 
• • '.I constructive notice. 
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However, it is not realistic to expect all parties dealing with a company to examine the 
company's memorandum of association. If this were the case, it would impose great 
inconvenience and would hinder normal business practise.4 
In order to overcome the problem caused by the doctrine of ultra vires, companies 
drafted the objects clause in the widest possible way. These listed many specific activities 
and were supplemented by dependent objects which could be construed so as to include 
any lawful activity. 
In the case of HA Stephenson & Son Ltd V. Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co5 ., the company 
was incorporated with an independent object of carrying on the business of a product 
merchant. A dependent object authorised it, 
"to carry on any other business whether manufacturing or otherwise as the 
company may deem expedient." 
Sometime after its incorporation it entered into the business of speculation of jute futures. 
The High Court held that contracts entered into the course of this business were not ultra 
vires as they were within the dependent object which was widely construed. 
Similarly, in Bell Houses Ltd v. City Wall Properties uat, the company was a housing 
developer. The objects clause of the company's memorandum contained independent 
objects related to housing development and a dependent object, 
"to carry on any other trade or business whatsoever which can, in the board of 
directors, be advantageously carried on by the company in connection with or as 
4 H1• .!011 Beaufon (London) ua [ 1953) Cit 131 
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ancillary to any of the above business or the general business of the company." 
The Court of Appeal held that this dependent object enabled the company to contract to 
introduce another company to a source of finance. As long as the directors held the 
honest opinion that a business could be carried on advantageously in connection with the 
business authorised in the independent objects it was not ultra vires. 
In the Australian case of Donohoe v. Stadiums Pty. Ltd7 . the company, incorporated in 
1914, had an independent object permitting it to run boxing stadiums. In 1988 it 
commenced trading in listed shares and options. The Supreme Court of New South Wales 
held that the share trading activities were not ultra vires as the company had a dependent 
object similar to that in the Bell Houses ua' case. 
Where the memorandum contains an objects clause it will state that the company has the 
object of conducting particular businesses. To carry on this business the company must 
have certain powers which are incidental to the attainment of its objects. The exercise of 
such powers is not ultra vires provided that they are incidental to one of the company's 
independent objects. However, in some cases a company may seek to exercise a power, 
incidental to its main object but for an extraneous purpose. In the case of Attorney 
General v. Great Eastern Railway Co9 . it has been held that the court will generally 
permit a company to operate with wide powers if they are incidental to either its main or 
independent objects. 
The practise has also developed of concluding a company's objects clause with a 
declaration that each of the specified objects and powers are to be interpreted 
I(!!)<)]) 11ACLC190 
R [I %6j 2Qll 656 
v(ll!l!O)~/\pp ('11 ·17' 
independently of another. In the case of Re Introductions Ltd.10 , the company's objects 
clause concluded with the following statement: 
"It is hereby expressly declared that each of the preceding sub-clauses shall be 
construed independently of and shall be in no way limited by reference to any 
other sub-clause and that the objects set out in each sub-clause are independent 
objects of the company." 
In that case the company's main object was to provide services for tourists visiting 
Britain. It also had a dependent object authorising the company to carry on any other 
business which in the opinion of the board could be carried on in connection with its 
main objects The objects clause also included the power to borrow money. 
Several years after its incorporation the company ceased its tourist business and carried 
on a pig-breeding business. In furtherance of that business it borrowed money from its 
bank. The bank was aware of its objects clause and the company's new business. The 
court held that loan from the bank was ultra vires. The power to borrow could not 
converted into an independent object merely because of a provision to that effect in the 
memorandum. 
The decision in Re Introduction" was criticised in Re Tivoli Freeholds Ltd.12 , on the 
basis that the power to borrow, whilst not incidental to the company's main object, was 
incidental to its dependent object of carrying on any other business which would be 
carried on in connection with its main objects. Despite this criticism, prudent lenders 
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often, in cases of doubt as to the extent of the object, require a company to alter its 
objects expressly to give it the required authority. 
Drafting techniques were employed by the business community to produce results that 
would obfuscate the clear distinction between objects and powers. For example, it is 
widespread drafting technique to enumerate the objects clause in the memorandum at 
great length so as to render a company's limited capacity almost limitless. The courts 
initially responded by construing only one of these objects as the main object and the rest 
only as ancillary powers. 
This caused the business community to insert what is now known as the Cotman v. 
Brougham't clause which is an express declaration in the objects clause to the effect that 
each of the specified objects or powers should be deemed to be independent and not 
ancillary or subordinate to any other objects. The House of Lords in the case of Cotman 
v.Brougham approved of such a clause and Lord Parker justified the result on the ground 
that: 
" ... a person who deals with a company is entitled to assume that a company 
can do everything which it is expressly authorised to do by its memorandum 
of association .... " 
Subsequently, it was felt that if the effect of such a clause remained unchecked it would 
seriously undermine the ultra vires doctrine. Several judges began to express the view 
that where objects were really mere powers they must be treated as powers 
. f b' 1 14 notwithstanding the presence o a eparate o JCCt c ause . 
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This view was also affirmed by Slade L.l in his judgment in the case of Rolled Steel 
(Holdings) Ltd. v. British Steel Corporation" where he accepted the argument that full 
force must be given to the Cotman v. Brougham clause unless the power in question is by 
nature incapable of constituting a substantive object. Clearly, an independent clause 
would not elevate what is essentially a power into an object. 
Further, Slade L.J. in the Rolled Steel case" subjected the Cotman v. Brougham clause to 
one more restriction. He took the view that a construction of the memorandum as a whole 
might show that the sub-clause, whether containing a power or an object, was intended as 
an ancillary power only. 
In the case of Re Horsley & Weight Ltd17 ., Buckley L.J. has justified this need for 
implied powers in the following words: 
" ... for it is the practical need to imply the power in order to enable the company 
effectively to pursue its authorised objects which justifies the implication of the 
" powers. 
Gower states in his text that the strict ultra vires rule is also to be applied reasonably so 
that whatever is incidental to the objects expressly authorised by the memorandum or 
statute, unless expressly prohibited, will be intra vires'" . 
The modern expression of this rule is that an exercise of power is intra vires if it is 
ancillary or reasonably incidental to the pursuit of an authorised object 19 . 
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It follows that a distinction between objects and powers is vital. The reason is that true 
objects are in substance well-defined business activities or purposes which are capable of 
being pursued in isolation as the sole activity of the company. Such objects are therefore 
truly capable of defining and limiting a company's capacity. Powers, on the other hand, 
are mere abilities which may be exercised for any purpose including those purposes that 
are neither ancillary nor incidental to the pursuit of authorised objects. 
It is hence fundamental to the ultra vires doctrine that a distinction be maintained 
between objects and powers. 
The above discussions reveal the extent to which attempts have been made to evade the 
ultra vires rule and how judges have tried to contain these efforts. 
2.2.2 THE ROLLED STEEL ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE 
In the light of these controversies, the Court of Appeal judgement in the Rolled Steel 
case20 deserves close scrutiny , especially as the judgement has been described as an 
attempt by Slade L.J. to remodel the ultra vires doctrine. 
The facts of the case are that there are four companies involved in a chain of 
indebtedness. One SSS Ltd. owed some 860,000 Pounds (Sterling) to a C Ltd. 
On the other hand, SSS Ltd. was a creditor of Rolled Steel Products (Holding) Ltd. 
(hereinafter referred to as 'RSP') and had lent to RSP a sum of 400,000 Pounds 
(Sterling). However both SSS Ltd. and RSP were owned and controlled by the Shenkman 
family. 
20 II C',I.<.' 4116 
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Subsequently , C Ltd. was taken over by the British Steel Corporation ( hereinafter 
referred to as 'BSC') which continued to press SSS Ltd. for the repayment of its debts to 
CLtd .. 
To ensure that SSS Ltd. would finally pay its debt, BSC pressed for a personal guarantee 
by Mr. Shenkman as well as a company guarantee by RSP which owned sufficient assets 
to meet the debt. 
Although Mr. Shenkman acceded to the demand , RSP could not readily do so as the 
payment under the guarantee by RSP to BSC which was in excess of RSP's debt of 
400,000 pounds to SSS Ltd. might subsequently have been attacked as a fraudulent 
preference over RSP' s creditors and perhaps even as .an act of misfeasance on the part of 
the directors. 
The solution to this problem was that C Ltd. would lend a further 401,448 Pounds 
(Sterling) to RSP before RSP issued the guarantee to BSC. This money would then be 
used to extinguish RSP's debt to SSS Ltd. And SSS Ltd. would, in tum, use the same 
partially to reduce its debt of 860,000 Pounds (Sterling) to C Ltd. Having transferred, in 
effect , a portion of SSS Ltd.'s debt to RSP, RSP would then agree to guarantee the 
balance of SSS Ltd. 's debt to C Ltd. and failing that , RSP was to issue a debenture in 
favour of C Ltd .. 
A disquieting feature of the scheme was that Mr. Shenkman had earlier personally 
guaranteed SSS Ltd. 's indebtedness to C Ltd .. The transfer of a portion of SSS Ltd. debt 
to RSP served to benefit him as it would reduce his liability under his guarantee. ln 
contra vent ion of Article 17 of RSP' s Articles of Association , Mr. Shenkman 
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subsequently approved of the scheme without any declaration of his self-interest in this 
series of transactions. 
On 25 March 1975 , RSP brought an action against BSC, the receiver , the trustees in 
bankruptcy of Mr.Shenkman and his father on the following grounds:- 
i) neither the guarantee nor the debenture was the deed of RSP, because it was not duly 
executed by RSP. The reason was that Mr.Shenkman was personally interested in the 
arrangements and because he had not declared his interest in accordance with article 
17 and 18(a) of the Articles of Association of RSP he was not entitled to guarantee 
the debenture. In short, there had been no proper quorum of directors voting on the 
resolution; 
ii) if contrary to the plaintiffs submission, the guarantee and the debenture were the 
deeds of RSP, each of them was ultra vires and void because the arrangements were 
made not for the purposes or benefit of Mr.Shenkman; 
iii) if contrary to the plaintiffs submission, the guarantee and debenture were the deeds 
ofRSP and were intra vires RSP, the directors were acting in breach of their fiduciary 
duties because these transactions were entered into in bad faith and not for the 
purposes of RSP. It followed that BSC and the receiver, having received the monies 
with actual or constructive knowledge of this breach, took them as constructive 
trustees. 
In defence, the defendants sought to rely on the role in Turquand's case in that although 
the resolution was defective the defendants were entitled to rely on it as a formally valid 
resolution. They also argued that the shareholders by having unanimously consented to 
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the execution of the guarantee and debenture ratified and made binding the transaction in 
question. 
With regard to the shareholder's consent point, the court and in particular Slade L.J. took 
the view that as this argument was raised after the close of evidence, it came too late to 
be heard. Slade L.J. also confirmed an important factual finding that C Ltd. and BSC 
knew that the guarantee and the debentures were not entered into by RSP for any purpose 
ofRSP, but were gratuitous disposition of the property ofRSP and were entered into by 
RSP for the benefit of SSS Ltd. and Mr.Shenkan personally. 
This knowledge was imputed to C Ltd. and BSC because legal advice given to RSP's 
solicitor that the proposed transactions were probably ultra vires and constituted a 
misfeasance by its directors was reported to the head of the legal services department of 
CLtd .. 
The finding of this knowledge on the part of the defendants was fatal to their appeals for 
the following reasons> 
a) if the transactions were found to be ultra vi res, they could not rely on the rule that 
as bona fide purchasers without notice the transactions remained binding; 
b) if the transactions were found to be intra vires , they alternatively constituted a 
breach of director's fiduciary duties. The same transactions could be set aside at 
the instance of the company and the directors would be liable as constructive 
trustees because they had assisted with knowledge in a breach of trust; 
c) if the transactions were held to be intra vi res and to be treated as instances of 
directors exceeding their authority as agents , this knowledge on the part of the 
d •fondants would disentitle them from relying on the doctrine of apparent 
authority to validate the transactions. 
Slade L.J.' s efforts to answer this question in effect amounted to a restructuring of the 
ultra vires doctrine, resulting in a modified new model ultra vires doctrine being 
introduced. 
In summary, the following were held by Slade L.J. :- 
1) that a sharp distinction must be maintained between objects and powers. It 
follows that powers ought not to be inserted in a company's memorandum and 
the exercise of any implied or express powers should also be controlled so that a 
company is treated as having implied powers only to do acts for purposes which 
are reasonably incidental to the attainment or pursuit of any of its express 
objects"; 
2) following from the above, the proposition that once a 
clause is capable of subsisting as an independent object of the company it cannot 
be ultra vires for it is by definition something which the company is formed to do 
and so must be intra vires; 
3) he took the view that even if a sub- clause might exist as a substantive object, a 
construction of the memorandum as a whole might show that it was intended to 
constitute an ancillary power only. The presence of a Cotman v.Brougham clause 
should not elevate what were essentially powers into objects. 
However, Slade L.J. did express the view that wherever possible the Cotman v. 
Brougham clause be granted its full impact . 
21 811pr11, note 20 11 p 500 
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4) Since the sub-clause was in the nature of a power, the view that strict logic might 
require that any exercise of such a power whether implied or express would be 
beyond the company's capacity if the resultant transactions were in fact performed 
for purposes other than those of its incorporation. 
However, Slade L.J. modified rule 4 above on the ground that the practical difficulties 
resulting from such a conclusion for persons dealing with a company carrying on a 
business authorised by the memorandum would be intolerable. To solve the problem, 
Slade L.J. relied on Buckley's judgement in Re David Payne & Co.Ltd. 22 , as stating the 
proper alternative approach. Under this approach, an act that is beyond the objects clause 
would not be regarded as ultra vires. It follows that the act would become voidable but 
not void. Such an act would instead be treated as an act of impropriety on the part of the 
directors who have exercised the powers in question. Since this only raises questions of 
equity between the directors and the shareholders it does not affect the legal quality of the 
act vis-a-vis the outsider without notice of the impropriety. 
In Slade L.J. 's view, directors' authority as agents is limited by the implied condition that 
they must exercise their powers only for the purposes of the company and therefore any 
such express restrictions found in the sub-clauses in a memorandum merely reinforced 
such a condition. Slade L.J. was therefore suggesting that every general power contained 
in a company's memorandum was subject to the express or implied restriction that it must 
be exercised for the purposes of the company. Thus, every exercise of power outside the 
condition ought not to be treated as ultra vires but as an instance of directors exceeding 
their authority. Slade L.J. then put forward the proposition that an outsider acting without 
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notice of the impropriety. of the transaction in question may invoke the independent 
"indoor management rule" and the agency doctrine of apparent authority in their favour. 
This brings us to the end of Slade L.J.' s valiant efforts to remodel the ultra vires doctrine 
affecting ancillary 'objects' and 'powers' . 
At this juncture, it is useful to recall that the basic justification for the concept of limited 
capacity is that it protects shareholders and existing creditors by rejecting as null and void 
transactions between the company and the outsider if the purpose of that transaction is 
outside the scope of the memorandum. It follows that an outsider whose transaction with 
the company is now being challenged as ultra vires runs the risk of the transaction being 
held null and void. Theoretically, this system of protection is thought to be a fair system 
because a company's limited capacity is ascertainable by its memorandum which is a 
constitutional document of the company freely available for inspection. 
However, commercial realities have shown that the system may work oppressively for 
the following reasons:- 
1) businessmen have neither the time nor the resources to study a company's 
memorandum in order to acquaint themselves with its legal capacity; 
2) they may not appreciate the significance of the distinction between objects and powers. 
3) it is also extremely unjust that the company which has solicited the interest of the 
outsider in the transaction now, for its own reasons, turns around and invokes the 
ultra vires doctrine arguing that the transaction should be set aside as being null and 
void 
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2.3 Should Agency Principles Be Used In Place Of The Strict Ultra Vires Doctrine 
Slade L.J. in the Rolled Steel case believed that the anomalous ultra vires rule23 could be 
explained by using the agency principles. In his opinion, an outsider was entitled to rely 
on the fact that as a general rule, a company incorporated under the Companies Act held 
out to its directors as having ostensible authority to do on its behalf anything which its 
memorandum of association, expressly or by implication gave the company capacity to 
do24 It followed that if a sub-clause in the memorandum authorised a company to borrow 
for the purposes of the company, its directors would have the power to do so, as long as 
the outsider had no notice of their ulterior motive to use the borrowed money for a 
limiting the authorities of the director" . Although the outsider had constructive 
'foreign' purpose. Since the company through its memorandum held out its directors as 
having the apparent authority to borrow, then not only is the ultra vires issue pre-empted 
but the express condition that the borrowing must be done for the purposes of the 
company would also be construed not as limiting a company's capacity but simply as 
knowledge of the memorandum including any condition that was attached to the sub- 
clause, he nevertheless had no notice of the breach of the condition because he was 
entitled to assume that its directors were properly exercising such powers for the 
. h d 26 purposes of the company as set out in t e memoran um 
In the opinion of Slade L.J., three factors actually operated to legitimize this particular 
assumption. 
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The first factor has already been stated, that is, a company holds out its directors as 
having apparent authority to bind the company to any transaction which falls within the 
powers expressly or impliedly conferred on it by its memorandum of association" . 
The second factor is based upon policy considerations and is reflected in the rule that an 
outsider is under no duty to investigate and inquire into the purpose behind a transaction. 
In this connection Slade L.J. cited Buckley J.'s words in Re David Payne & Co. Ltd.28 
that:- 
"A corporation, every time it wants to borrow, cannot be called upon by the 
lender to expose all its affairs, so that the lender can say, before I lend you 
anything, I must investigate how you carry on your business, and I must know 
why you want the money, and how you apply it, and when you have it I must see 
you apply it in the right way." 
It is impossible to work on such a principle. 
The third factor is that an outsider is entitled to assume on the authority of the principle 
stated in the case of Royal British Bank v. Turquancf9 that the directors of the borrowing 
company were acting properly and regularly in the internal management of its affairs and 
f. h , b . 30 were borrowing for the purposes o t e company s usmess. 
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In summary, the gist of Slade L.J. 's judgement is that any act that falls within the scope 
of a company's powers is intra vires. From now on the strict logic of the ultra vires 
doctrine will continue to have impact only in cases where the act in question does not 
even, to begin with, fall within the scope of the company's powers. 
An interesting comment on this development was expressed by Clark in the following 
" On this narrow view, few activities will fall outside the corporate capacity of the 
modern limited company. With the standard multifarious list of objects/powers, a 
Cotman v. Brougham and a Bell Houses sub-clause32 , a company's contractual 
capacity will be close to that of a natural person. By the decision in Rolled Steel" 
case the court has abandoned the ultra vires doctrine as the appropriate vehicle for 
implementing the prime policy aim of protecting shareholders and creditors. In 
order to strike down an unreasonable depletion of corporate assets, such as in 
Rolled Stee/34,Re Introduction't and Re David Payne" , other means ~ including 
breach of duty and the law of agency - will be used." 
31 See Clark, "Ultra Vires after Rolled Steel Products", (1985) 6 Co. Law 155, 158 
32 The English Bell Houses clause (Bell Houses Ltd. v. City Wall Properties, [ 1966] 2QB. 656) authorised the company 
" to carry on any other trade or business whatsoever which can, in the opinion of the board of directors, be 
advantageously carried on by the company in connection with or ancillary to any of the objects of the company " 
This 11.~ noted by Ford imposes 11 'Ubjcctive test of honest belief on the directors. See H.A.J. Ford, Principles of 
Company Law, ( 1982, 3rd Ed.) p. 96. 
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2.4 The English Position on the Doctrine of Ultra Vires 
In England, it was long recognised that . the strict ultra vires doctrine in relation to 
companies should be abolished. 
Section 9 of the European Communities Act 1972, later re-enacted as section 35 of the 
Companies Act 1985 attempted to dispose of all the problems posed in short sub-sections, 
the first of which provided that, in favour of a person dealing with a company in good 
faith, any transaction decided on by the directors should be deemed to be within the 
capacity of the company and free from any limitations under the memorandum and 
articles on the directors' powers, and the second of which relieved the other party of any 
obligation to inquire about those matters. 
Although this was a considerable step forward it was widely criticised for various 
reasons. It was said that it only covered 'transactions decided by the directors', and 
protected only a third party 'dealing with the company in good faith' and it did nothing to 
protect the company against invocation of ultra vires by the other party. 
2.4.1 The Companies Act 1989 - 
Virtual abolition of ultra vires doctrine 
In 1989, a further amendment to the Companies Act made an attempt to remove the 
consequences of exceeding any limitations on a company's capacity without actually 
admitting that it had full capacity. lt did this by substituting for the original section 35 of 
the 1985 Act new sections 35, 3SA and 35B. 
Subsection (1) of the new section 35 of the Companies Act 1989 reads as follows:- 
"The validity of an act done by a company shall not be called into question on the 
ground of lack of capacity by reason of anything in the company's 
memorandum." 
This is an improvement of the former section 35(1), as it deals directly with the effects of 
lack of capacity instead of attempting, to deal in the same sub-section with acts in excess 
of directors' powers. It omits the former words "in favour of a person dealing with a 
company" and thereby does not merely remove the uncertainties flowing from "dealing 
with" but makes it clear that neither the company nor a third party can any longer invoke 
the strict ultra vires. Had the section stopped there the only question that would have 
remained was whether the acts done failed to bind the company because those acting for 
it had acted outside their actual or apparent authority. 
2.4.2 Lack of authority and constructive notice 
These two matters were dealt with by sections 35A , 35B and section 711 of the 
Companies Act 1989. 
Section 35A sub-section (1) provides:- 
"In favour of a person dealing with a company in good faith, the power of the 
board of directors to bind the company, or authorise others to do so, shall be 
deemed to be free of any limitations under the company's constitution." 
This, too, is an improvement on the wording of the former section 35 in that it omits the 
iestriction to "transactions decided on by the director " and thus recogni cs that many 
transactions will be decided upon by executive officers appointed by the board of 
directors. 
However this section is not free from difficulties. The first difficulty is that, the 
Companies Act 1989 has never defined what the powers of the directors are. This is left 
to the memorandum and articles of association. 
A more serious objection is that section 35A(l) of the Companies Act 1989 fails to 
afford any protection when the third party has dealt with another organ of the company 
for example the members in the general meeting to whom there may have been certain 
powers awarded under the company's constitution. 
The section however went on to add some qualifications> 
Subsection (2) provides: 
" A member of the company may bring proceedings to restrain the doing of an act 
which for subsection (1) would be beyond the company's capacity; but no such 
proceedings shall lie in respect of an act done in fulfilment of a legal obligation 
arising from a previous act of the company." 
A second qualification was added by subsection (3), which provides that: 
"It remains the duty of the directors to observe any limitation on their powers 
flowing from the company's memorandum and any action by the directors which, 
but for sub. cction ( l ), would be beyond the company's capacity may only be 
ratified by the company by a special resolution. A resolution ratifying such action 
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shall not affect any liability incurred by the directors or any other person; relief 
from any such liability must be agreed to separately by special resolution." 
This subsection was included because of the English Government's declared policy to 
abolish ultra vires in relation to external relations but, so far as possible, to maintain the 
status quo for internal relations between the company and its directors. 
Subsection (1) of section 35A of the Companies Act 1989 retains the expressions 
"dealing with the company" and "in good faith" which caused some difficulty in the 
earlier version of section 3 5. However, subsection(2) of the new section3 5 A gives help in 
the interpretation. 
It provides: 
For this purpose- 
a) a person "deals with" a company if he is a party to any transaction or any act to 
which the company is a party; 
b) a person shall not be regarded as acting in bad faith by reason only of his knowing 
that an act is beyond the powers of the directors under the company's constitution; 
and 
c) a person shall be deemed to have acted in good faith unless the contrary is 
proved. 
Subsection (2)(a) provides a straightforward test of whether a person is "dealing with a 
company". He will be, so long as he is a party to a transaction or an act to which the 
company is also a party. Further, knowledge is itself not conclusive evidence that the 
party acted in bad faith. 
Section 35A(3) of the Companies Act 1989 makes it clear that "any limitation under the 
company's constitution" includes not only a limitation in the memorandum and articles 
but also one deriving from an agreement or resolution of the members even if it does not 
formally alter the memorandum or articles themselves. 
Section 3 SB of the Companies Act 1989 provides that: 
" A party to a transaction with a company is not bound to inquire as to whether it 
is permitted by the company's memorandum or as to any limitation on the powers 
of the board of directors to bind the company or authorise others to do so." 
On its own this adds little to what is already implied by section 35 and 35A and stops far 
short of totally abolishing the doctrine that those having dealings with a company are 
deemed to have notice of its public documents. That further step, is however, taken by the 
new section 711 (I) of the Companies Act 1989 which provides that : 
" A person shall not be taken to have notice of any matter merely because of its 
being disclosed in any document kept by the registrar of companies ( and thus 
available for inspection) or made available by the company for inspection." 
The result of this is that those dealing with the company are no longer deemed to have 
notice of the contents of any document merely because it is one of the company's 
documents available for inspection at the Registrar of Companies or the company's 
registered office. 
Subscct ion (1) is, however, qualified by subsection (2) which reads : 
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"This does not effect the question whether a person is affected by notice of any matter 
by reason of a failure to make such inquires as ought reasonably be mad." 
Gower37 states in his text that at first glance this might appear to diminish the protection 
afforded by section 35A of the Companies Act 1989 to a person dealing with a company 
in good faith. However this is not so. Under section 3 5 A of the Companies Act 1989, in 
favour of such a person " the power of the board of directors to bind the company or 
authorise the others to do so" is deemed to be free of any limitation and he is not 
regarded as acting in bad faith. " by reason only of his knowing that an act is beyond the 
powers of the directors." In this case, section 711 A of the Companies Act 1989 is 
relevant only in situations where section 3 SA of the same Act does not protect him 
because it is not the board of directors that has exceeded its powers but the officer of the 
company through whom he dealt with the company. Here, it is not suggested that a 
failure to make such inquires that ought to made may not be evidence of bad faith; 
however if he has deliberately decided not to make inquires knowing that, if he does, it is 
likely to confirm his suspicions that the board is exceeding its powers, that may be treated 
as equivalent to actual knowledge and, in consequence, as probable bad faith. 
Gower further states that negligent failure to make further inquires cannot, m itself, 
constitute bad faith. 
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2.4.3 Transactions involving Directors 
The new section 322A of the Companies Act 1989 constitutes an important qualification 
to the new sections 35 and 35A. It applies where the transaction exceeds a limitation on 
the powers of the board of directors under the company's constitution and the other 
parties include a director of the company or the holding company, or a person connected 
with such a director, or a company with which such a director is associated. In such 
circumstances the transaction is voidable at the instance of the company and, whether or 
not it is avoided, such parties and any director who authorised the transaction, knowing 
that it exceeded the board's powers, are liable to account to the company for any gains 
they make and to indemnify the company against any loss it suffers. 
The objective of the foregoing statutory changes was as Gower points out "to draw the 
sting of the ultra vires" and constructive notice doctrines, thus improving the position of 
those who dealt with the company externally, while making as few alterations as possible 
to the position as between the company and its members, directors and its other agents. 
2.5 The Malaysian Position on the Doctrine of Ultra Vires 
The Companies Act 1965 ( hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') was drafted by using the 
Uniform Companies Act of Australia as it's main model. Section 20 of the Act which is 
derived from s.20 of the Australian Uniform Companies Act 1961 made important 
changes to common law doctrine of ultra vires in Malaysia. It releases an outsider who is 
contracting with the company from any adv rse application of the doctrine. 
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Before analysing s.20 of the Act, reference will be made first to s.18 and s.19 of the Act. 
Section 18 of the Act requires every company to have an objects clause in its' 
Memorandum of Association. In addition to the powers given to the company in the 
objects clause, the company has all the powers stated in s.19 of the Act, which is :- 
a) power to make donations for patriotic or for charitable purposes (s.19 (1 )(a)); 
b) power to transact any lawful business in aid of Malaysia in the prosecution of any war 
or hostilities in which Malaysia is engaged (s.19(1) (b)); and 
c) unless expressly excluded or modified by the memorandum or articles, the powers set 
forth in the Third Schedule but the powers of a company which has by the license of 
the Minister pursuant to s.24 been registered without the word "Berhad" or pursuant 
to any corresponding previous written law been registered without the addition of the 
word "Limited" to its name shall not include any of the powers set forth in the Third 
Schedule unless expressly included in the memorandum or articles with the approval 
in writing of the Minister (s. 19(1)(c )). 
2.5.1 Section 20 of the Act 
The common law principle that an act of the company which is ultra vires does not bind 
the company to the outsider or vice-versa is set aside by s.20(1) of the Act. As a result, an 
outsider can sue or be sued under a contract entered into by the company which has 
exceeded its powers as stated in the objects clause. This can be illustrated in the case of 
Pamaran Holdings Sdn.Bhd. v. Gonda Holdings Bhd.38 . In this case, by an outsider 
attempted to release himself from the terms of a contract with a company by raising the 
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doctrine of ultra vires as a defence. He failed because s.20 of the Act had removed the 
application of the doctrine between the company and an outsider. 
The Act is silent on whether the doctrine of constructive notice of the public documents 
of the company, like the Memorandum or Articles of Association will be applicable to 
s.20 of the Act. However, it may be presumed that the doctrine of constructive notice will 
not be applicable to s.20 of the Act, because if it is, it will defeat the very purpose of s.20 
of the Act. 
Section 20 of the Act was also applied in the case of Public Bank Bhd. v. Metro 
Construction Sdn. Bhd.39. In this case M Bhd. had created two charges over a piece of 
land as security for a loan given by Bank P to another company, that is T Bhd .. T Bhd. 
has no relationship with M Bhd .. Bank P foreclosed on the land.It was argued that the 
charges were created not for the benefit of M Bhd. but for the benefit of T Bhd. and 
further that the directors of M Bhd. had acted beyond the powers given to them by the 
articles. Also, it was alleged that two of the directors of M Bhd. had committed fraud. 
However, there was no allegation made that Bank P had knowledge of the alleged fraud. 
The memorandum of association ofM Bhd. allowed the company to borrow money and 
create a charge for a legally valid reason. The articles of association of the company 
allowed the directors of the company to borrow money for the company. Justice Lim 
Beng Choon held that both charges were within the powers given by the objects clause of 
the company. The judge relied on the decision of In Re David Payne & Co.40 and the 
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case Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v. British Steel Corporation & Ors.41 and 
held that the loan and the charge was valid because if a company was allowed to borrow 
money for its business, the lender is not required to inquire the purpose for which the 
money is going to be used. The judge also relied on s.20 of the Act and stated that even 
though the company acted ultra vires its memorandum, the transaction can still be valid 
by virtue of s.20 of the Act. 
A pertinent point is whether an act which is ultra vies the article can be saved by s.20 of 
the Act. Section 20 (1) of the Act states: 
" No act or purported act of the company . . . and no conveyance or transfer of 
property, whether real or personal, to or by a company shall be invalid by 
reason only of the fact that the company was without capacity or power to do the 
act or to execute or take the conveyance or transfer." 
It is about the powers of the company as stated in the memorandum. It is not about the 
authority of the directors or the officers of the company as stated in the articles of 
association. The authority of directors or officers and how far they can bind the company 
is usually stated in the articles of association. At common law, an outsider is taken to 
have constructive notice of the contents of the memorandum and articles of association of 
the company. If an act of an agent of a company is clearly outside the articles of 
association, the outsider is said to have constructive notice of the abuse of power. The 
fact that the outsider did not actually read the article is immaterial. The act though not 
ultra vires under s.20 of the Act, can be avoided by the company under the law of agency. 
41 Supru not 16 
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In the case of Public Bank Bhd. v, Metro Construction Sdn. Bhd.42 , the judge chose to 
combine the two issues, that is, the capacity of the company and the authority of its 
organs and agents. This, confused what was painstakingly untwined by the Court of 
Appeal in the Rolled Steel case. The judge first held that the two directors had ostensible 
or apparent, if not actual authority to execute the charges. However, he still had to 
address the improper purpose argument, that is, the directors could not borrow money if 
the borrowed money was not used for the purposes of the company. 
He went on to cite the case of Cotman v. Brougham" and the case of Re Introductions" 
and held that where a company has a general power to borrow money for the purposes of 
its business, a lender in not bound to enquire into the purpose for which the money is to 
be applied. 
Thus, under normal circumstances a third party need not enquire and if he does not and is 
ignorant of the purposes, the transaction is binding on the company. 
The issue then is what is the basis for this principle, ultra vires or agency? In Re 
Introductioti", the basis was ultra vires until it was remodelled as agency by the Court of 
Appeal in the Rolled Steel case.46 
41 I 199111 MU 56 
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Lim Beng Choon J. in the Metro case47 quoted the David Payne 's48 case as authority for 
the two propositions : (1) that where there is a power to borrow for the company's 
business and the borrowing is made otherwise than for those purposes, the borrowing is 
not void as being ultra vires; and (2) a third party is not put on notice by an express 
requirement that the power is only exerciseable for the purposes of the company's 
business. 
Therefore though he seems to have avoided giving a definite answer pertaining to 
whether it is ultra vires or agency, by holding that, whatever the case, the transactions 
were binding as the party had no knowledge of the improper purpose. The fact that he has 
quoted with approval the two propositions goes to show that this case gives judicial 
support for both the propositions. 
Therefore the narrow view of ultra vires, that is, a transaction within the company's 
powers but for unauthorised objects would not be ultra vires and would not fall within the 
scope of s.20 of the Act seems to be good law in Malaysia.49 
Another case which is similar to the facts of Public Bank Bhd. v. Metro Construction 
Sdn. Bhd. so and was decided likewise is the case of Executive Aids Sdn. Bhd v. Kuala 
Lumpur Finance Bhd.51. 
Even though s.20 (1) of the Act has set aside the doctrine ultra vires as far as the outsider 
•7 Supra note 42 
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is considered, there are still some effects of the common law doctrine applicable in 
Malaysia. 
Firstly, s.20 (2)(a) of the Act states that an ultra vires act may be restrained before it is 
fully performed by a member or a debenture holder secured by a floating charge. A 
discussion of s.20(2)(a) of the Act is incomplete unless reference is also made to s.20 
(3)of the Act. 
Section 20 (3) of the Act reads as follows: 
" If the unauthorised act, conveyance or transfer sought to be restrained in any 
proceedings under subsection (2) (a) is being or is to be performed or made 
pursuant to any contract to which the company is a party, the court may, if all 
the parties to the contract are parties to the proceedings and if the court deems it 
to be just and equitable, set-aside and restrain the performance of the contract and 
may allow to the company or to the parties to the contract (as the case requires) 
compensation for the loss or damage sustained by either of them which may result 
from the action of the court in setting aside and restraining the performance of the 
contract but anticipated profits to be derived from the performance of the contract 
shall not be awarded by the Court as a loss or damage sustained." 
Clearly the intention of s.20 (3) of the Act is to protect both the company and the 
innocent outsider or the third party from the effects of s.20 (2) (a) of the Act. Where an 
executory ultra vires transaction is restrained by the court under s.20 (2) (a) both the 
company and the outsider may suffer loss as expenses may have been incurred in 
anticipation of the contract being performed by both parties. Section 20 (3) of the Act 
gives the court a wide discretion to order compensation for either party to the tran action 
in the event the court grants a restraining order or an injunctive relief 52 It is to be 
highlighted however that the courts power, although couched in wide terms, does not 
extend to awarding damages for loss of anticipated profits. 
The first point to note from s.20 (2) (a) of the Act is that the right to restrain is also given 
to a debenture holder under a floating charge, a peculiarity of the Malaysian provision. 
The second point is that the right to restrain arises even though a binding relationship has 
arisen between the company and the outsider or third party. However, the right is only 
available where the transaction is executory and not fully performed. The third point to 
note is that the company itself cannot be an applicant under s.20 (2) (a) of the Act. It is 
debarred by s.20 (1) of the Act from asserting ultra vires. The fourth point is that the 
member or debenture holder under a floating charge cannot seek any injunctive relief 
against the outsider or third party. This is because by virtue ofs.20 (1) ofthe Act the ultra 
vires doctrine has been abolished as between the company and the outsider. The member 
or debenture holder must therefore seek to restrain the company from executing the ultra 
vires act. The fourth point was stressed by Street J. in the instructive case of Hawkesbury 
Development Co. Ltd v, Landmark Finance Pty. Ltd. 53 
Secondly, s.20 (2) (b) of the Act states that the issue of a company's lack of capacity may 
be raised in any action by the company or any member against any present or former 
officers of the company. This may be an action to restrain an officer from causing the 
'2 Obviously the outsider or third party must be 11 party before the court before it can grant it an order in tis favour. As 
to procedural details by which the outsider may be made a party see Balan and Talat Mahmood, "Doktrin Ultra Vires 
dim Sek yen 20 Aktn Syunkut 1965", an article about to be publi ·hcd in Ole Journal of Malaysian & Comparative 
I .aw (JMCL) Vol.23. 
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company to act in a manner that is unauthorised by its memorandum of association or an 
action against an officer in respect of his breach of duty in causing the company to do an 
ultra vires act. 
Thirdly, the fact that a company has acted beyond its capacity may be relied upon in any 
petition by the Minister to have the company wound-up. 
Fourthly, the case of Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche54 it was stated that 
if a transaction is ultra vires, it may not be made intra vires even by the unanimous assent 
of the members. In Malaysia, there is no necessity for ratification in order to make an 
ultra vires transaction binding; because it is binding by virtue of s.20(1) of the Act. 
However, the principle an ultra vires act cannot be made intra vires even with the 
unanimous consent of the members still remains. This means a member may still try to 
restrain an ultra vires act even though he had previously consented to it. However, the 
court will take into consideration the previous consent of the member before it exercises 
its discretion to restrain the act. 
Finally, s.20 of the Act has no application to foreign companies as the section refers to 
companies and not corporations. S.4 of the Act state that a company refers to a company 
incorporated under the Act. 
\~ '"' I ,,up111 uotc 
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2.6 The Australian Position on the Doctrine of Ultra Vires 
Prior to l" January 1984, the memorandum of every company in Australia had to contain 
an objects clause. S.117(2) of the Australian Corporations Act 1984 (hereinafter referred 
to as "the Law") eliminated this requirement. Companies incorporated after 1 January 
1984 have had a choice whether or not to include an objects clause in the memoranda. 
Further, companies, no matter when incorporated, can amend their memoranda so as to 
alter, omit or insert any provisions with respect to their objects or powers as stated in 
s.172(1) of the Law. 
Most companies incorporated after 1 January 1984 in Australia have dispensed with an 
objects clause and rely on the powers contained in s.161(1) of the Law. 
Under s.161(1) of the Law, a company has the legal capacity of a natural person. This 
. means that a company is able to engage in any business or activity and may acquire and 
exercise rights in the same way as a human being. 
However, there are still a large number of companies with an objects clause. These 
include companies incorporated before 1984 and companies which may wish to restrict 
their activities to specified objects. They include joint venture companies which are 
incorporated to carry out a specific project. Under the joint venture agreement, the parties 
may wish to limit the company's activities to the joint venture purposes. 
Section 161 (2) of the Law provides that notwithstanding that such companies have 
objects in the memoranda, the S.161(1) of the Law powers still apply. 
As stated earlier the doctrine of ultra vires can only have application to a company whose 
memorandum contains a statement of its objects or other self-imposed restrictions on the 
exercise of its powers. Even in such cases, the operation of the ultra vires doctrine in 
Australia is no longer as significant as it once was. This is due to several developments in 
the Law:- 
1) s.161 in effect gives every company the unlimited legal capacity of a natural person. 
2) s.162 ensures that the concluded contracts with outsiders cannot be overturned merely 
because an arrangement breaches a company's objects or other self-imposed 
restrictions. 
3) s.160 assists in the interpretation of ss.161 and 162. It states that their purpose is to 
abolish the doctrine of ultra vires as it applies to dealings with outsiders while at the 
same time to ensure that a company's objects and powers are given effect to by its 
officers and members; 
4) s.165( 1) has abolished the doctrine of constructive notice; 
5) the courts have generally broadly construed the objects, particularly the dependent 
objects; and 
6) s.172 gives every company the ability to alter its objects clause. 
b9 
2.6.1 Section 162 of the Law 
The Law however, does recognise that in certain circumstances, ultra vires may be 
asserted. These circumstances involve matters of an internal nature and is explained in 
s.160 (b) of the Law. The second object of the Law with respect to the legal capacity of 
companies is to ensure that the rules of a company relating to objects or powers are given 
effect to by the company's officers and members, without unduly affecting outsiders in 
their dealing with the company. 
A company contravenes s.162(2) of the Law where : 
i) it exercises a power contrary to an express restriction or prohibition contained in its 
memorandum or articles of association; or 
ii) the memorandum contains objects and the company does an act otherwise than in 
pursuance of those objects. 
An officer of a company contravenes s.162 (3) of the Law if the officer is involved in the 
company's contravention ofs.162 (2) ofthe Law. 
However, s.162 (4) of the Law states that neither a company that contravenes s.162 (2) of 
the Law or an officer who contravenes s.162 (3) of the Law is guilty of an offence. 
The policy expressed ins. 160(a) of the Law is given effect by s.162 (5) of the Law. The 
exercise of a power contrary to a restriction or prohibition contained in the company's 
constitution or an act outside its objects clause of the memorandum is not invalid merely 
because of the contravention of s.162 (2) of the Law. Similarly, s.162 (6) of the Law 
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states that an act of an officer who contravenes s.162 (3) is not invalid merely because the 
officer contravenes the section. 
Despite the effect of s.162 (5) and s.162 (6) of the Law the fact of non- compliance with 
the objects or any restrictions or prohibitions may still be raised in certain circumstances. 
These are listed in s.162 (7) of the Law. The fact of non-compliance may be asserted or 
relied upon only in the following proceedings: 
1. A prosecution of a person for an offence against the Law under s.162(7)( c) of the 
Law. Whilst s.162(4) of the Law makes it clear that an officer who is involved in a 
contravention of s.162(2) of the Law is not guilty of an offence under the section, 
under s.162(7)(c) of the Law that contravention may be raised in other contexts. For 
example, an officer who allows the company to contravene s. 162 of the Law may 
breach either the duty to act honestly or the duty to exercise a reasonable degree of 
care and diligence under s.232(2) and (4) of the Law and so be guilty of criminal 
offences under s.13 l 7F A of the Law. 
2. An application for an order unders.230 of the Law brought under S.162 (7)(d) of the 
Law. Section 162(7)(d) of the Law allows the contravention of s.162 of the Law to be 
raised in the context of an application for an order under s.230 of the Law. This 
section enables the Australian Securities Commission and certain other persons 
including a liquidator, members or creditors to apply to the court for an order 
prohibiting a person from being a director or from taking part in the management of a 
corporation where the corporation has repeatedly breached the Law and that person 
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has failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the repeated breaches or where the 
person repeatedly breached the Law or his or her duties. 
3. An application for an order under s.260 of the Law under s.162 (7)(e) of the Law. 
Section 260 of the Law permits members to seek a remedy where the affairs of a 
company are conducted in a manner that are oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or 
unfairly discriminatory against members or contrary to the interests of the members 
as a whole. The reference to s.260 of the Law in s.162(7) ( e) of the Law indicates that 
the fact that a company exercises a power contrary to an express restriction or 
prohibition in its memorandum or outside its objects may involve oppressive or unfair 
conduct. 
4. An application for an injunction under sl324 of the Law to restrain the company from 
entering into an agreement under s.162 (7)(f) of the Law. Of the six proceedings 
specified in s.162 (7) of the Law, para (f) can have the most impact on a company's 
dealings with outsiders. It allows ultra vires to raised in the context of an application 
for an injunction under s.1324 of the Law to restrain the company from entering into 
a contract or agreement which is outside its objects or is in breach of a restriction or 
prohibition contained in the memorandum or articles of association. Section 1324 of 
the Law allows either the Australian Securities Commission or a person whose 
interests are effected by conduct that involves a contravention of the Law to apply for 
an injunction restraining such conduct or possibly requiring that an act or thing be 
done. 
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5. Proceedings (other than an application for an injunction) by the company, or a 
member against the present or former officers under s.162 (7)(g) of the Law. This 
section allows the contravention of s.162 of the Law to be raised in proceedings by 
the company, or by a member against the present or former officers. The section 
appears to include claims for damages against officers for harm caused to a company 
as a consequence of it entering into an agreement which contravenes s.162 of the 
Law. This is a statutory exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle 55 This rule 
prevents shareholders from enforcing rights against officers whose duties are only 
owed to the company. 
6. An application by the Australian Securities Commission or a member for the 
winding-up of the company under s.162 (7)(h) of the Law. 
2.6.2 Abolition of the Doctrine of Constructive Notice 
In their application of the ultra vires doctrine the courts relied on a principle that persons 
dealing with a company had constructive notice of its memorandum and articles of 
association. The company could then assert that a contract outside the objects was ultra 
vires and he could not be bound by the contract. The legislation has recognised the 
harshness of this and abolished the doctrine of constructive notice. Under s.165 (1) of the 
Law, a person is not taken to have knowledge of the memorandum or articles of 
association or any other public document or particulars by reason only that they have 
been lodged with the Australian Securities Commission. This means that an unexecuted, 
"(t84l)2llurc'1(1l,h7FR 189 
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but binding agreement with an outsider cannot be restrained under s.162 (7)(f) of the Law 
on the basis that it was ultra vires and that the outsider had constructive notice of the 
company's objects. In addition, persons dealing with a company are entitled to make 
certain assumptions under s.164 (3) of the Law. These include an assumption that the 
memorandum and articles of association have been complied with, as stated in s.164 
(3)(a) of the Law. The abolition of the doctrine of constructive notice has improved the 
position of outsiders dealing with a company. It is now more difficult for companies to 
avoid their contractual obligations. 
2. 7 Conclusion 
The ultra vires doctrine was once a serious trap for those contracting with a company. 
lngenous drafting of the objects clause and legislative intervention has drawn the sting of 
the doctrine. 
England, the original source of our Company Law has gone to almost the extent of 
granting full capacity to companies. Australia has taken a bolder step and has given full 
legal capacity to companies. Both the English and Australian legislatures have recognised 
that some parts of the old doctrine are beneficial and must remain and therefore have 
preserved it statutory provisions. In England, directors are under a duty to the company 
and its members to adhere to a company's objects clause. Again in England, a member 
could restrain a proposed ultra vires transaction provided that no legal obligation has 
arisen between the company and a third party. Australia has provisions in its 
orporations Law which achieve similar results where the company chooses to state its 
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objects clause in its memorandum of association. Both legislatures have abolished its 
constructive notice doctrine. 
Malaysia has continued to pin its faith in its s.20 (1) of the Companies Act 1965. Section 
20(1) abolishes the application of the doctrine between a company and a third party. An 
unusual feature of the Malaysian provision is that a member or a holder of a debenture 
secured by a floating charge can restrain performance of an ultra vires act even though a 
binding agreement has arisen between the company and a third party, as long as the 
transaction remains executory and remains to be performed. Although the third party may 
receive compensation by virtue of s.20(3), the compensation is limited. A pertinent point 
to note about the Malaysian statutory provisions on ultra vires is the absence of a clear 
and express provision abolishing the Common law doctrine of constructive notice. Thus 
technically it is possible for -n court to nullify the effect of s.20 (1) by ruling that the . 
Common law doctrine still applies in Malaysia. The application of the Common law 
doctrine will make s.20 (1) a dead letter. Such a ruling is extremely remote bearing in 
mind the legislative intent behind s.20 ( 1 ). However, a clear statutory provision clarifying 
the position would be useful. 
56 
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CHAPTER3 
THEAGENTSOFTHECOMPANY 
3.1 Introduction 
As stated earlier, a company is an abstract entity, and it can only enter into contracts 
through the actions of a natural person. Section 35 (4) of the Companies Act 1965 
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act')'. provides that so far as concerns the formality of 
making a contract, a person acting under the express or i~plied authority of a company, 
may make a contract in the name of or on behalf of the company in the same manner as if 
that contract were made by a natural person. 
This indicates that a company may enter into a contract directly through one of its organs, 
usually the board of directors, or through a person who represents the mind and will of 
the company. This type of situation is governed under the organic theory of company law 
which largely lies outside the law of agency but draws upon it. 
A company may also enter into a contract indirectly through an agent. The agent may be 
an officer or employee of the company. Whether a company will be liable under a 
contract for the acts of an officer or agent is governed under the general law of agency. 
These agency principles have been modified by the common law and the Act so as to 
recognise the ab tract nature of companies. The agency rules which are applicable to 
1 Act 125 
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companies are subject to the common law rules as to the doctrine of constructive notice 
and a special set of principles known as the "rule in Turquand's case" and its exceptions. 
Whenever there is a delegation of power to an agent, that agent is given some sort of 
authority by the principal. This authority is the actual authority of the agent. This 
authority may be express or implied authority. Express authority is that which is 
expressly conferred upon the agent. Implied authority is not expressly stated; it ts 
authority implied by the circumstances. This may be of two forms: authority to do things 
incidental to matters that the agent is expressly authorised to do so, 2 and authority to do 
things that a person in that position usually does' . This type of implied authority is 
sometimes known as "customary" or "usual" authority. 
3.2 ACTUAL AUTHORITY 
Actual authority arises where the principal has given consent to the agent to act for the 
principal 4 . This may derive from an express or implied conferral of authority by the 
principal to do certain acts or enter into a particular transaction. 
Section 139 of the Contracts Act 19505 states that the authority of an agent may be 
expressed or implied. Furthers. 140 of the Contracts Act 1950 defines what is an express 
and implied authority. It states that an express authority is when authority is given by 
words spoken or written and an implied authority is said to be inferred from the 
2 Pol« v, Leask ( J 860) 28 Beav 562, 575 per Sir John Romilly MR ( Moster of the Rolls' Court, England); affirmed by 
U1c Ilous of Lords. (1863) '31UCh155 
1 I !t•~v - I tutchinson v. Bruylwad Ltd. [ 1968) 1 QU 549, 583 per Lord Denning MR ( Court of Appeal, England) 
~ Ford und Austin'. Pnnciplc of Corporutions Law 7t11 ed. Buncrworths 1995 p. 505 
Act 116 
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circumstances of the case; and things spoken or written , or the ordinary course of 
dealing, may be accounted circumstances of the case. 
The extent of the agents authority is given in s.141(1) and (2) of the Contracts Act 1950. 
It states that if an agent has authority to do an act, he has the authority to do every lawful 
thing which is necessary in order to do the act or if the agent has authority to carry on a 
business, he has authority to do every lawful thing necessary for the purpose, or usually 
done in the course of conducting such business. 
In a company context, an agent may be conferred actual authority by some statute. For 
instance, section 57(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code" provides that the managing 
director of a company is authorised to appoint a person to represent the company if it is 
charged with an offence. Authority may also be conferred upon a particular agent by the 
memorandum or articles of association. More commonly, however, the board of directors 
may appoint agents and delegate duties and functions to them'. An agent may also be 
conferred authority to act by the general meeting acting within its sphere. Finally, the 
company's agents may be authorised to delegate authority to sub-agents. 
Further, an officer or agent will often have implied authority. A company will usually 
give consent to an agent to act for it by appointing the agent to a particular position. 
Generally, the articles will confer a wide power of management on the board of 
directors8. In the usual case, the board is the organ of the company for the purposes of 
management so that its acts are the acts of the company itself. The authority of the board 
n 'up 68 
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in this respect, stems directly from the articles. While the board is more than an agent as 
regards contracts between a company and an outsider it has actual authority in the same 
way as an agent may have actual authority to act for the company. 
However, outsiders do not deal directly with the board. Rather, they deal with a person 
to whom the board has delegated some or all of its functions. This person may be 
appointed as managing director of the company" upon whom the directors may confer 
any of the powers exercisable by them'" . 
The appointment of a person as managing director results in that person having the 
implied authority usually associated with that position. The implication arises from the 
facts of the appointment as managing director and the usual or customary authority of a 
managing director in the circumstances of the company and the nature of its business. 
In certain cases, the appointment of a person to a position other than managing director 
may also create agency by implied authority. In Brick and Pipe Industries Ltd v 
Occidental Life Nominees Pty Ltd11 , a director was taken to have implied authority to 
act as the company in circumstances where he had the controlling shares and assumed the 
role of managing director with the acquiescence of the other directors. Transactions had 
generally been entered into without prior reference to the board and no attempt was made 
to interfere with this assertion of the control. 
The acquiescence of members of the board to the conferral of actual authority requires, 
v Sc • Tuble A mt 76( I) 
10 See 'J ublc urt 91 (I) 
II (llJIJ7) 10 ACL( 2~1 
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"not merely the silent acquiescence of the individual members of the board, but 
the communications by words or conduct of their respective consents to one 
12 
another and to the agent" 
Normally, the appointment of a person as a director does not carry with it the implied 
authority to bind the company.13 The powers of management under the articles is 
conferred on the board as a collegiate body. In the case of Dart Sum Timber (Pte) Ltd v 
Bank of Canton Ltd 14 it was held that an individual director has no authority as such to 
make contracts on behalf of his company, even if he is chairman of the board of directors 
unless he is expressly authorised to do so. 
Lord Justice Browne - Wilkinson in the case of Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v 
British Steel Corporation & Ors. 15 said 
" Apart from questions of ostensible authority, directors like any other agents can 
only bind the company by acts done in accordance with the formal requirements 
of their agency.... Acts done otherwise than in accordance with these formal 
requirements will not be the acts of the company?" . 
Hence, where powers are not exercised in the manner prescribed by the articles or the 
Act, the power when exercised cannot be legally classified as an act of the company 
unless the principle of unanimous consent is applicable. 
11 per Diplock Jin Freemon and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd ( 1964] 2 QB 480 
11 Northside I )uvl'iopmNllS Pty J,td 11 R(!R(,ftror -G ineral ( 1990) 8 ACLC 611 at p 645 per Dawson J. 
1~ (1982) 2 MLJ 101 (Court of Appeal, Singapore) 
n 1198~11 All ER 52 
lft llnd nt p '>1-92 
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In Kelapa Sawit (Teluk Anson) Sdn. Bhd. v Dr Yeoh Kim Leng & Ors11 the articles of 
association of the company, in particular article 54, empowered the directors to pass 
circular resolutions and the circular resolutions signed by all directors would be as valid 
and effected as if it had been passed at a meeting of the directors duly constituted. It also 
provided that the seal of the company may only be affixed under the authority of a 
director's resolution and in the presence of a director and a secretary both of whom were 
also required to sign every document to which the seal of the company was affixed. 
Following the practice of the plaintiff to issue shares to its members as capitalisation of 
loans or debts which may be owed to the members, a circular resolution was purportedly 
passed to allot shares. The circular resolution, was however, only signed by three and not 
by all the directors. Additionally, the share certificates were already signed and sealed 
when the circular resolution was presented to the three directors for their respective 
signatures. 
The Supreme Court (now the Federal Court) held that the general rule is that directors 
may only exercise their powers collectively by passing resolutions at board meetings 
unless the articles otherwise provide. While the directors were empowered to pass the 
circular resolution, they would only have done so in the manner prescribed by the articles 
and likewise the directors could not have signed and sealed the share certificates in the , 
absence of the prior resolution. In view of these irregularities, the allotment of the share 
would not be described as an act of the company and hence was a nullity. 
17 
( 1991) I MU 30 I 
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The appointment of a person as secretary of a company confers implied authority to make 
contracts in connection with the internal administration of the company but not in relation 
to the management of the company in the sense of carrying on the company's business18. 
Whether a chairman of directors has implied authority to bind a company is not entirely 
clear. The usual functions of a chairman do not generally extend to conducting the 
company's business operations 19 and a chairman has no more authority to bind the 
company than has any other single director." Ford suggests that as a chairman commonly 
receives more remuneration than other directors, there may be some things that the 
chairman of a public company is impliedly authorised to do which is beyond the usual 
h . f . 1 d' 
21 
aut onty o a sing e irector. 
While the usual authority of a chairman is unclear, the existence of implied authority may 
be determined from the circumstances and conduct of the company and its chairman in 
the same way as occurred in the Brick and Pipe case. This arose in Equiticorp Finance 
Ltd v Bank of New Zealand12 . The Equiticorp Group comprised of companies in its 
finance arm and other companies in an industrial arm. Hawkins was chairman of the 
Group and director of a number of companies. A company in the industrial group 
borrowed money from a bank. The bank required early repayment and Hawkins applied 
is Panorama Developments (Guilford) Ltd v Fide/is Furnishings Fabrics Ltd [1971] 2 QB 711 and 
Northside Dt:velopments at 645 per Dawson J. 
19 //ugh ts v NM Superannuation Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACLC 923 
20 I My itutchmson v Brayh tad Ltd 1196811 QB 549 
21 Nole ~24 ut Jl 105, Ford '. Pnnc1ples of Corporations Law (6111 Ed) 
22 (1993) 11ACLC'952 
82 
assets of two member companies of the finance arm with the tacit approval of all but one 
of the directors of the finance arm companies. There was no formal approval for the 
transfer of assets from the board of the finance arm companies. When the companies 
went into liquidation, they sought recovery of the assets on the ground, among others, 
that the payment of the assets was unauthorised by the two companies. 
Clarke and Cripps JJ A, in a majority judgment, held that the business of the various 
companies in the Equiticorp Group was conducted under the general authority of 
Hawkins who undertook all decisions of significance either with or without consultation 
with senior members of management. In these circumstances, Hawkins had implied 
authority to apply the assets of the finance companies in the manner in which he directed. 
In a dissenting judgment, Kirby P held that no implied authority had been conferred on 
Hawkins. He stated : 
"Where however actual authority is held to be implied, it remains vital to ask the 
' ' 
question: 'authority for what?' It cannot be an authority at large to do anything at 
all. Relevantly, it must be authority to do something apparently in the best 
. f h 23 interests o t e company. 
Kirby P also found that the other directors were either unaware of the disposal of the 
assets or were opposed to it. This did not amount to acquiescence at the time in the 
transfer of the assets. In his judgement, Kirby P noted that outsiders should be protected 
in their dealings with companies which operate in an irregular way and are dominated 
and effectively controlled by particular individuals. Kirby P said, 
- 
'1 ( l'N1) 11 AC'LC 952 at p 978 
"it is to debase the integrity of company law, and the obligations of companies to 
operate according to law, to extend the protective principle to cloak Mr Hawkins 
with implied actual authority .... The suggested imperative of "realism" and the 
real politic of corporate control does not authorise courts to ride roughshod over 
the due observance of company law."24 
This dissenting judgment emphasises the balance of interests which is at the heart of 
determining when a company is to be bound by the unauthorised acts of its officers. 
These considerations form the basis of the common law principles. 
3.3 APPARENT AUTHORITY 
An agent's apparent or ostensible authority creates the agency relationship because of the 
appearance of authority conferred on the agent. It does not depend on any agreement or 
. relationship between principal and agent. It is often the case that an outsider does not 
know whether an agent has actual authority and the extent of that authority. Usually, all 
the outsider relies on is the appearance of authority. Depending on the circumstances, the 
extent of an agent's apparent authority may be the same as the agent's actual authority or 
it may exceed the scope of the agent's actual authority. 
In some situations a person may have apparent authority to do particular acts for the 
principal even though that person has been given no actual authority to contract. Thus 
actual and apparent authority rest upon entirely different basis but may often overlap. 
If an agent's apparent authority can be established, it creates an agency by estoppel. This 
means that as between principal and outsider, the principal is prevented or estopped from 
I~ lh1d 111 p 1J7K 
denying that the agent lacked authority. An agency by estoppel creates a contract between 
the principal and outsider in the same way as a contract is created by an agent with actual 
authority. 
The representation of the agent's authority must be made by the principal to the outsider. 
A principal is not liable merely on the representations of the agent. Where an outsider 
deals with a particular person, it may be difficult to determine whether the dealing is with 
the company or only with that person. In particular, is a representation made by a person 
acting as an officer to be taken as representations by the company? 
The principal may expressly make the representation to the outsider. It is more usual for 
the representation to arise by the principal' s conduct. A representation by conduct may 
take either one of two forms: 
i) it may arise when the principal permits the agent to occupy a particular position. In 
such cases the principal represents or holds out that the agent has the customary authority 
of a person in such a position. In this respect it is similar to an agent with implied actual 
authority resulting from the position occupied. 
ii) it may also arise when the principal's conduct permits the agent to carry out particular 
tasks on the principal's behalf which are beyond the scope of the agent's customary 
authority. For example, a single director may be permitted by the company to contract on 
its behalf in a number of previous transactions. This is a holding out that the director's 
authority is greater than would normally be the case. Apparent authority typically arises 
where a person is allowed by the board to act as a managing director even though not 
appointed to this position. Apparent authority may arise even though implied actual 
authority may not have been conferred because the board had not acquiesced to the 
particular person assuming the role of managing director. 
In Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd 25 there were two 
controllers of a company formed for the purpose of developing a property. Each held half 
of the issued shares and they comprised the board together with a nominee of each. The 
quorum of the board was four. One of the two controllers was absent for a long period. 
The other controller acted as managing director with the approval of the board, even 
though he had not actually been appointed. The articles were of similar effect to Table A 
art. 76 and conferred a power on the board to appoint a managing director. The de facto 
managing director entered into contracts related to the property development business of 
the company. One of these contracts was with a firm of architects which sought to 
enforce the contract after the company refused to pay its fees. The Court of Appeal held 
that the company was bound by the acts of its de facto managing director. It had 
represented through its board that its agent was the managing director if the company. 
The contract was within the customary authority of a managing director and the outsider 
had relied on this apparent authority. 
Diplock LJ stated four conditions which must be met in order for a company to be bound 
by the acts of an agent where the agent had no actual authority to so act : 
a) a representation must be made to the outsider that the agent had authority to enter into 
the kind of contract the outsider seeks to enforce; 
b) the representation must be made by someone with actual authority to manage the 
company's business or at least authority in respect of the matters relating to the 
contract; 
c) the outsider must be induced by the representation to enter into the contract and in fact 
relied upon the representation; 
d) the memorandum or articles do not deprive the company of the capacity to either enter 
into the type of contract concerned or to delegate authority to enter into that kind of 
contract to the agent. 
The last of these conditions refers to acts which are ultra vires the company in the sense of 
being outside the objects clause in the memorandum. Ultra vires contracts have been 
dealt with in Chapter 2. The last condition also requires the articles to authorise a 
delegation of authority to enter into the type of contract concerned. This power to 
delegate is usually conferred by articles in a form similar to Table A art 76 of the Articles 
of Association. 
The condition which has caused the most uncertainty from the outsider's point of view 
has been the second. This requires the representation to be made by someone with actual 
authority to manage the company's business or in respect of matters to which the contract 
relates. In the Freeman and Lockyer case, this did not present a problem to the outsider 
because the representation or holding out was made by the board through its 
acquiescence to the de facto managing director acting as such. Usually, an outsider will 
be in contact with ·omeonc to whom the board has delegated authority. It will be 
difficult for the outsider to determine the nature and extent of this authority. This 
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becomes critical where the board has represented that someone has apparent authority to 
bind the company and this person then purports to cloak another person with apparent 
authority. Such a situation does not meet the second of Diplock LJ' s conditions. This 
fact situation arose in the Australian High Court case of Crabtree-Vickers Pty Ltd v 
Australian Direct Mail Advertising Co Pty Ltd 26 in which the court approved of the 
principles stated by Diplock J in Freeman and Lockyer. A de facto managing director 
was found to lack actual authority because he had not been formally appointed. An 
employee of the company was a member of a board committee to whom the board had 
delegated the power of management. This employee has been held out by the de facto 
managing director to have the necessary authority to enter into a contract on behalf of the 
company. The High Court applied the principles formulated by Diplock LJ and held that 
the employee had no actual authority. He also did not have apparent authority because 
the representation was made by someone who himself only had apparent authority to 
carry on management of the company. The de facto managing director had apparent 
authority on the same basis as was the case in Freeman and Lockyer. This person did not 
have actual authority because he had not been formally appointed. In order for the 
representation in this case to have been made by someone with actual authority, it would 
need to have been made by either the board or the committee of directors. It seems 
curious that a de facto managing director may bind the company through his apparent 
authority based on a representation by the company and yet, such a person is unable to 
represent that someone else has apparent authority. If a company can be bound by a 
lb (1976)50ALJR20J 
contract, in circumstances such as that which arose in Freeman and Lockyer, it is hard to 
see why the company cannot be bound by a representation of the same person which 
holds out that someone else has authority to bind the company. This problematic result 
could be avoided if the de facto managing director is regarded as having implied actual 
authority because the board acquiesced to his assumption of broad powers. 
This strict adherence to the conditions enunciated in the Freeman and Lockyer case 
produces considerable difficulties and uncertainty to an outsider. The outsider is required 
to ascertain the validity of a conferral of authority on the managing director in 
circumstances where the dealings are not with the board or a committee to whom 
authority has been delegated. 
To the outsider, the circumstances indicate a holding out by the company because it 
appears to have allowed the representation to be made. The application of agency law 
requires the representation to be made by an organ of the company, such as its board or a 
person or persons to whom authority has been delegated, such as managing director or 
committee of directors. In the latter case, the outsider must hope that the authority was 
properly conferred on the committee so as to constitute actual authority. This places 
outsiders dealing with any person who does not possess actual authority in a potentially 
perilous position and yet it may be difficult or impossible for an outsider to ascertain the 
nature of the authority. 
3.4 USTOMARY AUTHORITY 
Where an officer or agent of the company exercises authority which is not customary for 
someone in that position to normally have, the agent docs not have implied authority or 
IW 
apparent authority to bind the company. The customary authority of particular officers is 
relevant in considering the limits of both implied actual authority and apparent authority. 
3.4.1. Customary Powers and Duties of Directors 
While it is usual for the board as a whole or a managing director to be conferred with 
very wide powers of management, it is not usual for an individual, ordinary director to 
have such authority. In Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar Genera/27 , 
Dawson J considered the authority of an individual director. 
"The position of director does not carry with it an ostensible authority to act on 
behalf of the company. Directors can act only collectively as a board and the 
function of an individual director is to participate in decisions of the board. In the 
absence of some representation made by the company, a director has no ostensible 
authority to bind it". 
In the case of Dart Sum Timber (Pte.) Ltd. v. Bank of Canton Ltd.28 the court held that an 
individual director has no authority to make contracts on behalf of his company, even if 
he is the chairman of the board of directors, unless he is authorized to do so. 
It should be noted that while the customary authority of directors is limited, they may still 
be able to bind the company, if they have actual authority, or there has been a 
representation or holding out by the company that they have greater authority than is 
customary for directors. 
11 (1990) K AC'LC 611atp645 
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The articles of association frequently give individual directors the power to: 
a. authenticate the company's common seal: Table A, art.96; 
b. sign the company's negotiable instruments, including cheques and receipts on behalf of 
the company: Table A, art.77. 
In Brick and Pipe Industries Ltd v. Occidental Life Nominees Pty.Ltd. 
29, 
a dominant 
director was taken to represent the mind and will of the company and have the authority 
of a managing director where the other directors acquiesced to this and did not involve 
themselves in transactions entered into by the dominant director. In the absence of the 
acquiescence of other directors, and individual director does not have customary 
authority to represent that someone else had been appointed as secretary. This can be 
enunciated from the New Zealand case of Bank of New Zealand v. Fiberi Pty.Ltd.30. 
3.4.2. Customary Powers and Duties of Secretaries 
A company secretary may in certain circumstances act as an agent of the company. The 
implied authority or apparent authority of a company secretary extends to making 
contracts on behalf of a company which relate to the administration or internal workings 
of the company. In this respect, the customary authority of the company secretary has 
expanded substantially over the past century. 
lH 1198 I 2 MLJ I() I (Court of Appeal • Singapore) 
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The early cases held that a secretary had no customary authority to bind a company. In 
New/ands v. National Employers' Accident Assoc.,31 Brett MR said: 
"A secretary is a mere servant; his position is that he is to do what he is told and ' 
no persons can assume that he has any authority to represent anything at ~I." 
A similar restrictive view was taken in Ruben v. Great Fingal/ Consolidated". In that 
case, the secretary issued false share certificates by forging the signatures of the 
company's directors. He then used the share certificates as security for a loan to himself. 
The lender sued the company on the basis of the untrue information contained in the 
share certificate. 
The House of Lords held that company was not liable because the forgery rendered the 
certificate a "pure nullity". The secretary had no actual or apparent authority to warrant 
the certificate was genuine. 
Lord MacNaughten said: 
"The secretary of the company, who is a mere servant, may be the proper hand to 
deliver out certificates which the company issues in due course, but he can have 
no authority to guarantee the genuineness or the validity of a document which is 
not the deed of the company." 
II (I X8 ~) ~·· IJ (QI ID) 428 
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As stated earlier, Lord Denning MR considered this question in Panorama Developments 
(Gilford) Ltd v Fide/is Furnishing Fabrics Ltcf3 A company secretary entered into a 
contract for the hire of cars for the purpose of carrying the company's major customers. 
The secretary then used the cars for his own purposes. The car hirer sued the company 
on the basis that its secretary had apparent authority to enter into that contract. Lord 
Denning stated: 
" A company secretary is a much more important person nowadays than he was in 
1887. He is an officer of the company with extensive duties and 
responsibilities .... He regularly makes representations on behalf of the company 
and enters into contracts on its behalf which come within the day-to-day running 
of the company's business. So much so that he may be regarded as held out as 
having authority to do such things on behalf of the company. He is certainly 
entitled to sign contracts connected with the administrative side of a company's 
affairs, such as employing staff, and ordering cars and so forth. All such matters 
now come within the ostensible authority of a company's secretary. "34 
The role of the secretary clearly does not extend as far as that of the directors. It is 
limited to matters of an internal nature. Dawson J in the Northside case held that the 
office of secretary did not carry with it any apparent authority to affix the company seal 
and mortgage a company's land nor to enter into, 
11 ( l 97 l J 2 QB 711 at pp 716- 7. The distinction between managerial and administrative acts was also 
referred 
10 111 
Ctub i'/oti/la (Pacific Palms} Ltd. v, Isherwood (1987) 12 ACLR 387 and Mohamed inn 
Othman & A nor. v. Ahdul SIU111ar bin Abdul Rahman & Ors. l 1987) 2 MLJ 695. 
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"commercial transactions upon his own decision which are not of an 
administrative kind required for the daily running of the company's affairs".35 
Where an outsider deals with a secretary or individual director who is acting outside the 
usual authority of an officer of the type concerned, the outsider loses the protection which 
arises from reliance on apparent authority. From the outsider's point of view this 
presents difficulties because it is rare for the outsider to deal directly with the board. 
Usually, the outsider deals with someone whom it may reasonably be assumed has been 
delegated to act on behalf of the board. It may be difficult for the outsider to determine 
whether the officer or agent is acting with actual or apparent authority and the extent of 
the authority conferred by the board. 
An outsider dealing with a company will usually be in a stronger position if dealings 
were conducted with a managing director. The articles will usually empower the board to 
appoint a managing director to exercise such of the board's powers at it thinks fit36 . 
3.4.3. Customary Powers and Duties of Managing Directors 
A managing director is invested with the customary authority to carry on the company 
business in the usual way and do all acts and enter into all contracts necessary for that 
purpose. Thus, he may sign cheques on the company's behalf7 , even in favour of 
himself 8 , borrow money on the company's account and give security over the 
c. . t39 
company's property tor its repaymen receive payment of debts owed to the 
- 
n ( 1990) 8 ACLC 611 at p 645 
'h Table A art 76 is a typical cxnmplc. 
17 / Jey ,, J'illing<'r Fng1111•1•rin' o. ( 1921) l K B 77 
'" Honk of New South Wales v (;ou/hurn Valley Butter Co. Ply Ltd ( 1902) AC 54 
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company" , guarantee loans made to the company 's subsidiary, agree to indemnify 
persons who have given such guarantees themselves 41 and to initiate legal proceedings 
on behalf of the company42. 
The customary authority of the managing director is however confined to commercial 
matters and so he has no customary authority to approve transfer of shares in the 
company or to alter its register of members". The limits of the customary authority of 
the managing director are however not entirely clear. 
Therefore, where an officer or agent of a company acts outside the customary authority of 
a person occupying the particular position concerned, the company may still be liable if it 
has held out that its officer or agent possesses greater authority than would be usual. This 
holding out must have been made by someone who has actual authority to make such a 
representation to the company. Where such a representation has been made, the outsider 
may still enforce the contract even though the agent of the company was not validly 
appointed or the agent acted outside the customary authority of a person occupying the 
particular position concerned. 
3. 5 Conclusion 
The actual authority of an agent is a relationship between the principal and the agent; the 
rest of the world is a stranger to this relationship. The third party dealing with the agent 
of a company does not know what the agent's actual authority is, nor in most cases can he 
~u ('/av l{JI/ Brick & Tile Co Ltd v Rawlings ( 1938) 4 ALL ER 98 
11 Br! ttsh Thomson //ouston Co Ltd v Federated European Bank Ltd ( 1932) 2 KB 176 
~1 l I(' 
11 1. 
Sdn J'li<I v •tfohd Zain Yusof suit no. 3'36 of 1984 (unreported) 
I \111 (lfl.\'I/ nn ,\ • ")(, J J~ • 
11 C il'org11 Whi11•rh1m·h /,td v Cavanagh ( 1902) AC 117 
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find out. Sometimes the authority of agent to do certain acts depends on compliance with 
certain formalities or there is some irregularity in the management which vitiates the 
authority conferred upon the agent. A party outside the company has no way of 
determining whether the company's internal regulations have been complied with. 
However, the law does not require an outside party to do so. If an agent has an apparent 
authority to do an act, a person dealing with the company is entitled to assume that all 
matters of internal management and procedure prescribed by the articles of association 
have been complied with. This is known as the "rule in Turquand's case" or the "indoor 
management rule" and this will be dealt with in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER4 
THE RULE IN TURQUAND'S CASE 
4.1 Introduction 
Person's dealing with a company and contracting in good faith may assume that 
"acts within its constitution and powers have been properly and duly performed 
and are not bound to inquire whether acts of internal management have been 
1 
regular." 
The application of this rule gives rise to a presumption which prevents the 
company from avoiding a contract by relying on the fact that the proceedings 
were irregular and the person acting for the company was unauthorised to do so. 
This serves to protect persons "who are entitled to presume, just because they 
cannot know, that the person with whom they deal has the authority which he 
claims"2 . 
At common law, the doctrine of constructive notice operated against outsiders 
dealing with companies. However, this doctrine did not operate where the 
directors or other agents of a company acted outside their authority but this was 
not apparent from the articles or other public documents of the company. The 
1 I In!. bury'. I .aw of Fngluntl 401 d 1988 Vol 7 ( 1) par 980. This statement was approved by Lord Simonds 
111 Morn» 11 K1111.v.v1•11119461AC459 ul P 474· 
2 per Lord Siinond Ill A/orris v Knnssen (abovo) 
97 
Rule in Turquand's' case states that while persons dealing with a company are 
taken to have constructive notice of the contents of the company's public 
documents, they need not go further to ensure that the internal proceedings of the 
company have been properly carried out. In fact, the outsider can assume that 
these proceedings were properly carried out. 
In Royal British Bank v Turquand, 4 the deed of settlement, the equivalent of the 
memorandum and articles of a company, empowered the board of directors to 
borrow such sums as were authorised by a resolution of the general meeting of the 
shareholders. The company borrowed money from a bank on the authority of 
two of its directors who authenticated the company's common seal. There was no 
authority given by the general meeting. The company refused to repay the loan 
and argued that the bank had constructive notice of the articles and should have 
been aware of the lack of authority. It was held that an outsider need not inquire 
into whether such a resolutions had in fact been passed. The company was bound 
to the bank because the passing of the resolutions was a matter internal to the 
company. Jervis CJ said: 
" ... the party here, on reading the deed of settlement, would find, not a 
prohibition from borrowing, but a permission to do so on certain conditions. 
Finding that the authority might be made complete by a resolution, he would 
, l<mtil Jfn11.1h /hml.. i•. /'urqll<llUI (1856) 6 F & 133]7;I19 ER 886 
1 S11p111 note ~ 
have a right to infer the fact of a resolution authorising that which on the face 
of the document appeared to be legitimately done". 
5 
The Rule in Turquand's case grew naturally as a response to the development of 
the doctrine of constructive notice. While outsiders had constructive notice of 
matters they could discover for themselves from public documents such as the 
articles, they could not reasonably be taken to have notice of matters concerning 
the indoor management of the company. 
In the case of Mahoney v. East HolyjordMining Co.6 Lord Hatherly said: 
"When there are persons conducting the affairs of the company in a manner 
which appears to be perfectly consonant with the articles of association, those 
so dealing with them externally are not to be affected by any irregularities 
which may take place in the internal management of the company.?" 
When an outsider is dealing with the board or those authorised by it, the case of 
Morris v. Kanssen8 states that the Rule applies where there has been a valid 
appointment which has not been vacated and not where there has been "no 
appointment." 
If an outsider is dealing with officers not so authorised to act on behalf of the 
company, that the outsider is entitled to rely on the Rule if the person through 
whom the outsider dealt with occupies a position in the company such that it 
1 ( 18%) 1~ & B 327 at p 332 
n (I H7 ) L.R. 7I1.1,.Hl>9 
1 II p X').I 
• 1111-!hl A . I 'I 
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would be usual of that position to have authority to bind the company in relation 
to the transaction concerned unless the outsider knows of the contrary or knows of 
facts which would put a reasonable person on inquiry.9 Thus, if the person acting 
for the company is its chief executive or managing director, then, he may be 
safely be assumed to be authorised. In practise, he will probably have actual 
authority" but even if he has not he will have ostensible authority and his acts 
will bind the company.11 Much of the same applies to other executive directors 
except that if the descriptions of their posts suggest particular areas of 
responsibility ("finance director" or "sales director") they cannot be assumed to 
have authority outside those areas. Even though individual non-executive 
directors have no responsibility unless the board delegates it to them12 they may 
be assumed to have some individual authority, beyond that of sharing in the 
exercise of the board's collective authority at meetings of the board.13 Moreover, 
it is not uncommon for the board of directors to allow one of the director to 
assume the position of managing director even though he has never been formally 
appointed to that position and in these cir~umstances the courts have treated him 
. di t 14 as if he were the managing irec or. 
When the outsider deals with an officer or employee below the level of director, 
v Underwoo! /,td. v. Bank of Liverpool I J 924] l K.O. 715,C.A. 
10Ifi.lv1 [utcluuson v. /Jmylll'ad Ltd. I 1968] 1 Q.B. 549, C.A. 
11 
1• 
• 
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the position is more problematical and, until recently the courts have shown a 
marked reluctance to recognise any ostensible authority even of a manager.15 
However, this is now changing and it may be taken that a manager, even if he 
does not have actual authority, will have ostensible authority to undertake 
everyday transactions relating to the branch of business which he is managing" 
and the secretary will similarly have such authority in relation to administrative 
matters.17 An officer or agent of the company cannot, however, confer ostensible 
authority on himself by representing that he has actual authority.18 It can only be 
conferred by conduct of the company, acting through an organ or agent of the 
company, such as the board or the managing director, with actual or apparent 
authority to make representations as to the extent of the authority of the 
company's agents. Therefore, if the company has made such representation on 
which the outsider has acted in good faith, the outsider may rely on the Rule. 
It can be seen that protection afforded to an outsider who has dealt with an 
employee is considerably less than that afforded to one who has dealt with the 
board of directors or someone actually authorised by the board. 
In Australia, the operation of the rule in Turquand's case was considered by the 
High Court in Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar - General'? . The 
1~ Kmlitbank Cassel v. Schenkers [ 1927] 1 K.B. 826 
in AmrcJK(J.f ud. v, Mimdogas S.A. [ 1986) A.C. 717, H.L. 
1111 !) lo ·•nit•ti•• l ui v Fide/is Furnishing Fabrics Ltd. [ 1971] 2 Q.B. 711,C.A 
llllOfYJnl{J t'VI' 1' · .. , ' ' ' 
IH Suprn note 15. 
1ij (1990) 8 A 'LC 61 l 
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common seal of Northside was affixed to a mortgage document which secured a 
loan from Barclays to a company controlled by Sturgess, a director and 
shareholder ofNorthside. The mortgage was over land owned by Northside and 
was its only major asset. The common seal was affixed and signed by Sturgess as 
director and by his son who purported to sign as the company secretary. The son 
had not been appointed under the articles although a statutory return filed with the 
Commission named him as the company secretary. The other two directors, who 
were also the remaining shareholders, did not know of or authorise the execution 
of the mortgage, nor did they know of the purported appointment of secretary. 
They had no interest in the borrowing company and Northside derived no benefit 
from the transactions. The High Court considered the validity of the mortgage. 
This depended upon whether it had been executed by Northside. The case was 
decided under the common law. The High Court held that Northside was not 
bound by the mortgage because the affixing of the common seal was invalid. 
Although the Rule in Turquand 's case enabled Barclays to assume that the 
common seal was properly affixed and the internal proceedings of the company 
had been properly carried out in accordance with its memorandum and articles, 
the circumstances of the case should have put Barclays upon inquiry. Since 
Barclays failed to make further inquiries as to whether the common seal was 
properly affixed it was unable to rely on the Rule in Turquand's case and 
Northsido was not bound by the mortgage. 
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The circumstances which put Barclays upon inquiry were that the mortgage 
secured Northside's major asset where the transactions were outside its usual 
business and not for its benefit. Barclays was prevented from relying on the Rule 
in Turquand's case because it ought to have suspected an irregularity. Barclays 
did not have to have actual knowledge of the lack of authority of Sturgess and his 
son to affix the company seal. 
Mason CJ stated the policy behind the Rule in Turquand 's case. 
"What is important is that the principle and the criterion which the Rule in 
Turquand' s case presents for application give sufficient protection to 
innocent lenders and other persons dealing with companies, thereby 
promoting business convenience and leading to just outcomes. The precise 
formulation and application of that rule calls for a fine balance between 
competing interests. On the other hand, the rule has been developed to 
protect and promote business convenience which would be at hazard if 
persons dealing with companies were under the necessity of investigating 
their internal proceedings in order to satisfy themselves about the actual 
authority of officers and the validity of instruments."20 . 
The Rule in Turquand's case protects an outsider where there is an irregularity 
concerning the proper holding of a meeting. For example, a quorum may not 
I b ent 
inadequate notice may have been given or a voting irregularity 
ia vc een pres , 
l d The obscurity surrounding the Rule in Turquand's case has 
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resulted in significant differences of opinion in attempts to express the basis of the 
Rule and its inter-relationship with agency principles. 
Campbell suggests that the principle of estoppel is not an adequate explanation of 
the Rule21. While a company may make a representation by means of its articles, 
if the articles state that the authority of an agent is subject to a condition, this does 
not constitute a representation that the condition has been fulfilled. Therefore, if 
the articles empower the board to delegate some or all of its functions. the 
company does not thereby represent that a delegation was in fact made. 
Campbell is of the view that the Rule in Turquand's case goes far beyond the 
principle of estoppel as its effect is to hold a company bound by a contract even in 
the absence of actual or apparent authority. Campbell does not cite any example 
of where a company was bound by a contract where an agent lacked actual and 
apparent authority. 
Although the High Court judges in the Northside case adopted different 
approaches, they all suggested that in agency situations, the Rule did not apply in 
the absence of authority. 
Ford and Austin22 suggest another theoretical basis behind the Rule m 
Turquand's case which they consider to be the best supported by weight of 
authority. This is referred to as the "closed door rationale" for the Rule which is 
designed to allow outsiders to make protective assumptions just because they 
11 •1.1 "Cc11111,1111v 1 uw. J)octnucs and Authority to Contract" (1956) 11 Univ. of Toronto LJ 
10111JlSOJI . ' • 
248 at p '\4. 
1 Ford I IAJ and Austill RP· Ford' Principles of Corporation Law 71h cd Buucrworths p 524 
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cannot know that the person with whom they deal has the authority which he 
claims.23 
In the context of a transaction enter ed into by a company and a bank, Kirby p of 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Registrar-General v Northside 
Developments Pty Ltcf4 expressed reservations on the justification of the Rule. 
Outsiders such as banks are generally in a very strong commercial position to 
insist on detailed scrutiny of the internal workings of a company. 
ct.2 The Rule in Turquand's Case and Agency Principles 
The general principles of agency law in their application to companies operate in 
conjunction with the Rule in Turquand 's case. 
We have seen that the operation of the rule enables an outsider to presume that the 
indoor management of a company has been carried out in a regular manner. This 
enables an outsider to show that a company has given either actual or apparent 
authority to an officer or agent of the company. It also enables an outsider to 
presume that where a company enters into a contract directly by itself, the person 
who acted for the company were properly authorised to do so. This is particularly 
relevant where the common seal of the company was affixed by persons 
purporting to act as directors or secretary with authority to affix the company seal. 
• It 94Ci I AC 459 Simonds ul p 475 
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Of course, this protection was subject to certain exceptions which limited the 
operation of the Rule in Turquand 's case. 
In Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General 25 the High Court judges 
analysed the relationship between the Rule in Turquand's case and the general 
agency principles in different terms. In particular, Dawson J 26 considered that the 
Rule depended on the operation of agency law. The person who purported to act 
on behalf of the company must act within his actual or apparent authority. 
The organic theory is also subject to agency rules. It is a principle of company law 
which attributes certain acts to be the acts of the company itself. In this way, a 
distinction is drawn between the acts of an agent which are binding on a company 
as a principal and acts which are directly those of the company. The affixing of 
the company seal has historically been regarded as a direct act of the company, 
generally through its board of directors and is analogous to the signature of a 
natural person. This theory also finds expression in relation to a company's 
liability in tort, criminal liability and the division of powers between the board 
and general meeting of members. 
A company will only be bound by its own act where the persons acting as the 
company do so within their actual or apparent authority. The organic theory 
merely extends the scope of the capacity of an agent to bind the company directly. 
2' ( Jl)«JO) ACLC' <i 11 ul p 645 
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It does not enable a person who acts without authority to bind the company. This 
includes the situation where the company seal is affixed. 
Toohey J27 stated that the Rule in Turquand's case originally evolved in relation 
to irregularities in the internal management of companies, such as failure to hold 
proper meetings or pass regular resolutions. The issues which arise where 
officers of a company act without authority are resolved by application of agency 
rules rather than indoor management in the strict sense. While the Rule in 
Turquand's case protects outsiders where there is an irregularity it does not 
extend to confer authority on an officer where that authority does not otherwise 
exist. This is apparent from the Freeman and Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park 
Properties (Mangal)Ltd28. and Crabtree-Vickers Pty. Ltd. v. Australian Direct 
Mai I Advertising and Addressing Co. L~d. 
29 
Mason CJ30 considered that the Rule in Turquand's case is a particular aspect of 
the principles of agency law. It is unclear whether agency principles extend to a 
pre. umption of regularity where the common seal has been affixed. In such a 
ca e, the organic theory may operate separately from the law of agency. The 
aff ing of the company seal represents corporate assent arising from a resolution 
of th board which i the appropriate organ of the company. 
2 't11 tlmd /l1 i·t/111•111 "' f'r1•. I t.l v, U g1 \/flit Or111•rril ( 111 l) 8 ACL ' 11 
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Brennan J31 considered that the Rule comes within the framework of apparent 
authority which itself is based upon estoppel. The company is prevented from 
denying the representation of authority which it has made. There is no material 
distinction between acts of natural persons in affixing the company seal which are 
acts of the company itself or acts of an agent of the company. The principles 
established in the Freeman and Lockyer and Crabtree-Vickers cases are 
applicable to cases involving the Rule in Turquand 's case. 
Gaudron J32 thought that the principles of apparent authority represent an example 
of estoppel. The rule in Turquand's case is also based on principles which provide 
the foundation of estoppel. 
4.3 Exception to the Rule in Turquand's Case 
In Malaysia, the Rule in 'Yurquand's case is applied with its common law 
exceptions. The exceptions limit the outsiders ability to rely upon the Rule. 
The exceptions to the Rule in Turouand's case are: 
i) if the contracting party knows or should know of the agents lack of authority 
he cannot rely on the Rule in Turquand's case. This is usually the case where 
the contracting party is an "insider", that is, a person who by virtue of his 
position should know of the incapacity. This is illustrated in the case of 
Howard v. Patent Ivory Manufoctnring Co 33. In the ca e the directors of the 
11 lhnl 111 p hl l 
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company Jent money to the company on the security of debentures. The 
articles of association provided that the company could only borrow up to a 
certain limit, and this limit has been exceeded. The directors sought to enforce 
the debentures. The court declined to let them do so. They were all directors 
of the company; as directors they knew or should have known of the 
limitation of borrowing. Accordingly, they could not rely upon the rule in 
Turquand 's case. 
However, the fact that one party to the contract is the director of the company 
himself does not automatically mean that he cannot take advantage of the 
Rule. It all depends whether he ought to have known of the agents lack of 
h . 34 aut onty. 
ii) if there are circumstances that would put the contracting party on inquiry, the 
Rule in Turquand's case will not apply.35 Sometimes the circumstances are 
such that a reasonable man would be suspicious of the agent's authority; if 
this is so, the contracting party must make reasonable inquiries. If such 
inquiries would have revealed the agent's lack of authority, the contracting 
party cannot rely on the Rule in Turquand's case to assist him.36 
11 1 lvlv 1 futrlull.\O// 1, Umv/w{ld Ltd / 1968/ J()JJ 5./9, 578 579 
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Lord Simonds in Morris v Kanssen stated, 
"he cannot presume in his own favour that things are rightly done if 
inquiry that he ought to have made would tell him that they were wrongly 
done". 37 
Lord Esher :MR expressed this inferred actual knowledge in English and 
Scottish Mercantile Investment Co Ltd v Brunton, 38 
"When a man has statements made to him, or has knowledge of facts, 
which do not expressly tell him of something which is against him, and he 
abstains from making further inquiry because he knows what the result 
would be - or, as the phrase is, he 'wilfully shuts his eyes' - then judges 
are in the habit of telling juries that they may infer that he did know what 
was against him. It is an inference of fact drawn because you cannot look 
into a man's mind, but you can infer from his conduct whether he is 
speaking truly or not when he says that he did not know of particular 
facts". 
In Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar - General 39 all five judges of 
the High Court held that a bank was put on inquiry where it sought to enforce 
a mortgage against a company. It was put on inquiry as to the authority of the 
persons who affixed the company seal to the mortgage document. This was 
because of the nature of the transaction which was firstly of no benefit to the 
17!1'Mh1At'il 9111p·l7 
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company and secondly, appeared unrelated to its business. It secured debts of 
companies controlled by the person who signed as director but these 
companies has no association with the company against which the bank 
sought to enforce the mortgage. The inquiry exception was triggered because 
the bank took no steps to establish that the company's officers had authority to 
affix the company seal. Therefore, if a person knew the truth or he ought to 
have known the truth, he cannot rely on the Rule. 
iii) if an examination of the company's memorandum or articles of association 
would have made it plain that the agent's authority was limited, the contractor 
may not depend in the Rule in Turquand's case. This can be enunciated from 
the case of Irvine v. Union Bank of Australia'": A party cannot plead that he 
has not actually read the memorandum or articles of association since 
everyone is deemed to have constructive notice of those documents."! This 
only applies if it is clear from the memorandum and articles of association that 
the agent could not authorise or that the contractor was put on inquiry by 
reason of some provision of the memorandum and articles." If the 
memorandum and articles envisage the agent may be so authorised subject to 
some pre cribed formalities being satisfied, the Rule in Turquand's case 
applies in full force and the contractor need not inquire further. 
~o ( 1 H77) App Cos \(1(1 ( P11vv C'o11m:1l cm appeal from llunuu) 
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iv) as it is often stated that the Rule in Turquand 's case has no application where 
forgery is involved. This idea appears to stem from the decision of the House 
of Lords in Ruben v, Great Fingall Consolidated", 
However, forgery may arise in two senses. In the strict sense it is as illustrated 
in Ruben 's case, where a false or counterfeit seal or signature is affixed. In 
this case the forgery is a nullity and cannot be binding on the company, so it 
therefore falls outside the Rule. Forgery may arise in a wider sense where the 
seal and signatures are genuine but affixed by persons acting without 
authority. In such cases, the Rule in Turquand's case does not apply where 
the officers lacked actual or apparent authority. 
Mason CJ in the Northside Development case expressed doubt on whether 
forgery is a true exception to the Rule in Turquand's case. This question did 
not have to be resolved in the Northside Development case because of the 
operation of the inquiry exception. In any case, he said that the forgery 
exception has a narrow area of operation. This appears to refer to the 
distinction between cases where the company seal and signatures are forged 
and those where the seal and signatures are genuine but are fixed without 
authority.44 Mason CJ appears to imply that only forgery in the strict sense is 
an exception to the Rule in Turquand 's case. 
Bt ennan J also considered that "forgery" may be used in both senses. In the 
strict sen , where a false seal or signature is affixed, this is outside the Rule in 
A I 11 (}()(>I A ', ll !) 
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Turquand 's case because the Rule is based on estoppel and the company is not 
estopped in such cases of forgery. In the wider sense the relevant question is 
whether the persons who affixed the seal had authority from the company to 
do so. 
Despite the differences between the judges it may be possible to indicate 
circumstances where forgery may result in an outsider losing the entitlement 
to rely on the Rule in Turquand's case. In the case of a counterfeit seal or 
signatures and in the wider sense of forgery, the relevant question comes back 
to whether the company held out the persons who affixed the seal as having 
authority to do so. 
This raises issues under general agency law dealing with the creation of actual 
or apparent authority. In the Australian case of Storey v Advance Bank 
A ustralia Ltd'5 , a signature of a director was forged on the affixing of the seal 
to a mortgage. The mortgage was held to be valid despite the forgery because 
the director with whom the bank dealt was permitted de facto control over the 
company's business by the director whose signature was forged. 
4.4 The English Position 
In England, the statutory changes discussed in Chapter 2, that is, ss.35, 35A and 711 
of th ompanics Act 1985 and s.322A of the Companies Act 1989 drew the sting 
- - ~\ ( l 'J'n) 11 AC'LC (1 IJ 
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of the ultra vires and constructive notice, thus improving the outsiders position in 
relation to its dealings with the company. 
However s.35 of the Companies Act 1985 helps the outsider dealing with the 
employee of the company only to the extent that he may safely assume that the 
board had the power to delegate to that employee. It will not protect him unless the 
board has actually done so or is estopped from denying that it has or has ratified 
what he did. If it has not, he will be unprotected unless the employee has acted 
within his apparent authority; and he will lose that protection not only if he has not 
acted in good faith but also if he has negligently failed to make proper inquiries or 
if he actually knew or ought to have known that the officer exceeded his authority. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The Rule has been criticised because of uncertainty which has arisen from a large 
body of case law. Professor Gower observed: 
" Unhappily its obscurity increases in direct proportion to the literature upon 
it, and only its undoubted practical importance makes it essential to devote 
some space to it even at the risk of further obfuscation." 
G wcr commented that the history of the development of the Rule saw an increase 
in the limitations to which the rule was subject. These limitation have b come so 
ext nsiv that th object of th rule has been ob cured. 
I 14 
" The-result is that the law has become a jungle of irreconcilable decisions to 
the benefit of no one save the legal profession. If this branch of the law is 
ever codified the draftsman will be well advised to ignore all case law of the 
present century and to go back to the first principles and the judgments of 
the founding fathers of our modem company law. Unhappily a textbook 
writer has to state the law as he finds it and not as it ought to be. "46 
As a consequence, in Australia, the common law principles discussed above have 
been now been replaced by statutory provisions. The following chapter will 
discuss these statutory provisions in detail. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE AUSTRALIAN POSITION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Detailed treatment is given in this chapter to developments in Australia because it is the 
most extensive statutory development in the Commonwealth on the subject of this 
dissertation in recent years. 
In Australia, the common law principles discussed in Chapter 4 have now been replaced 
by statutory provisions contained in ss. 164 to 166 of the Corporations Law (herein after 
referred to as the 'Corporation Law'). These provisions are based around six protective 
assumptions set out in s.164(3) of the Corporation Law and are subject to the limitations 
in s.164 ( 4).This chapter will also consider the extent to which the statutory provisions in 
Australia could be adopted in Malaysia. 
5.2 Sections 164 - 166 of the Corporation Law 
S.164 (1) and (2) of the Corporation Law lays down that a person having dealings with a 
company or with a person who has acquired property from a company is able to make the 
assumptions of regularity concerning the indoor management of a company. These 
assumptions are binding on the company which is unable to assert that particular 
assumptions are incorrect and should be disregarded. 
Th provision· of the Corporation Law relevant to this chapter are s.164(3), s 164( 4), 
s 1 <>S and s l <>6 It is 11 cessary to cite th sections in full to appreciate their impact and 
I I <i 
for a proper understanding of the discussion which will follow. Section 164(3) deals with 
persons who are entitled to make certain assumptions. The provision reads: 
The assumptions that a person is, by virtue of subsection ( 1) or (2), entitled to 
make in relation to dealings with a company, or in relation to an acquisition or 
purported acquisition from a company of title to property, as the case may be, are: 
(a) that, at all relevant times, the company's constitution has been complied with; 
(b) that a person who appears, from notices or returns lodged under section 242 or 
335 or with a person under a previous law corresponding to section 242 or 
335, to be a director or a secretary of the company has been duly appointed 
and has authority to exercise the powers and perform the duties customarily 
exercised or performed by a director or by a secretary, as the case may be, of a 
company carrying on a business of the kind carried on by the company; 
(c) that a person who is held out by the company to be an officer or agent of the 
company has been duly appointed and has authority to exercise the powers 
and perform the duties customarily exercised or performed by an officer of the 
kind concerned; 
( d) that an officer or agent of the company who has authority to issue a document 
on behalf of the company has authority to warrant that the document is 
genuine and that an officer or agent of the company who has authority to issue 
a certified copy of a document on behalf of the company has authority to 
warrant that the copy is a true copy; 
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( e) that a document has been duly sealed by the company if it bears what appears 
to be an impression of the company's seal and either: 
(i) the sealing of the document appears to be witnessed by 2 people, one of whom 
may be assumed to be a director of the company because of paragraph (b) and 
( c) and the other of whom may be assumed to be a director or a secretary of 
the company because of those paragraphs: or 
(ii) the sealing of the document appears to be witnessed by one person who may 
be assumed to be a director and a secretary of the company because of 
paragraph (b): or (c ) but only if it is stated next to the signature that the 
person witnesses the sealing in the capacity of sole director and sole 
secretary of the company; and 
(f) that the directors, the secretaries, the employees and the agents of the company 
properly perform their duties to the company. 
Section 164( 4) deals with the exceptions to s.164(3) and the provision reads: 
Despite subsection ( 1 ), a person is not entitled to make an assumption referred to in 
subsection (3) in relation to dealing with a company if: 
(a) the person has actual knowledge that the matter that, but for this subsection, 
the person would be entitled to assume is not correct; or 
(b) the p rson's connection or relationship with the company is such that the 
person ou 1ht to know that the matter that, but for this subsection, th per 'On 
would b cnt i1 led to assume is not corr ct; 
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and where, by virtue of this subsection, a person is not entitled to make a 
particular assumption in relation to dealings with a company, subsection (1) has 
no effect in relation to any assertion by the company in relation to the assumption. 
S.165(1) abolishes the doctrine of constructive notice. The section reads: 
Subject to subsection (2), a person shall not be taken to have knowledge of: 
(a) a company's memorandum or articles or any of the contents of a company's 
memorandum or articles; 
(b) a document or the contents of a document; or 
( c) any particulars; 
merely because of either or both of the following: 
(i) the memorandum, the articles.. the documents or the particulars has or have 
been lodged with the Commission, or lodged with a person under a previous 
law corresponding to a provision of this Law; 
(ii) the memorandum, the articles, the document or the particulars is or are 
referred to in any other document that has been lodged with the Commission, 
or lodged with a person under a previous law corresponding to a provision of 
this Law 
s. 166 allows the outsider to rely on s.164(3) assumptions even if an officer, agent or 
employ of the company commits fraud. The provision reads· 
(a) to cntul a person to make the assumption r fcrrcd to in subs ct ion (3) of that 
section i111d uion to d alin s with a comp my, or 
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(b) to entitle a person to make the assumptions referred to in subsection (3) of that 
section in relation to an acquisition or purported acquisition (whether direct or 
indirect) of title to property from a company; 
even if a person referred to in paragraph 164 (3) (b), ( c) or (e) or an officer, agent 
or employee of the company referred to in paragraph 164 (3) (d) or (f) acts 
fraudulently in relation to the dealings or has forged a document that appears to be 
sealed on behalf of the company. 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Companies and Securities Legislation 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1983 said that the purpose behind the s.164(3) 
assumptions is to: 
"ensure that a person who deals in good faith with persons who can be reasonably 
supposed to have the authority of the company should be protected against later 
claims by the company that the persons purporting to act for it lacked authority. 
This involves clarifying and codifying the so-called 'indoor management rule' 
which has developed from the decision in Royal British Bank v Turquand 1. 
The Explanatory Memorandum considered that the state of case law was not entirely 
clear or satisfactory despite the considerable amount of litigation revolving around the 
Rule in Turquand 's case. 
lt was clear from the Explanatory Memorandum, that the dominant policy consideration 
behind ss I ()4 _ 166 is to protect outsiders acting in good faith. As will be seen below, 
most of the cases interpreting this legislation have concerned the is uc of whether th 
I (IK~(1) 1191• H KK6, 
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outsider ought to be excluded from entitlement to gain that benefit of the protective 
assumptions. 
The assumptions sought to codify and clarify the Rule in Turquand's case. Gummow Jin 
Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Minister for Transport and Communication/, 
considered that s.164 was not a "comprehensive code" but designed to repair the failings 
of the common law. Kirby P said that s.164 does not appear in a legal, social and 
economic vacuum. It does not override the principles and policies of the common law 
unless this is plainly the result intended by the legislation'. Kirby P did not think that it 
was a universal and unconditional objective of the legislation to protect persons dealing 
with a company at the expense of all other competing considerations. Its purpose is to 
protect such persons who deal in good faith and innocently. Kirby P thought that the 
competing policy considerations behind the Rule in Turquand's case as stated by Mason 
CJ in Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-Generat, are also applicable in the 
interpretation of s.164 of the law. 
The strict interpretation of the reference in s.164 ( 1) to "a person having dealings with a 
company" would remove the benefit of the assumptions from an outsider who is unable 
to show the existence of an actual pre-existing legal relationship with the company. 
The term ''dealings" was given a broad meaning in Storey v Advance Bank Australia 
Ucf .In this case, a bank dealt with a managing director who was permitted de facto 
control of the conduct of a company's business by the other director. It was held that the 
1 (I 1)!!9) 7 Al'l .C 5 
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concept of having dealings with a company extends beyond dealing with someone who 
has actual authority and includes situations where a document is forged. It extends to 
purported dealings. 
Ford and Austin suggest that the expression should be interpreted so as to enable the 
assumptions to apply where the outsider reasonably believes that dealings were 
conducted with the company through a person who may be supposed to have a 
connection with the company appropriate to the particular dealings". This interpretation 
would enable an outsider to be protected in cases where the outsider is unable to show 
that the company's agent possessed authority so as to bind the company. The company 
would then be unable to argue that the outsider did not have dealings with it but only with 
its officers or agents. 
In Brick and Pipe Industries Ltd v Occidental Life Nominees Pty Ltd 7 it was held that 
each of the assumptions in s 164 (3) of the law is separate and discreet. This means that 
just because an outsider cannot rely on a particular assumption, he or she is not prevented 
from relying on the other assumptions. While the assumptions are discreet, they may 
overlap and an outsider may rely upon more than one assumptions: Bank of New Zealand 
v Fiberi Pty Ltl' 
It i not necessary for an outsider to actually make these assumptions in order to rely 
upon them In Lyford v Media Portfolio ud', a company argued that evidence showed 
that the making of the assurnptions would have be n contrary to the usual practice of the 
,, I lid Ford uul R I' Austul 1'(11(1 s !~n11c1plc.:s C orporuuon Law 7d• ed Buuerwonhs 
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concept of having dealings with a company extends beyond dealing with someone who 
has actual authority and includes situations where a document is forged. It extends to 
purported dealings. 
Ford and Austin suggest that the expression should be interpreted so as to enable the 
assumptions to apply where the outsider reasonably believes that dealings were 
conducted with the company through a person who may be supposed to have a 
connection with the company appropriate to the particular dealings". This interpretation 
would enable an outsider to be protected in cases where the outsider is unable to show 
that the company's agent possessed authority so as to bind the company. The company 
would then be unable to argue that the outsider did not have dealings with it but only with 
its officers or agents. 
In Bnck and Pipe Industries Ltd v Occidental Life Nominees Pty Ltd 7 it was held that 
each of the assumptions in s 164 (3) of the law is separate and discreet. This means that 
just because an outsider cannot rely on a particular assumption, he or she is not prevented 
from relying on the other assumptions. While the assumptions are discreet, they may 
overlap and an outsider may rely upon more than one assumptions: Bank of New Zealand 
v Fiberi Pty LtJ 
It is not necessary for an outsider to actually make these assumptions in order to rely 
upon them In Lyford v Media Portfolio Ltcf, a company argued that evidence showed 
that the making of the a. sumptions would have been contrary to the usual practice of the 
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outsider in making loans, therefore the assumptions could not be made. Nicholson J 
dismissed this argument on the basis that s.164 (1) of the Law prevents a company from 
asserting that any of the assumptions are incorrect. This is so, whether or not the 
assumptions were actually made by the outsider. 
5.2.1 Compliance with memorandum and articles - s.164 (3) (a) of the Corporation 
Law 
This assumption, contained in s.164 (3) (a) of the Corporation Law, is a restatement of 
the Rule in Turquand 's case. However it appears to have a wider operation because the 
Rule in Turquand's case was subject to the doctrine of constructive notice which has now 
been abolished by s.165 ( 1) of the Corporation Law. Outsiders are no longer taken to be 
aware of provisions in the memorandum and articles. This enables outsiders to make the 
assumption that the company has complied with its memorandum and articles even 
though the memorandum and articles have not been complied with and this would have 
been apparent to the outsider had they been read. For example, if the articles contain a 
requirement that the company seal be used in every document acknowledging a debt, an 
outsider who is unaware of the articles is not taken to know of this requirement. In fact, 
the outsider can assume that the board has done all that is required to borrow the money. 
This broader operation of the statutory assumption arising from the abolition of the 
doctrine of constructive. notice has significant implications. It places an outsider who is 
unwilling to read the company's articles in a stronger positions than one who makes an 
effo: t to rend the articles, This may sometimes unfairly advantage an outsider who 
dclih rarely don blinker. in circumstances whcr~ there arc grounds fo: suspicion that , n 
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officer or agent of a company is acting in an unauthorised manner. This situation is also 
addressed by the limitations to the assumptions contained in s.164 ( 4) of the Law. 
5.2.2 Where a person is named as an officer in certain public documents - s.164 (3) 
(b) of the Corporation Law 
This assumption, contained in s.164 (3) (b) of the Corporation Law, operates where a 
person is named in the company's annual return under the Corporation Law. An outsider 
may assume that the named person does in fact occupy the stated position, has been duly 
appointed and has the authority to exercise the powers customarily exercised by a person 
occupying that position in a company carrying on a business of the kind carried on by the 
company. 
By naming certain persons as being its officers in the annual returns, a company is 
holding out that those persons are officers occupying the stated positions with authority 
which is customary for such officers. In banking and other lending situations, this is 
probably the most important assumption because usual banking procedures involve a 
check of the company's returns in order to ascertain who are the officers of the company. 
The operation of the assumption contained in s.164 (3) (b) of the Corporation Law was 
illustrated in Re Madi Pty Ltd'", A subsidiary company entered into a deed of guarantee 
in which it guaranteed repayment of loans made to its holding company. The company 
seal was affixed to the deed attested by a director and a person who signed as secretary. 
111(1'1Kl) /\<'L<'Kl7 
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The company later claimed that it was not bound by the deed of guarantee because the 
person who signed as secretary had not been appointed despite having been named as one 
of two company secretaries at the relevant time. It argued that it was not bound because 
the seal had not been affixed in accordance with the articles. The Victorian Supreme 
Court of Australia held that the company was bound because the person had been named 
as secretary in the return lodged under the Companies Code (the predecessor to the 
Corporation Law). This amounted to a holding out by the company that the named 
person was its secretary and thereby authorised to affix the company's seal. This case 
illustrates that the s.164 (3) (b) of the Law assumption departs from the common law 
agency rules. The apparent authority of an agent depends upon a representation that the 
person has authority and reliance by the outsider upon this representation 11. Under s.164 
(3) (b) of the Corporation Law, the outsider may be totally unaware of the particulars 
contained in the annual returns and therefore cannot be said to rely upon this information. 
Nevertheless the company will be bound by the representation contained in the return. 
The s. 164 (3) (b) assumption appears to be unnecessarily narrow in that it refers only to 
returns lodged under the Corporation Law. The law usually requires certain other 
documents to be filed which are equally open to public inspection. In ANZ Banking 
Group Ltd v Australian Glass and Mirrors Pty. Ltd. 
12 
a bank sought to rely on a form 
which listed the persons who consented to act as directors. This was the only form filed 
by the company at the relevant time prior to execution of a mortgage debenture as the 
company wa: newly incorporated. The company had not lodged returns und r the 
11 
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Corporation Law, however the bank could not rely on the filed form for the purposes of 
s.164 (3) (b). 
It is unclear what purpose is served by so distinguishing between forms or documents 
required to be lodged. It might be more practical if s.164 (3) (b) of the Corporation Law 
is to be enacted in Malaysia that it be expanded so as to allow outsiders to rely on any 
forms or documents which are lodged. 
However, it must be stated that the filing of forms other than in accordance with the Law 
may constitute a "holding out by the company" for the purposes of the s.164(3) ( c) 
assumption. This occurred in the Australian Glass and Mirrors case discussed above. 
This may not assist an outsider in cases where the company file was not actually 
searched. In such cases, the outsider could not be said to have relied upon the 
information contained in the filed form and therefore may not be able to assert that the 
agent of the company acted with apparent authority13. Reliance on a representation is a 
requirement for a holding out by the company under the principles stated in the Freeman 
and Lockyer case. 
The policy objective of the legislation is to protect outsiders who act in good faith where 
a company seeks to avoid its actual contractual obligations by reliance on its own non- 
compliance with its memorandum or articles or obligations under the legislation. This 
11/,ifcm/11 At •dio Portfolw Lid (1989) 7 ACLC 271 however held that an out ider need not actually make 
the s 1 h·t (1) nssmupt1ons 111 order to rely upou them. This would appear to modify the common law 
rules I low ver 
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unclear whether there has been a holding out by the company where the outsider did 
not rd 011 such a rcprcscntalion. 
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would be better served by expanding the s.164 (3) (b) assumption to include any lodged 
document. 
As is the case with the assumption under s.164 (3) (c), an outsider is entitled to assume 
that the particular officer of the company has the customary authority of the particular 
officer concerned. There is however, a difference in the wording of the assumptions in 
s.164 (3) (b) and (c). As discussed below, under s.164 (3) (c), an outsider may assume 
that the person held out by the company to be an officer or agent has the customary 
authority ofan officer of the kind concerned. On the other hand, s.164 (3) (b) of the Law 
entitles an outsider to assume that a person named as an officer in the specified returns 
has the customary authority of an officer of a company carrying on a business of the kind 
carried on by the company. 
5.2.3 Where a person is held out as an officer of agent s.164 (3) ( c) of the 
Corporation Law 
Outsiders, when dealing with an officer or agent of the company, are generally not aware 
of the extent of the actual authority of the agent. This is because actual authority stems 
from the principal-agent relationship and outsiders are rarely privy to this. It is much 
more common for the outsider to gain the impression that a particular person has 
authority to bind the company from the representations or conduct of the company itself 
or of persons acting as the company or on behalf of the company. Such representations 
or holding out create an agency relationship which binds the company by apparent or 
ostensibl authrn ity Thcs situations are governed under th law of agency which forms 
the hasi: of the protcctiv assumptions contained ins 164 (3) (b) and (c). The s.164 (3) 
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officer in certain returns filed with the Australian Securities Commission. The s.164 (3) 
( c) assumption operates where the holding out by the company arises in other ways. 
The agency principles of apparent authority in Australia have been restated by the 
statutory assumptions contained in s.164 (3) (b) and (c). 
Under s.164 (3) (c), a person having dealings with a company is entitled to make the 
assumption that a person who is held out by the company to be an officer or agent of the 
company has been duly appointed and has authority to exercise the powers and perform 
the duties customarily exercised or performed by an officer or agent of the kind 
concerned. 
This assumption comprises two mam elements which must be established by the 
outsider: 
i) a holding out or representation by the company that a person is an officer or 
agent; and 
ii) the particular power exercised by this person is within the scope of powers 
customarily exercised or performed by an officer or agent of the kind concerned. 
The purpose of this assumption was stated in the Explanatory Memorandum to be a 
restatement of the protection given to outsiders under the "indoor management rule" 
where the company's officers and agents have not been properly appointed". This 
id I IS protection was ivcn to an outsi er at common aw . 
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The statutory assumption does away with the distinction drawn between defective 
appointments and non-existent appointments. This distinction was drawn by the House of 
Lords in Morris v Kanssen'" in the context of interpreting the equivalent of s.226 of the 
Companies Act 1985. This section validates contracts where directors or a secretary of a 
company act despite a defect in their appointments. The acts of directors or secretary are 
valid notwithstanding any defect that may afterward be discovered in their appointment 
or qualification. Such acts are not validated under s.226 where there has not been an 
appointment at all. 
5.2.3.1. What is a "holding out by the company"? 
The first element of the s.164 (3) (c) assumption requires that a person is held out by the 
company to be an officer or agent of the company. In order to gain the protection of this 
assumption, it would appear that an outsider must establish the creation of apparent 
authority in the same way as under the agency rules applied in the Freeman and Lockyer 
and Crabtree-Vickers cases17.In Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties 
(Mangal) Ltd's, Oiplock J stated that several conditions must be met in order for an 
outsider to hold a company liable under a contract where the company's agent did not 
posses actual authority. In particular, a representation that the agent had authority must 
be made by a person or persons who had actual authority to manage the business of the 
company either generally or in respect of the particular contract concerned. In Freeman 
and Lockyer th representation was made by the board because it failed to prevent a 
P ., son from acting as if he was the company's managing director. 
11'(194h)AC 4SCJ 
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The question whether the person who made the representation of authority was able to 
make the representation for the company depends on whether that person has actual 
authority to do so. In Crabtree-Vickers Pty Ltd v Australian Direct Mail Advertising & 
Addressing Co Pty. Ltd. 19 such a representation was made by a person who acted as 
managing director but had not been formally appointed. Since this person did not have 
actual authority to manage the company's business, he was not capable of representing 
that someone else had apparent authority to enter into a contract on behalf of the 
company. The outsider was therefore unable to enforce a contract against the company. 
This decision can be criticised on the basis that it does not give due regard to commercial 
practice. It exposes an outsider to uncertainty where a representation is made by someone 
who an outsider reasonably believes has authority but it turns out that the representation 
was not made by someone with actual authority "to manage the business of the company 
either generally or in respect of those matters to which the contract relates?". It is often 
almost impossible for an outsider in a case such as Crabtree-Vickers'! to discover who 
has actual authority to make representations for the company. 
A more commercially realistic approach was taken by the court in Brick and Pipe 
Industries Ltd v Occidental Life Nominees Pty Ltd 
22. 
In this case a de facto managing 
director was taken to have implied actual authority to manage the business of the 
company. The p rson concerned had assumed a dominant position in control of the 
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company with the acquiescence of the other directors and his mind and will was 
attributed to the company itself A representation by this person was a representation of 
the company and he could not hold out for the company that someone else had apparent 
authority in relation to a particular dealing. 
Under the statutory provision, it is possible that a de facto managing director in the 
position which arose in Freeman and Lockyer would have apparent authority to bind the 
company as an agent in entering into a contract on behalf of the company but would not 
have implied actual authority to hold out for the company that someone else has authority 
to bind the company. Such a result does not appear to have been intended by the 
legislation which aims to protect outsiders who act bona fide. To require outsiders to 
ascertain whether the person with whom they are dealing has actual or apparent authority 
is to demand the type of inquiry into the internal workings of the company to which the 
Rule in Turquand's case applied to protect an outsider acting in good faith. 
"A holding out by the company" would include acting through its members in general 
meeting or through its directors or through its principal executive, or through an officer 
or agent of the company. This highlights whose representations may be attributed to the 
company for the purpose of a "holding out by the company." It would also appear to 
encompass a representation made by a de facto managing director. "Principal executive 
officer" i defined in s. of the Corporation Law to include a person who may be call d 
by a not h 1 nam or who may not even be a director. In mo t ca se this will include a de 
facto munu tin dir ctoi in circumst nee which aros in th Fr· iman and Io ikyer , nd 
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Clearly, where the board makes a representation, this is a representation of the company 
under the organic theory. A representation made by a properly appointed managing 
director or committee of directors may be similarly seen where delegation by the board is 
permitted under the articles. Where the representation is made by a de facto managing 
director, this may come within the term "principal executive officers". 
The uncertainty arises where the representation is made by an individual director. This 
also raises the question regarding the customary authority of an individual director. 
Generally, an individual director does not have the customary authority to make 
representations which are binding on the company. However, whether there has been a 
holding out by the company for the purposes of s.164(3)(c), constituted by a 
representation of a single director, depends upon the circumstances. In Bank of New 
Zealand v Fiberi Pty Ltcl3 it was held that an individual director did not have actual 
authority to hold out for the company in circumstances where the other director was 
unaware of the conduct of the representor and had not acquiesced to the conferral of this 
authority. This case differs from the Brick and Pipe case where the other directors 
acquiesced to the conferral of wide authority upon the director who made a similar 
representation. It appears that in order to gain the protection of s.164(3)(c) of the 
Corporation Law an outsider is required to look into whether the board has acquiesced to 
the conferral of actual authority. The position of an outsider is strengthened if steps are 
taken to ascer tain the authority of the person with whom the outsider deals. 
( l 'JCl·I) I /\Cl.< 18 
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In ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Australian Glass and Mirrors Pty Ltd,24 a mortgage 
debenture under seal was executed by a company. The company seal was affixed and 
witnessed by the director and secretary. At the time of execution, those persons had not 
been appointed. The solicitor who had incorporated the company was still named as a 
director and a legal secretary was the other director and secretary. The company defaulted 
and the lending bank sought to enforce its security under the mortgage debenture. The 
company argued that the deed was unenforceable because the seal was affixed by persons 
who were not directors. Kaye J considered the circumstances which constituted a holding 
out for the purposes of s.164 (3) (c) of the Corporation Law by the company, that the 
persons who witnessed and affixed the seal of the company were authorised to act as 
directors at the time of execution. The filing of the form listing the persons who 
consented to act as directors were regarded as particularly significant. When the bank's 
solicitors conducted a company search prior to the execution of the mortgage debenture, 
it was the only form filed by the company. The filing of this form made it reasonable for 
the bank to assume that the persons who executed the mortgage debenture had been 
appointed as directors. As regards the persons who were named as directors at the time of 
execution of the mortgage debenture, it was reasonable for the bank to assume that the 
named directors and secretary were the solicitor and an employee who merely 
incorporated the company. 
Oth ·r circumstances which indicated a holding out by the company were the past 
-4 ( 1'11 I) AC'U' 102 
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dealings between the bank, the company and the persons who purported to be its 
directors. They had previously opened an account in the name of another company and 
had given personal guarantees. When this account was closed and a new one opened in 
the name of the defendant company, all negotiations were conducted by the same 
persons. They also stated on a signed form that they were authorised to sign cheques on 
behalf of the company and otherwise act in dealings between the bank and the company. 
The persons who purported to act as directors also signed personal guarantees and affixed 
the company seal on other documents. 
It can be seen from this case that the position of the outsider was considerably 
strengthened by the fact that the bank had searched the company's file and discovered the 
form of consent to act as a director. Had the bank not searched the company file and been 
unaware that the consent to act form had been filed, it could possibly not be said that the 
company had held this out to the bank because the bank would not have been induced to 
enter into the contract by the filing of a form the existence of which it did not know. 
lt would seem that the position of an outsider who acts in good faith should be 
strengthened by expanding the operation of the s.164 (3) ( c) assumption. A "holding out 
by the company" should be taken to include representations by an officer of the company 
who, it was reasonable in the circumstances for an outsider to believe, had authority to 
make the representation for the company. This may include representations by persons 
who did not have actual authority to make those representations. This would overcome 
th 
1 
strictivc effect of th common law rules of agency as stated in the Freeman and 
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5.2.3.2. Reliance on Representation 
In order for agency by apparent authority to arise at common law, it must be shown that 
the outsider was induced by the representation to enter into the contract and in fact relied 
upon it.25 Without this reliance, the outsider may be unable to seek the protection of the 
common law rules of agency. The holding out by a company that a person has authority 
to act as its officer or agent must be made known to the outsider who must then act in 
reliance on the representation. 
It appears that the common law rules of agency as stated in the Freeman and Lockyer 
case may have been modified by the s.164 (3) (c) assumptions. 
ln Lyford v Media Portfolio Ltcf6 it was held that an outsider need not actually make the 
assumptions contained in s.164 (3) of the Corporation Law in order to rely upon them. A 
company is prevented under s.164( 1) of the Corporation Law from asserting that the 
assumptions are incorrect. It is not relevant that the outsider actually made the 
assumptions. 
ln Brick and Pipe J11d11stries Ltd. V Occidental Life Nominees Pty. Ltd 
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,the Full Court 
of the Supreme Court of Victoria approved the following statement of Ormiston J at first 
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" ... the section talks only of assumptions which may be made and need not 
necessarily reflect the actual assumptions made by the parties seeking to rely on 
s.164." 
This appears to dispense with the common law requirement that the outsider must rely on 
the representation in order to hold the company bound by the acts of an agent who was 
held out by the company to be an officer or agent. 
5.2.4 Customary Authority of Officers 
The second element of s. 164 (3) (c) is that the person who has been held out by the 
company to be an officer or agent has authority to exercise the powers and perform the 
duties customarily exercised or performed by an officer of the kind concerned. This 
aspect involves a consideration of the customary authority of a company's officers, which 
would appear to incorporate the general agency rules in their application to companies. 
It was enunciated in Rely-Hutchinson v Brayheacf-8 that to be its managing director, that 
person has wide customary authority which is only limited in cases of unusual 
transactions. These limits were considered under the common law principles. In such 
cases, the protective assumptions may in any case be subject to the limitations contained 
ins. 164 (4) of the Corporation Law. 
Whci th person with whom the outsider deals is an ordinary director, the outsider is at 
iK (I %8 <)I{ •111 ti ~KI 
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the company than does an agent in relation to a principal. It is therefore more important 
to protect the interests of a principal in cases where an agent acts in an unauthorised 
manner. In the case of a company standing as a principal, the policy of the legislation is 
to hold the company liable for the acts of its officers. An outsider should not be deprived 
of reliance on the protective assumptions where the making of such assumptions is 
reasonable. The limitations contained in s.164 (4) of the Corporation Law are intended to 
operate in cases where the outsider does not act in good faith. 
The customary authority of a company secretary is narrower than that of a director. While 
the role of the company secretary is far more important today than during the last century, 
the customary authority of the company secretary is restricted to contracts connected to 
the administrative side of a company's affairs.31 
As discussed above, in Northside Developments Pty Ltd v. Registrar-General' 2 , Dawson 
J held that a company secretary did not have apparent authority to affix the company seal 
to a document which mortgaged the company's land. 
Ford and Austin" suggest that s.164 (3) (c) impliedly requires a consideration of the kind 
of business carried on by the company in determining the question of customary 
authority. This would be consistent with common law principles which may restrict the 
customary authority of a managing director to acts which are within ordinary trading 
1 /' J) 
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transactions. It must be noted that the limits of this customary authority are uncertain. 
5.2.5 Officers or agents have authority to warrant that documents are genuine - 
S.164(3)(d) of the Corporation Law 
Under s.164(3)(d), a person dealing with a company may assume that an officer or agent 
of the company who has authority to issue a document on behalf of the company, has 
authority to warrant that it is genuine. Therefore a company secretary may be assumed to 
have the requisite authority to warrant that a share certificate is genuine. At common law 
it was doubtful whether a company secretary had authority to do this. Section 164(3)(d) 
of the Corporation Law overrules a principle stated in the case of Ruben v. Great Fingal/ 
Consolidated" . In that case, a company secretary forged a share certificate and 
purported to issue it on behalf of the company. The share certificate appeared to have 
been validly issued, however the company seal had been affixed without authority. Two 
directors' signatures had been forged and the company secretary had countersigned the 
certificate without authority. The secretary then lodged the certificate as security for a 
loan to himself After the secretary defaulted, the lender was refused registration as 
owner of the shares and sued the company. He argued that the rule in Turquand's case 
operated so that he could assume that the internal proceedings of the company regarding 
the i sue of the share certificates were properly carried out. The House of Lords held that 
the company was not bound by the forged certificate. It had not held out that the secretary 
had th authority to do more than merely deliver valid certificates. Therefore the lender 
4 I l 110<1 I ss: •I W 
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was not the true owner of the shares. While the authority of a company secretary has been 
considerably broadened since this case" , the authority of a secretary to warrant that a 
document that he or she has issued is genuine, has not been expressly considered. The 
s.-164(3)( d) assumption specifically clarifies this position. 
5.2.6 Assumption of Valid Sealing - S.164 (3) (e) Of the Law 
The previous discussion regarding the assumptions dealing with the actual or apparent 
authority of a company's officers and agents is directly relevant to the question whether 
the affixation of the company's seal is binding on a company. Under s.164 (3) (e) of the 
Law, a person dealing with a company may assume that a document has been duly sealed 
if is bears what appears to be an impression of the seal of the company and the sealing 
appears to be attested by two persons, one of whom, by virtue of s.164 (3) (b) or (c) 
appears to be a director and the other appears to be either a director or secretary of the 
company. 
This statutory assumption seeks to clarify the common law position. The uncertainty 
surrounding the law with respect to whether a company was bound by the affixing of the 
common seal was indicated by the different approaches taken by the High Court judges in 
Northside Development Pty Ltd v Registrar-General.36 
Mason C J considered that contracts under seal were different to contracts made by 
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directors or officers of the company itself. The Rule in Turquand's case, when applied to 
contracts under the company seal, are an organic principle of company law rather than an 
application of agency law. The presence of the company seal has particular significance 
because it is indicative of, 
"corporate assent stemming from a resolution of the board of directors, the 
determinative act then being that of the board which is the organ of the company 
which administers its affairs."37 
Even though in the Northside case there was no resolution of the board that the company 
seal can be affixed, the presence of the common seal nevertheless gave rise to the 
presumption that the seal had been affixed with the authority of the directors. An outsider 
dealing with a company could rely on the validity of the affixing of the common seal 
where it appears to be accordance with the articles. 
Brennan J thought that there was no special significance in the fact that the contract was 
executed under the seal of the company. He said that, 
"It is irnmat-rial whether the acts of natural persons in executing an instrument 
which binds the company are invested with the character of acts done by an agent of 
l ,, 18 t 1 company. 
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The assumption contained in s.164 (3) (e) protects an outsider in circumstances where the 
common seal of a company was affixed by an officer or person held out by the company 
. to be an officer where that person acted without authority. The operation of this 
assumption was illustrated in Brick and Pipe Industries Ltd vOccidental Life Nominees 
Pty Ltd 39 Brick and Pipe was taken over by a company controlled by Goldberg. The 
previous directors of Brick and Pipe were joined on the board by Goldberg and his son in 
law, Furst, and although remaining on the board, these previous directors ceased to take 
an active role in the management of the company. Another company controlled by 
Goldberg borrowed money form Occidental. This loan was secured by guarantees 
executed by thirteen other companies in the Goldberg group including Brick and Pipe. 
The deed of guarantee executed by Brick and Pipe was under the company seal which 
was attested by Goldberg and Furst as director and secretary respectively. The other 
directors had no knowledge of the existence of the guarantee and no board meeting was 
held to consider the transaction although minutes of such a supposed meeting were taken. 
The lender's solicitor was aware that Furst had not been appointed as secretary. When 
this matter was raised, the financial controller of the Goldberg group said that the 
required appointment form had been lodged and stated that Furst was secretary and 
unauthorised to affix the company seal. This statement was made in front of Goldberg 
who acquiesced to it by remaining silent. After receiving this assurance, Occidental 
proceeded with the transaction. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria held that 
w (I 'l'I ) IO A 'LC 2 1 
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Occidental was entitled to assume that the deed was duly sealed under s.164 (3) (e) of the 
Corporation Law. The central issue was whether Furst had been held out by Brick and 
Pipe to be its secretary in accordance with s.164 (3) (c) of the Corporation Law. It was 
held that there had been a holding out through the implied conduct of Goldberg. While 
Goldberg had only been appointed as an individual director, his dominance of the 
company with the acquiescence of the other directors, enabled Goldberg to "speak" for 
the company and represent its mind and will. The court also held that s.164 (3) ( e) of the 
Corporation Law does not require a signatory to hold the office indicated on the 
document. Furst had been appointed as a director, however he signed as secretary. 
The court also pointed out that the use of the wrong designation may be relevant for the 
purpose of establishing whether the limitation contained in s.164 (4) (a) is applicable. If 
the outsider was aware of the incorrect designation, this may establish that the outsider 
had actual knowledge that the document was not duly sealed. This limitation was not 
applied in the Brick and Pipe case. 
In Bank of New Zealand v Fiberi Pty Ltd,40 the New South Wales Court of Appeal also 
considered the valid sealing assumption contained in s.164 (3) (e). It came to the opposite 
conclusion that the outsider was not entitled to rely on this assumption. The company, 
Fiberi was owned by Doyle and Arnhold who were its director's equal shareholders. , 
Arnhold was also the secretary. Fiberi guaranteed debts of Doyle's companies and 
"' ( 11 'l·t) I A( ir: Ill, 
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granted a mortgage over land held by it to secure the guarantee. The company seal of 
Fiberi was attested by Doyle as director and his son as secretary, a position to which he 
had not been appointed. Arnhold knew nothing of the guarantees and mortgage. 
Kirby P in the above case considered the operation of the s.164 (3)(e) assumptions and 
held that the lender could not rely on s.164 (3) (e) of the Corporation Law. This 
assumption of valid sealing incorporated the apparent authority assumptions contained in 
s.164 (3) (b) and (c). The common law principles of agency were applicable in 
determining whether there had been a holding out by the company. 
On the basis of Crab-Tree Vickers Pty Ltd v Australian Direct Mail Advertising and 
Addressing Co Pty Ltd,41 only a person with actual authority of the company could hold 
out others as a director or secretary. Kirby P in the Bank of New Zealand case held that 
the director had no authority to hold out for the company that his son was the company's 
secretary. A single director does not usually have the customary authority to hold out that 
a person is vested with authority to bind the company. 
The company's solicitor also did not usually have this power. This conclusion is 
interesting because it is common for banks to seek statements from company solicitors 
regarding the authority of company officers. 
ln ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Australian Glass and Mirrors Pty ur«, Kaye J held that 
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s.164 (3) (e) entitled an outsider to assume that the affixing of the company seal by 
persons who had not been appointed as directors and secretary of a company had been 
validly affixed. This was because the company had held out that the persons concerned 
were officers of the company under s.164 (3) (c) and were authorised to affix the 
common seal. This holding out occurred with the lodgement of a return of a list of 
persons who consented to be directors. There had also been previous dealings which 
created this impression. 
The statutory assumption of valid sealing clarifies the uncertainties of the Rule in 
Turquand's case apparent from the judgements in the Northside case. The validity of the 
affixing of the seal depends upon the authority of the company's officers as is the case 
with any other contract. This approach rebuts the suggestion of Mason CJ43 in the 
Northside case that contracts under seal are different to other contracts because such 
contracts are acts of the company itself and the organic theory of company law is 
applicable rather than agency law. It is in accordance with the view of Brennan J in the 
Northside case who thought that there was no special significance in the fact that the 
company seal was affixed to a contract. The validity of the contract depended on the 
application of agency rules.44 
5.2.7 Assumption of Proper Performance of Duties - S.164 (3) (f) Of The Law 
Under the assumption contained in s.164 (3) (f) of the Law, a person dealing with a 
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company is entitled to assume that the directors, the principal executive officer, the 
secretaries, employees and agents of the company properly perform their duties to the 
company. 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, this statutory presumption of regularity 
restates the common law principle enunciated in Richard Brady Franks Ltd v Price" This 
case involved an issue of debentures to persons including directors of the company. The 
validity of the debentures was challenged on the grounds that the issue was not authorised 
by a quorum of directors who were entitled to vote. The holders of the debentures were 
protected from the assertion by the company that the persons purporting to act for it 
lacked authority. Dixon J stated this rule. 
"Under the general law of agency it is a breach of duty for an agent to 
exercise his authority for the purpose of conferring a benefit on himself or 
upon some other person to the detriment of his principal. But, at the same 
time, if his act is otherwise within the scope of his authority it binds the 
principal in favour of third parties who deal with him bona fide and without 
notice of his fraud ... The rule, no doubt, is the same with respect to the acts 
of directors. It follows that a transaction carried out by directors for their 
own or some other person's benefit and not to further any purpose of the 
company is voidable but not void." 
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by other means. This approach appears consistent with the other assumptions of s.164 (3) 
of the Corporation Law as it represents a part of the Rule in Turquand 's case, enabling a 
presumption of regularity in the internal workings of the company. 
The adoption of this broad meaning of "duties" enables an outsider to seek the protection 
of the assumption in s.164 (3) (f) where the company's officers or agents act beyond the 
authority conferred on them by the company. The outsider will only be precluded from 
relying on this assumption if he possess the knowledge referred to in the s.164 ( 4) 
limitations. 
5.3 The Limitations to the Statutory Assumptions 
The assumptions set out in s.164 (3) of the Corporation Law are subject to two limitations 
contained in s.164 (4) of the Law. These limitations prevent a person dealing with a 
company from making the statutory assumptions where the person has actual knowledge 
that the assumption is not correct or the person's connection or relationship with the 
company is such that the person ought to know that the assumption is not correct. 
The Explanatory Memorandum, in introducing s.164(4) of the Corporation Law stated 
that the purpose of these limitations was "to make it clear that the protection afforded by 
the 'indoor management rule' is only available to 'innocent' parties" 
Th two limitations contained in s.164 ( 4) differentiate between situations where the 
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person dealing with the company has no "connection or relationship" with the company 
and where there is such a connection or relationship. In the latter case, the protective 
assumptions are lost where the person dealing with the company ought to know of 
circumstances that would indicate that the assumptions are incorrect. 
The operation of these limitations to some extent serves the same purpose as the common 
law exceptions to the Rule in Turquand's case, because they prevent a person dealing 
with a company from assuming that the indoor management of a company is regular. 
They play a crucial role in determining the balance of interests between commercial 
convenience on the one hand and discouragement of fraud and unauthorised acts by 
officers and agents on the other. Of particular importance here is the extent to which the 
statutory limitations in s.164 (4) differ from the common law exception to the Rule in 
Turquand's case where the outsider has knowledge or put upon inquiry. 
5.3.1 The "Actual Knowledge" Limitations 
A strict reading ofs.164 (4) (a) ofthe Corporation Law would indicate that this limitation 
is significantly narrower than the common law exception which puts outsiders on inquiry. 
The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria agreed to this interpretation in the Brick 
and Pipe case by stating: 
"The expression 'actual knowledge' means, what we think it says. It does not lend 
its 1 f to definition or elaboration. "49 
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However the Full Court of the Supreme Court implicitly recognised circumstances like in 
the fact situation which occurred in Northside case. In applying the common law rules . , 
all members of the High Court held that in the circumstances, the lending bank was put 
on inquiry and therefore could not rely on the protection of the Rule in Turquand 's case 
because it had not made further inquiry when its suspicions of irregularity should have 
been aroused. Under the statutory provisions, a strict interpretation of "actual knowledge" 
in s.164 (4) (a) of the Corporation Law would have resulted in the bank being able to 
assert the protective assumptions in s.164 (3). This is because despite the existence of 
suspicious circumstances, the bank did not actually know that the company seal had been 
affixed by a person unauthorised to do so. 
To give protection to an outsider in these circumstances may encourage the outsider to 
refrain from making reasonable inquiries in the fear that such inquiries may lead to the 
acquisition of knowledge which would result in the loss of the protective assumptions. 
This would encourage outsiders such as lenders to don blinkers and perhaps unwittingly 
assist company officers to breach their duties or act without authority to the detriment of 
the company and its innocent shareholders or creditors. Mason CJ in the Northside case 
commented that to put a lender on inquiry in the circumstances of the case was to strike a 
fair balance between promoting business convenience and discouraging fraud and 
dishonesty. It would compel lending institutions to act prudently and thereby enhance the 
integrity of commercial transactions and morality . so 
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Perhaps in recognition of these policy considerations, the Full Court of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria in the Brick and Pipe case retracted form a strict interpretation of 
"actual knowledge" when it added: 
"What amounts to 'actual knowledge' is largely dependent on the facts and 
circumstances in a particular case and the inference they allow''.51 
The court was prepared to impute to the lender, the actual knowledge of its solicitor. It 
was not necessary to establish the actual knowledge of the lender itself This means that 
the knowledge of an agent may be imputed as "actual knowledge" of a principal. 
It is inconsistent to state that the term must be given its apparent meaning without 
elaboration and then to suggest that inferences may be drawn from what seems to be a 
deficiency in the drafting of s.164 ( 4) (a) of the Corporation Law. The Explanatory 
Memorandum to the 1983 Amendments indicated that s.164 was aimed at protecting 
outsiders who acted "in good faith" or were "innocent". In this regard the statutory 
provisions were intended to adopt the policy behind the common law Rule in Turquand's 
case and its exceptions. Gummow J in Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Minister 
for Transport andCommunications52 thought that s. 164 of the Corporation Law was not 
so much a "comprehensive code" as a provision designed to repair the failings of the 
common law. 
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It is difficult to argue that the inquiry exception to the Rule in Turquand 's case is such a 
failure. The High Court in the Northside case strongly indicated that the common law 
inquiry exception was crucial in achieving the purpose of the Rule. 
The strict wording of s.164 (4) (a) of the Corporation Law, which revolves around the 
term "actual knowledge", does not adequately incorporate the policy behind the common 
law principles. This has resulted in the courts showing some willingness to adopt a liberal 
interpretation of this term in order to arrive at a result which accords with the common 
law. This may mean the possible retention of the inquiry exception to the Rule in 
Turquand's case or something similar to it, despite its apparent removal in s.164 (4) (a) 
of the Corporation Law. 
In considering whether an outsider should have the protection contained in the s.164 (3) 
assumptions, it seems that the good faith and probity of the outsider must be relevant so 
as to allow a consideration of their factors. This could be achieved by extending the 
operation of s.164 ( 4) (a) of the Corporation Law to include a situation where the outsider 
ought to know that a protective assumption is not correct. The limitation would then be 
attracted where the outsider is put on inquiry but fails to do so in circumstances such as 
arose in the Northside case. The implementation of this proposal would clarify the 
operation of the s.164 ( 4) (a) limitation in accordance with the policy of the section an 
obviate the need for judicial ingenuity by giving a strained interpretation to the words 
"actual knowledge". It is presently uncertain as to when inferences arise which would 
enable a court to de m an outsider as possessing actual knowledge when this cannot be 
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strictly shown. 53 
This extension of the limitation in s.164 (4) (a) of the Corporation Law to incorporate the 
inquiry exception would be consistent with equitable principles in relation to constructive 
trusts. A company may recover compensation from a third party who has assisted the 
company's officers in a dishonest transaction with knowledge of their breach of duty. 54 
The meaning of "knowledge" in these constructive trust cases has been broadly 
interpreted so as to include knowledge that would have been gained by a reasonable 
person put on inquiry due to the circumstances. The law of constructive trusts applies to 
directors who act in breach of duty as well as trustees. Therefore under equitable 
principles, a company may seek a remedy for the recovery of property from a third party 
who made a "calculated abstention from inquiry. -ss 
If the equitable rule gives a company greater scope to bring an action against an outsider 
to seek remedies to avoid the contract or recover property, a plaintiff company would be 
well-advised to rely, if possible, on the equitable rules which give a broad meaning to 
"knowledge". However this would require the company to firstly establish a breach of 
fiduciary duty by an officer. Section 164 of the Corporation Law does not require this. 
The extent to which "actual knowledge" may be inferred also causes significant 
'J Lipton P "lloldmg out that a person i an Officer of the Company." (1991) 9 C&SLJ 404. 
Consu! 1)11iit•lopmenu Ptv JJd v /)/'(' fatat s Pty /Jcl (1975) 132 CLR 71, Bad11,, Devau» and J, cut; v Societe 
(il'lwml 11910 J llCLC 325, Ninetv Fw Pty / sd v Banqu Nanoaal d Paris l 1988] WAR l 2 
·~ ·1· ·" 11 t I'"· 1t'l"(l991)9C'11..,"I' 7 1 Lipton JI "'(11 I{ ul 111 mq1uu1u ell • : 11. or • . ,,.,,, rJ 
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uncertainty. For example it is difficult to determine whether actual knowledge exists in 
circumstances where the outsider is aware of various facts but may not have understood 
that these have a combined significance which if understood would have resulted in the 
acquisition of further actual knowledge. The circumstances where knowledge will be 
deemed under equitable principles of constructive trusts are quite clearly defined. These 
principles have evolved over a long period and it is difficult to determine the extent to 
which they may be incorporated into s.164 (4) (a) of the Corporation Law. 
5.3.2. Where there is A Connection or Relationship with the Company 
Section 164 (4) (b) of the Corporation Law provides for a second limitation which 
prevents a persori dealing with a company from being entitled to make as assumption 
under s.164 (3). These assumptions cannot be made where the person's connection or 
relationship with the company is such that the person ought to know that the assumption 
ianot correct. 
This limitation appears to adopt something similar to the common law inquiry exception 
to the Rule in Turquand's case in situations where the person dealing with the company 
has a "connection or relationship" with the company. This limb of s.164 (4) of the 
Corporation Law may strengthen the argument that the first limb should be given a 
narrow reading in the interpretation of"actual knowledge". 
'I he purpose behind the second limb of s.164 (4) of the Corporation Law appears to be 
the adoption of the common law principle that director and other "insiders" of a 
1 4 
company generally cannot gain the protection of the Rule in Turquand's case.56 This 
exception was restricted so as not to operate against a director who did not act as such in 
the particular transaction. 57 Section 164 ( 4) (b) of the Corporation Law does not refer to 
this distinction. Its terms are satisfied if there is a connection or relationship with the 
company, irrespective of whether the person acted for the company in the particular 
transaction. 
The meaning of "connection or relationship" is therefore important to determine because 
only where this exists does the Corporation Law incorporate something similar to the 
common law inquiry exception to indoor management rule. 
On this interpretation it would appear that s.164 ( 4) (b) of the Corporation Law has a 
narrow application so that it only applies to a no~-~'s length connection or relationship 
where the person dealing with the company is an "insider". The Explanatory 
Memorandum states the purpose of the provisions as being to protect persons who are 
"innocent" and act in good faith. The existence of a connection or relationship which 
results in a non-arm's length dealing would strike at the innocence and good faith of the 
person dealing with the company. 
This narrow interpretation of "connection or relationship" was adopted in Lyford v Media 
Morns v Konssen 11946 I AC S49. 
"JI l lel» f !11tchm.wn v /Jmvhrml [l 968) I QB 549. 
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Portfolio Ltd 58 Media borrowed money from Broadlands and secured the loan by 
conferring a charge which was executed under the common seal of Media. The common 
seal was affixed and signed by a director who acted without authority. The articles of 
Media provided that the common seal could only be affixed with the authority of a 
resolution of the board. Such a resolution was not passed. Broadlands sought to enforce 
the charge and relied on the assumption of due sealing under s.164 (3) (e). Media argued 
that Broadlands was prevented form relying on this assumption because Broadlands and 
one of its directors had a relationship with the director of Media such that Broadlands 
ought to have known that the director of Media was acting without authority. This 
argument asserted that s.164 (4) (b) operated so as to prevent Broadlands form making 
the s.164 (3) ( e) assumption. Nicholson J rejected this argument and gave s.164 ( 4) (b) of 
the Law a narrow operation. He held that it that it referred to knowledge that a person 
ought to have by reason of a connection or relationship with the company and not to 
knowledge which the person ought to have because of the circumstances of the 
transaction itself 
Obviously, a person who is a director, principal executive officer or secretary would have 
a connection or relationship with the company such that the person would be deemed to 
have knowledge of irregularities in the company's internal affairs. To allow an officer of 
the company the protection of the statutory indoor management rule would be "to 
encourage ignorance and condone dereliction of duty. "'9 Such encouragement may aris 
(1989) 7 AC'LC 271 
9 Morns v Kan n•n 1194(1 I AC 1l p 47<>. 
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where a director gained protection so as to enforce a transaction which was not beneficial 
to the company and also where directors are unaware of the articles of their company and 
whether the internal proceedings are properly carried out. 
A non-arm's length relationship may also occur where the person dealing with the 
company is an employee or solicitor of the company or perhaps a major shareholder. A 
person may also be regarded as having a connection or relationship with the company for 
the purposes of the narrow view of s.164 (4) (b) of the Corporation Law where that 
person in involved in the operation of a group of companies of which the company with 
which he or she is dealing is a member. 60 
According to Lyford v Media Portfolio Ltd,61 in order for the limitation contained in s.164 
(4)(b) of the Corporation Law to apply, it is necessary to refer to all the circumstances 
which show the nature of the connection or relationship. It may then be assessed whether 
that connection or relationship was such that the person ought to have known that the 
assumption was incorrect. 
Nicholson J did not extend "connection or relationship" to include an arm's length 
business relationship with past dealings. On the contrary, he considered that the past 
dealings indicated that the director of the charger had the authority of the company to 
affix the common seal. This was because the lender knew the director was in day-to-day 
so 111'1/ U .wrun., J lo/tlurg' /l/y I td v ( 'ommissian tr for AO' Rev nu Coll1•cticNu ( 1990) 93 !\LR 3 4 l p 36 
ll1 l111J 
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control of the management and finances of the company, the company's office was the 
director's office and earlier borrowings in the name of the company had been concluded 
by the director. 
The view of Nicholson J that the statutory provisions did not include the common law 
inquiry exception was supported by Studdert J in Advance Bank Australia Ltd v 
Fleetwood Star Pty Ltc/'2 and the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Brick 
and Pipe Industries Ltd v Occidental Life Nominees Pty Ltd 63 
The narrow interpretation outlined above has the effect of giving an outsider greater 
scope under the statutory rules of enforce a contract despite refusing to make inquiries 
about an apparent irregularity, than was the position previously at common law. This is 
because the inquiry exception as applied in the Northside case only operates where the 
person dealing with the company has a legal or non-arm's length connection or 
relationship with company. 
Recent cases in Australia have indicated a greater willingness by the courts to give the 
s.164 (4) (b) limitation a broader operation. A wider interpretation of "connection or 
relationship" was first suggested by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Storey v 
Advance Bank Aust. Ltd. 64 Gleeson CJ indicated that it could arise out of "the very 
dealing which is putatively affected by the irregularity". 
B2 ( 199 ) 10A('L701 nt P 712 'lhi. c . went on appeal u Su» y 11 Advanc Hank Au.ft. fol (199 ) 11 A J, 24. 
( 1992) 10 ACL 2 3 at p 2<>2. 
IM ( )! I) 3) 11 A 'LC (! " Ill p <i 19 
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The ambit of s.164 ( 4) (b) of the Corporation Law was considerably expanded in Bank of 
New Zealand v Fiberi Pty Ltd.65 Priestley JA held that the connection or relationship 
between the bank and the company was such that the bank ought to have known that the 
persons who executed the guarantees did not have authority and therefore the bank could 
not rely on the protective assumptions. 
Priestley JA focused on the meaning of the words "ought to know". He considered that 
these words required a judge, 
"to look at the person in question, consider the full factual circumstances of that 
person's connection or relationship with the company in regard to the particular 
matter in question and then decide whether in those circumstances that person acting 
reasonably would know the true position about the matter assumed.v'" 
It would appear that an important consideration is if the outsider is a bank or other 
financial institution. In such cases, the outsider should have knowledge of the capital and 
shareholder structures of the company and the nature of lending transactions encourages 
prudent assessment of the circumstances. This is particularly the case where there is 
something unusual about those circumstances. 
This formulation is similar to the common law inquiry exception even though Priestley 
JA considered that the concepts were different. The inquiry exception refers to the 
" ( 1994) AC'U' 48. 
'" ( 19'M) 12 AC'L '4~ nt p ' 
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existence of circumstances which require further inquiry. The "ought to know" concept 
requires consideration of what a person acting reasonable would have known in the 
circumstances. 
On the facts of the Fiberi case, Priestley JA concluded that a reasonably competent and 
prudent bank official in the factual matrix in which the Bank's official was placed, would 
have seen to it that further information about the company officer's authority would have 
been obtained. "The obtaining of the information should have been a matter of no 
difficulty. Should there have been any difficulty, then the need for obtaining the 
information would become only more obvious. 67 Kirby P in the Fiberi case adopted a 
different approach to the interpretation of s.164 ( 4) (b) of the Corporation Law but came 
to the same conclusion as the majority judges. He also rejected the restrictive approach 
adopted in Lyford's case and stated that theconnection or relationship did not have to be 
a "legal" one, nor did it refer only to a pre-existing or ongoing relationship. 
Kirby P applied the underlying principles of the Rule in Turquand's case as expressed by 
the High Court in the Northside case and on the facts considered that the circumstances . 
of the Fiberi case were stronger than those present in the Northside case so as to put the 
lender on inquiry. The facts which activated the requirement of inquiry included the 
following: 
a) The transactions were for purpose apparently unrelated to the company's bu ines and 
1 (I !Jll·l) I /\Cl C 411111 P 'I, 
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no apparent benefit was gained by it. 
b) The outsider dealt with an ordinary director who purported to act for the company. 
The need for inquiry is stronger than would be the case if the dealings were with a 
managing director. 
c) The property of the company which was dealt with was a residence and not acquired 
for commercial use. The property was used for the commercial purposes of other 
compames. 
d) One of the persons who purported to act as an officer had not been named in the 
company returns lodged with the Commission. 
It would seem that the approaches of both Priestley JA and Kirby P caused a sensible 
result to be reached in the Fiberi case which was accordance with the purpose of the 
legislation. However this has required a departure from a plain reading of the legislation. 
In particular, they do not address why s.164 ( 4) (a) of the Corporation Law precludes a 
person from making the protective assumptions only if that person has actual knowledge 
that an assumption is incorrect. The outsider is expressly required to make inquiry only 
where a connection or relationship with the company exists. According to the reasoning 
of the Court in the Fiberi case, a connection or relationship will generally arise where the 
circumstances of a transaction ought to lead to inquiries. ln a circular way, this then 
triggers the "ou ht to know" exception in s.164 (4) (b) the Corporation Law. 
The Fibert case would appear to largely incorporate the inquiry exception to th indoor 
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management rule into the legislation by giving a wide reading to s.164 ( 4) (b) of the 
Corporation Law. On the other hand, the "actual knowledge" exception in s.164 (4) (a) of 
the Corporation Law would be correspondingly restricted because in many cases there 
will be a connection or relationship so that the inquiry exception will apply. It is the 
overall conduct of the outsider which should be considered, not primarily whether the 
outsider has a connection or relationship with the company in a narrow sense. 
A person dealing with a company should lose the entitlement to rely on the protective 
assumptions where the person knows or ought to know that the assumption is incorrect. 
Any connection or relationship between the person and the· company would be a relevant 
fact in determining what the person ought to know rather than the primary requirement 
which must be shown before the inquiry exception is activated. The crucial consideration 
is whether the outsider has acted innocently or bona fide so as to warrant reliance on the 
statutory assumptions. 
5.4. Forgery 
Section 166 of the Corporation Law provides that the s.164 (3) assumptions may be made 
in relation to dealings with a company even if a person referred to in s.164 (3) (b), (c) or 
(e) or an officer, agent or employee referred to in (d) or (f) acts fraudulently in relation to 
the dealings or has forged a document that appears to have been sealed on behalf of the 
company. The outsider loses this entitlement to make the assumptions where that person 
has actual knowledge that the officer, agent or employee of the company or the person 
held out as such acted fraudulently or forged a document 
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The purpose of s.166 of the Corporation Law was stated in the Explanatory 
Memorandum as being to restate the common law rule in the Northside case68 that a 
company will not escape liability for the acts of its officers, agents or employees merely 
because they have acted fraudulently, if the company would otherwise have been made 
liable by the fraudulent act. It also over-rules the interpretation placed on Ruben v Great 
FingallConsolidated'" that a forgery is a nullity and therefore comprises an exception to 
the Rule in Turquand 's case. 
Section 166 of the Corporation Law does not explain whether a fraudulent act for a 
forged document includes an unauthorised affixing of the company seal of whether it is 
restricted to the affixing of a seal or signatures which are not genuine. It probably refers 
only to a fake seal or signatures because unauthorised affixation of a genuine seal would 
be covered by s.164 (3) (a) and (e) in any case. Kirby Pin the Fiberi case concluded that 
there was an overlap between s.164 (3) (a) and (e) and that paragraph (a) could be 
applicable to cases involving the use of the company seal. 
He suggested that paragraph (a) did not operate where "the sealing" was carried out with 
a fake seal. This restriction on the operation of s.164 (3) (a) was evident because the 
references to the seal.70 Where a seal which was not genuine was used, the outsider was 
still protected by s.164 (3) (e) of the Corporation Law. This is made clear by virtue of 
611 ( 1990) 8 ACL(' (i I l ul p '117 per Mason ('J 
9 
[ l 90<>1 /\C ·I W 
io ( 11 tJ.1) 12 AC'l.C' 48 nl p 8, 
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s.166 of the Corporation Law. 
Kirby P found support for this approach in the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying 
the 1983 Amendments which stated that, 
"the purpose of the assumption in s.164 (3) (e) is to make it clear that a company will 
not be able to escape liability for fraudulently sealed documents." 
This broad interpretation of s.164 (3) (e) would have enabled the lender in Fiberi to rely 
on this assumption despite the existence of forgery, but for the operation of the 
limitations contained in s.164 ( 4) of the Corporation Law. 
Mason CJ in the Northside case expressed doubt that forgery was a true exception to the 
Rule in Turquand's case but thought that in any case it had a limited operation.71 Section 
166 of the Corporation Law clearly provides that forgery and fraud do not take away the 
entitlement of an outsider to rely on the protective assumptions unless the outsider has 
actual knowledge of the forgery or fraud. 
71 ( tlJlJO) !! ACLC 1111ntp1117. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
Therefore it may be concluded that though s.164(3) of the Corporation Law sought to 
codify and clarify the rule in Turquand's case, it is not a "comprehensive code" but a 
provision designed to repair the failings of the common law. 
It has also to be highlighted that s.164(3) of the Corporation Law does not override the 
principles and policies of the common law unless this has been expressly stipulated by 
the legislation. 
Further, it was not a universal and unconditional objective of the legislation to protect 
persons dealing with a company at the expense of all other competing considerations. The 
purpose is to protect persons who deal in good faith and innocently. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
A company operates through its two vital and constituent parts or organs: the board of 
directors and the general meeting of members. Wide powers of management are 
conferred on the board of directors. This is typical of most companies. Accordingly, 
when the board exercises those powers, its acts are regarded as the acts of the company. 
In other instances, the acts of the members in general meeting are considered as the acts 
of the company. Sometimes the board of directors delegate some of their powers to 
particular individuals, such as the managing director or the principal executive officer. 
The acts or state of mind of these individuals may be attributed to the company. 
In practice, outsiders rarely deal with the board of directors or the members in general 
meeting. More often, its relationship with the company involves dealing with its agents or 
employees. Companies are capable of being bound by the acts of its agents in the same 
way as natural persons: s.35( 4) of the Act. This involves the application of the principles 
of agency law, in particular the question whether those who purport to act on the 
company's behalf have the authority to do so. It can be seen that agency law has several 
distinct features in its application to companies. 
The ultra vires doctrine was once a serious obstacle for those contracting with a 
company As was indicated in this dissertation, ingenous drafting of the objects claus by 
clever dr aflsmcn and legislative intervention by progrc minded legislatures have 
reduced the cffcctivcncs. of the once dr adcd ultra vires trap. 
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England, the original source of the Company Law of the Commonwealth has gone to 
almost the extent of granting full capacity to companies albeit with much caution and 
many safeguards. Australia has taken a bolder step and has given full legal capacity to 
companies. Both the English and Australian legislatures have recognised that some parts 
of the old doctrine are beneficial and must remain and therefore have preserved it in 
statutory provisions. In both countries the doctrine may sometimes (but rarely) rise from 
its grave and threaten both the outsider and the company. 
In England, directors are under a duty to the company and its members to adhere to a 
company's objects clause. Again in England, a member could restrain a proposed ultra 
vires transaction provided that no legal obligation has arisen between the company and a 
third party. Australia has provisions in its Corporations Law which achieve similar 
results where the company chooses to state. its objects clause in its memorandum of 
association. Both legislatures have abolished its constructive notice doctrine. 
Malaysia has continued to pin its faith in its s.20 (1) of the Companies Act 1965. Section 
20(1) abolishes the application of the doctrine between a company and a third party. An 
unusual feature of the Malaysian provision a member or a holder of a debenture secured 
by a floating charge can restrain performance of an ultra vires act even though a binding 
agreement has arisen between the company and a third party, as long as the transaction 
remains executory and remains to be performed. The power of members and debenture 
holders under a floating charge to restrain a legally binding agreement is a peculiarity of 
the Malaysian ompanic Act. Although the third party may receive compen ati n by 
virtue of ?O( ), the comp n ation is limited. A pertinent question i. whcth r Malay i' 
. hould adopt th En lish and Au trnli in refonns. 
An important point to note about the Malaysian statutory provisions on ultra vires is the 
absence of a clear and express provision abolishing the Common law doctrine of 
constructive notice. Thus technically it is possible for the courts to nullify the effect of 
s.20 (1) by ruling that the Common law doctrine still applies in Malaysia. The application 
of the Common law doctrine will make s.20 (1) a dead letter. Such a ruling is extremely 
remote bearing in mind the legislative intent behind s.20 (1). However, a clear statutory 
provision clarifying the position would be useful. In this context, the Australian statutory 
reform may be a useful provision to adopt. Again, where ultra vires can rear its offensive 
head, it must continually be borne in mind that its deals with the capacity of the company 
and is not ratifiable by using the agency principles. 
Even where s.20 of the Act prevents a company from defeating a transaction by pleading 
ultra vires it can do so by asserting a breach of authority of its agents and which breach 
was known to the other party to the transaction. 
With regards the actual authority of an agent, it is a relationship between the principal 
and the agent; the rest of the world is a stranger to this relationship. The third party 
dealing with the agent of a company does not know what the agent's actual authority is, 
nor in most cases can he find out. Sometimes the authority of agent to do certain acts 
depends on compliance with certain formalities or there is some irregularity in the 
management which vitiates the authority conferred upon the agent. A party outside the 
company has no way of determining whether the company's internal regulations hav 
been complied with. 
I low iver, th law do s not require an outsid party to do s . If an a ent ha. , n appar nt 
uurhority to do 111 act 1 p 1 on d ilin with the ompany i entitl d t< ·sum tluu 11 
matters of internal management and procedure prescribed by the articles of association 
have been complied with. This is known as the "rule in Turquand's case" or the "indoor 
management rule" . 
History has shown that, despite its noble intention to protect outsiders dealing with a 
company, the Rule became increasingly obscure and uncertain with the passing years. 
The Rule was subject to irreconcilable decisions and unacceptable distinctions for 
modern company law 
As a consequence, in Australia, the common law principles discussed above have been 
now been replaced by statutory provisions, in particular s.164(3) of the Corporation Law. 
It has also to be highlighted that s.164(3) of the Corporation Law does not override the 
principles and policies of the common law unless this has been expressly stipulated by 
the legislation. 
Further, it was not a universal and unconditional objective of the legislation to protect 
persons dealing with a company at the expense of all other competing considerations. The 
purpose is to protect persons who deal in good faith and innocently. 
One conclusion seems to be inevitable. Although s.164(3) of the Corporation Law sought 
to codify and clarify the rule in Turquand's case, it is not a "comprehensive code" but a 
provision designed to repair the failings of the common law. 
Early indications are that the section will be subject to minute scrutiny by the judiciary 
and be subject to numerous decisions. One fear may be that whether the imposition of the 
interpr tation upon int rpretation may lead to the uncertaintie which the exception to the 
Turquand 's rule itself arc subject to Th judicial d velopmcnt of . l 4( ) of th 
( orporntion Law will be an interesting topic for th future. 
I >'> 
In Malaysia the Rule in Turquand 's case reigns supreme together with its obscurities and 
inadequacies. Whether the Malaysian legislatures may be prompted or be tempted to 
venture into a statutory reform like in Australia or as in England remains to be seen. For 
the time being in Malaysia the subject of this dissertation continues to be regulated by 
common law, which to an Australian or English observer, may look a little out of date. 
Finally, it may be stated that while reform is welcome and necessary, a bland automatic 
adoption of foreign legislation may not be to Malaysia's advantage. Care must be taken 
to ensure that we do not import foreign legislation with all their deficiencies. 
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